When the grass grew under their feet

The fire at the Bharatpur ammunition depot is likely to affect military preparedness.

It may also retard the Army's post-Kargil modernisation drive, reports ATUL ANEJA.

DESPITE THE Government's effort to underplay the impact of the fire, the destruction of 10,000 tonnes of explosives at the Bharatpur ammunition depot is likely to affect military preparedness. It may also retard the Army's post-Kargil modernisation drive.

The Bharatpur depot fed the Army's key Southern and Central Commands. These Commands are central to the Army's mechanised columns undertaking offensive and defensive missions. The depot stores the ammunition for the tanks and armoured troop carriers and long-range artillery.

Besides, missiles for the mobile air defence elements are also stored there, as is ammunition for the Bofors howitzers. Multi- barrel rocket launchers and their shells, used to ``soften'' the ground to facilitate an armoured column's advance, were also destroyed in considerable numbers in the fire.

The Army's existing operational doctrine focusses on offensive missions across the desert towards the Rahimyar Khan area in Pakistan. The key objective of these armoured thrusts is either to cut Pakistan's main communication arteries or to engage and destroy its armoured reserves - the backbone of its national defence. According to the existing doctrine, the Army also maintains mechanised defensive corps for ``holding operations''. Indian military planners anticipate that offensive missions by armoured columns will encounter subsequent retaliation. Usually, the enemy will carry out a riposte - a counterattack at a point where it feels it holds a tactical advantage. The Indian army, therefore, has created special armoured units to contain such a counterstrike.

Preliminary reports indicate that considerable quantities of ammunition earmarked for offensive missions has either been saved or can be made up quickly, probably within a month or so. But large quantities of ammunition meant for conducting holding operations by the mechanised columns have been destroyed. Making up that loss is likely to be time-consuming. Since the offensive and defensive roles of armour are inter-linked, the overall strike capacity of India's mechanised forces has, therefore, been degraded at least for some time.

India's capacity to recoup will depend on yet another factor. The mix of the import and indigenous content of the ammunition destroyed will determine the time-frame within which the loss can be made up. Part of the ammunition such as small arms rounds and low-caliber field guns can be made up from indigenous sources. This, however, depends on the ``surge capacity'' or the overall capability of ordnance factories to step up production. Ordnance factories normally have an in-built surplus capacity which may become necessary to meet the sudden extra demand during a war.

Replacement of low-tech explosives is also possible by shifting some stocks from other ammunition depots, which might have a surplus. Replenishment of imported ammunition, however, is more difficult. For instance, ammunition for the multi-barrel rocket launchers and shells for the Bofors guns will have to be imported.

The fire will have a snowballing effect on modernisation. While the Defence Minister has put a price tag of Rs. 360 crores on the ammunition lost, insiders say that the figure is much higher. Sources say the destruction can trigger a reworking of the existing defence budget for all the three services. This, in turn, could retard the pace of modernisation, unless the Government decides to underwrite the loss by releasing additional funds.

Preliminary investigations show that sabotage was unlikely. Accidental lighting of the dry grass around the depot could have been the cause for the blaze which was then fanned by strong winds and spread to the area where the ammunition was stored in open plinths.

There are several lessons to be learnt from the incident. The service regulation which allows grass to be grown in ammunition depots needs to be amended. Despite the awareness of a possible fire hazard, grass is grown as camouflage in case of an enemy air raid during a war. Analysts argue that the regulation is outdated and needs to be immediately reversed. With better technical and human means of intelligence-gathering, it is now easier to predict air raids than in the past, they say.

While a lot of money is being spent on modernisation of equipment and training of manpower, spending for modernising ammunition depots is highly limited. Insiders point out that a large number of Indian ammunition depots are also overloaded.

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