The CDS appointment

THE APPOINTMENT OF the country's first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has been marred by unfortunate controversy. The difficulty faced by the Vajpayee Government in naming someone for the post has stemmed from two causes. First, less than dignified behaviour which lent the impression that there was a scramble for the job. And second, a tendency to view matters from the narrow standpoint of one or another armed force rather than in a broad and integrated manner. The reported decision of the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sushil Kumar, to withdraw from the `race' has made the Government's task of selecting a CDS less problematic. Although there were reservations about Admiral Kumar's suitability for the job, he would have been difficult to ignore given his seniority over the heads of the other two armed forces. But it remains to be seen how the Government will deal with the Indian Air Force (IAF), a section of which appears uncomfortable with the very concept of a CDS, partly because of the apprehension that such a post will diminish its status as the frontline armed service in the new technology-based military environment.

The concept of a CDS emerged from the Government's resolve to review the national security system in its entirety following the Kargil conflict. It was one of many wide-ranging recommendations of the task force headed by Mr. Arun Singh which was set up to examine the existing organisation and structure and recommend measures to improve the management of the country's defence. The CDS, who will serve as the operational head of the nuclear forces, is expected to integrate command and control of the three wings of the armed services and to act as the single-point military adviser to the political executive. The CDS concept exists, in one form or another, in many countries. It was envisaged in order to promote ``jointness'' in the armed services, to encourage a much needed tri- services view on defence matters in the new nuclearised environment. Ironically, the very post which was designed to promote this ``jointness'' has become the focus of an unfortunate disagreement, demonstrating the lack of a tri-services culture and creating the impression that there is an unseemly squabble among the armed forces to capture the post.

It now seems clear that the Government's first choice for the job is the Army Chief, General S. Padmanabhan, but it will have to deal firmly with the IAF, sections of which are unhappy over the creation of a CDS post and which feel that the IAF is the natural frontrunner given that it is the only force capable of delivering nuclear strikes at this juncture. It is not clear how the Government will tackle the difficulties that have cropped up in making the appointment. There can be endless arguments about the advisability of having a CDS and about which armed force should enjoy a special status in strategic commands. The point, however, is that the Cabinet Committee on Security has taken a decision to create such a post and the Government will only end up looking weak and ineffective if it delays making the appointment for much longer. The appointment of a CDS is a part of a large-scale restructuring of the management of the defence establishment and must be viewed in its totality. It is only after a CDS is appointed that command, control and intelligence aspects of the country's nuclear deterrent can be fully addressed and developed. The CDS will become a focal point for bringing about the restructuring recommended by the task forces which will need some years to undertake. Against this background, it is inadvisable to indefinitely postpone an appointment which has implications for both the country's strategic objectives and security system.

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