A new charter of renewal

THE POLITICAL AIM of a stylised new `Declaration on Strategic Partnership between India and Russia' is to infuse a sense of purpose into their bilateral engagement, which has been adrift, and, above all, to try and build a multipolar global order. In a sense, the India-Russia Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in January 1993 began a process of redefining the ties which had acquired the overtones of a virtual defence arrangement in August 1971. It was then that India and the Soviet Union had for the first time entered into an extensive accord, whose centrepiece was the provision for mutual ``consultations'' aimed at taking concerted action to meet the military challenges or threats to either side. The new document - signed in New Delhi on Tuesday by the visiting Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Putin, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee - diversifies the redefinition process that was set in motion in 1993. However, the real motive force at work now is their ``conviction'' favouring the diplomatic imperative of a new ``multipolar global structure'' of states. India and Russia have however made clear that they are not seeking to weave a military-political alliance and that their new partnership is ``not directed against any other state or group of states''. The clarification reflects the paradigm shift on the New Delhi-Moscow front since 1971 when the dominant perception was that the Soviet Union would help deter China and Pakistan from resorting to military adventurism against India. It also takes into account the changed and friendlier relationship of both countries with the United States.

Now, there is no inherent incompatibility between the India-U.S. `Vision Statement' of March 2000 and the present deed of an Indo- Russian `Strategic Partnership'. But the idea of multipolarity could be decoded as implying opposition to the present-day dominance of the U.S. as the sole superpower in strategic, military and economic spheres. Mr. Putin has recently made common cause with the Chinese leadership by advocating multipolarity as the sine qua non for an unborn new world order in the context of their objections to the U.S.'s plans for a space-oriented national missile defence system. If India, therefore, has chosen to cast its lot with an expanding but amorphous league of countries not happy with the present international system, it does not necessarily mean that New Delhi has suddenly begun to see the ghost of pax Americana in every shadow. The recent and definitive entente with the U.S. has already widened New Delhi's diplomatic options which evidently reflect in the desire to sustain the historic warmth with Moscow.

For India and Russia, the sweeping array of potential political opportunities is matched by the avenues for possible economic linkages including the nuclear energy facet and, more significantly, by the signs of a new quantum leap in defence ties. Russia is obviously looking for a commercial bonanza in the defence sector, despite its nuanced differences with India on nuclear non-proliferation issues, which have now been brought under the rubric of a bilateral political dialogue on a future international system. A more immediate `strategic' gain for India, therefore, is the accomplished groundwork for the possible constitution of a joint working group on Afghanistan. The related aspect of international terrorism with direct consequences to India can also be suitably addressed, and there is a case for widening this potential forum to include the U.S. In a narrow spectrum, the Vajpayee administration may feel glad that Mr. Putin has not only acknowledged India's credentials for a bigger role at the U.N. but also discounted the fears that he might play a so-called Pakistan card. But India's diplomacy can be only as good as its strategic thinking which should not be impaired by the gravitational pull of the Pakistan factor.

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