The neighbourhood

By K. K. Katyal

THE RECENT clash on the Bangladesh border and the heavy loss of lives have again thrown up the multi-dimensional challenge faced by India in its dealings with the neighbourhood. Ties with the countries in the region, even with the exclusion of Pakistan, have posed formidable problems, both in episodal and conceptual terms. India is a major factor in the political agendas of the various parties there, whether in the Government or in the Opposition, and anti-India feelings could be generated with incredible ease to achieve narrow political ends. The factors and forces operating below the surface, that led to the adventurist action of the Bangladesh Rifles, have yet to be identified but there is little doubt - on the basis of preliminary evidence - of the linkage with it of anti-India sentiments and anti-India elements.

Any in-depth discussion of the ghastly episode has to deal with 1) the facts of the incident, 2) the present state of India- Bangladesh relations (including the perception of India by different sections), 3) India's relationship with the neighbouring countries (except Pakistan which falls in a different category), 4) the manner in which the Pakistan factor impinges on New Delhi's ties with others in the region, and 5) the lessons to be learnt from the sudden eruption.

The accounts available from different sources establish the fact of intrusion, in the first instance, by the Bangladesh Rifles. Had that not been the case the Bangladesh side would not have expressed regret over the killing of the BSF personnel and reports from Dhaka would not have ascribed the killings to local adventurism, without the consent and knowledge of the higher-ups. There were conflicting versions of whether there had been a failure of intelligence or whether the authorities concerned did not pay attention to information supplied by the local agencies on the emerging situation on the `border. The Union Home Minister, Mr. L. K. Advani's denial of the failure charge does not carry conviction. Shades of Kargil.

In sharp contrast to the lapses on the ground was the handling at the diplomatic level. ``Restraint'' was the key word. Even before the Cabinet Committee on Security considered the situation, the official mind was made up - that conscious steps needed to be taken to de-escalate the situation. Both the Ministries of Home and External Affairs made known their concern, were firm in their postures but, otherwise, played it cool and saw to it that the clash did not develop into a bilateral crisis. This caution came under heavy strain when the gory details of the killing of the BSF personnel became known. While not giving up the restraint, New Delhi lodged a strong protest to Dhaka and made its displeasure known. On her part, the Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, would need to do some tight-rope walking - recognising India's concern while avoiding the impression of succumbing to New Delhi's pressure.

The India-Bangladesh relationship is a mix of complex factors - which operate differently, depending on who is in power in Dhaka. The Awami League Government had been keen on forging friendly ties with India. At the same time, it had to guard against the perception of a tilt towards New Delhi. The Opposition is continuously looking to pounce on the Government at the slightest sign of a perceived softness towards India. The main Opposition party, the Bangladesh National Party of Begum Khaleda Zia, had never tried to hide its antipathy towards New Delhi - and, in this, it was supported by its allies. There were at least two factors that made anti-India sentiment highly potent - it had the support, on the one hand, of sections of the armed forces and, on the other, of religious fundamentalists. The pro-Pakistan elements, who had not reconciled themselves to the creation of an independent Bangladesh (but did not dare say so publicly) took shelter behind the India-baiting parties. It was a highly polarised pattern.

Elections in Bangladesh are not far away and this makes the current situation particularly sensitive. The Opposition is certain to intensify its efforts to find new means to embarrass the Government and what could be a more effective way than making use of the India factor? In the present surcharged atmosphere, this is the easiest of the political options.

The Hasina Government finds itself in an unenviable position - it could not highlight, for instance, the benefits accruing from the agreement with India on the sharing of the Ganga waters, with a section of the Opposition either questioning the gain to Bangladesh or twisting it to highlight its pro- India bias. Sheikh Hasina, therefore, took a big risk in avoiding a jingoistic posture and in helping contain the diplomatic fall- out.

It is natural for suspicions to arise as regards the role of various elements and for the sequence of developments to be closely scrutinised. Could it not be the handiwork of elements out to stir, on the one hand, anti-India sentiment and, on the other, to put the Government on the mat? To talk of convergence between the interests of these elements and pro-Pakistan section is to stress the obvious. The infiltration of the ISI into sensitive agencies of Bangladesh is known, but some firm evidence is required to conclude that it was actively involved in the recent incident.

There are in-built handicaps for India in its dealings with neighbours, stemming from the asymmetry in size, population, economic strength and resources. India also has land or maritime borders with each one of them, while others do not have this contiguity. It creates presumptions of a hegemonistic approach among them while New Delhi is caught in fears of a gang-up.

In this setting, India becomes a major factor in the domestic politics of the neighbours - not only in Bangladesh but also in Nepal and Sri Lanka. The Hrithik Roshan episode in Nepal last December proves the point. The baseless rumour of alleged derogatory remarks by the film star was enough to trigger large- scale mob frenzy, rioting and killings - and for the protests to acquire shrill anti-India overtones. Only when the factual situation was known and it was established that the offensive remark ascribed to the actor was never made, was calm restored. By then considerable damage had been done.

The political parties in Nepal have vied with one another in generating and exploiting anti-India sentiment. Both the extreme left and the monarchists have been equally active in such campaigns. The issues cover a wide range - the 1950 treaty, rival claims on the demarcation of the border in unclear cases, especially on Kalapani, and the India-Nepal- China tri-junction. India has its quota of grievances. As regards Sri Lanka, the operation of the India factor has a long, unsavoury history, with the IPKF period representing the bitter climax.

Pakistan had been making all-out efforts to fan the anti-India sentiment in the neighbouring countries, finding the ground particularly fertile in Nepal and Bangladesh. In Nepal, the operations of Pakistan's ISI were both vast and deep. There were clearly identified cases, where the Pakistani hand was responsible for creating problems for New Delhi. At times, it succeeded in damaging its relations with Nepal. The Hrithik Roshan episode, for instance, could not have acquired the dimensions it did but for the role of Pakistani elements. The open India-Nepal border provides them an ideal situation to smuggle operatives into India. The case of the alleged involvement of a Pakistani diplomat in Kathmandu in the engineering of violent activities was the latest in the unsavoury series, of which the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane was the most horrible. In Bangladesh, the ISI job is easier - it, after all, was part of their country and there are strong linkages at various levels.

What are the lessons for New Delhi? Increased vigilance, of course, apart from improved intelligence network. More important, there is a case for discarding the tendency to shelve solutions of pending problems. It is shameful on the part of authorities to cite the difficult terrain of the 6.5-k.m. undemarcated sector of the border with Bangladesh to justify their criminal inaction. Cases of ``adverse possession'' along the border are standing provocations and, as such, delay in sorting them out is inexplicable. Frequent contacts at the top level could help dispel misperceptions and misunderstandings and prevent petty wrangles from becoming unmanageable. If the Government heads in Western Europe, to cite one example, could meet every other month, what prevents the top leaders here from having frequent contacts?

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