The tragedy of track-II

By K. K. Katyal

FOR YEARS when India and Pakistan did not make any headway at the government level in their efforts at normalising bilateral relations, initiatives by well-meaning non-officials - track-II diplomacy - provided a ray of hope. This optimism, guarded as it had to be, was not misplaced. The interaction by groups, comprising former bureaucrats and top brass of the armed forces, who held key positions in the past, leading figures from think- tanks, media and academia, seemed to not only supplement the official bid but also fill the gaps left by it. Those involved in the exercise had the requisite expertise and in-depth knowledge of the issues and could formulate positions and articulate their views with precision but without committing their Governments. Smooth personal equations, established in the process, facilitated mutual communication. And the two sides could convey harsh, unpalatable points without causing offence. At times, they appreciated each other's compulsions and appeared to muster the will to find a way out or evolve a common position. The issues covered by them could not have been more sensitive - Kashmir, armament, with the subsequent addition of the nuclear dimension, mutual threat perceptions, impediments to cooperation in different fields, economic subjects and trade, and activities of jehadi forces.

Regrettably, this process is running into a dead-end. That, in any case, is the message from Islamabad - after the recent meeting of the Neemrana group. It got this name from the tourist resort in Rajasthan, venue of the first meeting ten years ago. The discussions had since advanced gradually, producing an understanding bit by bit - of course, while encountering serious obstacles. However, now after the 20th session they were back at the stage they had reached after the third or fourth sitting. If this trend continues, the track-II process will be drowned in a sea of desperation, as it were. That tragedy needs to be averted.

There is a strong case for official India sustaining the moves that began with the Ramzan ceasefire - undeterred by the voices on the other side, calling it a fraud. This means another extension, after February 25, will be desirable. The Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, favours reactivation of the SAARC summit process. If early steps are taken and the summit is held in Kathmandu - Nepal is to be the next chairman - Mr. Vajpayee and the Pakistan Chief Executive, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, could either ``happen to meet'' or hold planned discussions; the ice would be broken. Simultaneously, Hurriyat representatives - and others - could be engaged in talks on the post-ceasefire steps.

Coinciding as the Neemrana round did with the aftermath of the recent positive governmental steps, hopes were pinned on the Islamabad meeting for accelerating the momentum already generated. On the contrary, it lagged behind the track-I process. And now, for seemingly inexplicable reasons, the interest of official Islamabad, too, in Indian moves seems to peter out. Perhaps, because of myths and wishful thinking. It is understandable for the die-hards in the establishment to spread misperceptions but for this to happen at the intellectual level is a matter of worry.

For a brief while after the Ramzan ceasefire announcement, there was some grudging appreciation in Pakistan (barring, of course, by the jehadi elements) of the Indian action. However, soon after, it began to be seen as a sequel to the Indian Army's ``fatigue'' and its keenness for a respite. This mindset was evident in the past too - ``A little more push and the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir would crack'' was the standard propaganda diet on which the Pakistani establishment sought to feed its people. But now, for the first time, it was linked with a peace move. Another sample of disinformation spread by Islamabad - there were several power centres in the ruling establishment in New Delhi, Pakistanis are told, because of which it could not come out with a coherent policy line. And myth number three - India could not hold together because of the escalating tensions and growing disintegrating factors.

This was not the first time a serious misperception of the situation in India was allowed to influence the thinking at high levels, if not policy-making. The 1965 misadventure against India was based on the erroneous belief that Nehru's death had left India in disarray. The military dictator of the day, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, could not resist the temptation of launching what he thought would be an easy strike. The events are recalled in a paper by Lt. Gen. M. L. Chibber, who had been C-in-C, India's Northern Command and who since retirement had been engaged in efforts at reconciliation between the estranged neighbours:

``It was in these (post-Nehru) conditions that Bhutto and his Kashmir group evolved a plan to annex J and K. Operation Gibraltar involved infiltrating thousands of trained irregulars and army units in civilian clothes into J and K to promote an uprising. This was to be followed by the coup de grace, appropriately named Grand Slam, to sever the line of communication of Indian troops. The plan was presented to President Ayub in G.H.Q. Despite the objection raised by General Musa and a written warning about the certain failure of Operation Gibraltar by the S.S.G. Commander in J and K, Col. S. G. S. Mehdi, the plan was launched, starting on August 5, 1965. Musa's objections were two. One, that Pakistan intelligence agencies had not yet built a dependable network of agents to ensure an uprising. Two, that the situation would escalate into an all-out war for which Pakistan was not ready. The truth about these operations was suppressed because they failed. People in Pakistan were made to believe that the 1965 war was started by the Indian attack on Pakistan on September 6, 1965. The main casualty of this war was Field Marshal Ayub Khan who, in later years, invariably told his friends not to remind him of this ignominious chapter of his life.''

Another episode recalled by Gen. Chibber relates to his 1992 trip to Pakistan, in a group along with General Sunderji, for dialogue. They were given a note by the ISI director, Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir - the thrust of which was that India had become bankrupt and was making payments with its gold reserves because of overspending on defence. Both of them, according to Gen. Chibber, came to the same conclusion - that ``Javed is totally innocent of macro or micro-economics''.

Now, why is the Neemrana initiative losing steam? It could be the perceived weakness of India that led the Pakistani intellectuals to adopt a hard line - both on Kashmir and nuclear issues. There was no mistaking the hawkishness of their approach, going by the accounts of the Islamabad meeting, available from each of the two groups. True, the Pakistani side had always been insistent on the centrality of Jammu and Kashmir but, at one stage in the past, it was inclined to discuss nuclear issues - confidence-building measures, test reduction steps - separately. That, at the official level, was also the approach at Lahore, where the two sides agreed to a memorandum of understanding on nuclear confidence-building measures. But Pakistani participants in the recent Neemrana round were insistent on the linkage between nuclear matters and the ``core'' issue. Obviously, there were second thoughts in Islamabad.

How come there was a slowdown in the non-official effort, when positive activity could be seen at the official level (despite hiccups)? Perhaps because the official moves were confined to procedural steps, while the Neemrana group was seized of substantive issues, which made their task far more daunting, far more challenging.

If the interest of peace and stability of the region is to be served, both official and non-official initiatives will need to be protected against negative influences. The two channels have different mechanics which need to be strengthened. In the pursuit of its efforts, the non-official side can achieve the intended results by adopting an independent approach and not letting its interaction be affected by the prejudices of officials. In the final analysis, however, there has to be a convergence - for achieving the common goal. What is true of the Pakistani participants applies to their Indian counterparts as well.

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