When neighbours meet

By K. K. Katyal

LAST WEEK, International Herald Tribune carried a front page photograph of a screaming woman with an effigy held aloft. It was captioned ``Anger in New Delhi - Hindu activists opposed to India's invitation to Pakistan's military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf''. The next sentence was about Islamabad - ``The invitation has called off Pakistan's bluff on Kashmir''. This, obviously, was meant to convey the impression that the invitation had not gone well with the people, that the opposition to the move was intense and widespread. Nothing could be farther from the truth, or so completely misleading. As a matter of fact, the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, was backed by national consensus, with the mainstream formations, the Congress(I), the Left parties and the representatives of the third force, hailing his initiative. Non-official commentators, by and large, regarded it a positive step though there were words of caution against euphoria. There was, of course, no denying the existence of fringe elements - taking to gimmickry and, in the process, attracting disproportionate attention. In the past, the electronic media and foreign newspapers vied with one another in projecting them as larger than life. But the International Herald Tribune pictorial coverage took the cake. The demonstrators may well appear on the streets during the Musharraf stay, providing striking visuals, but their ``action'' would need to be seen in a proper perspective, in the context of the total picture.

In Pakistan, too, the summit move was received well, with all the major parties happy over the prospect of engagement. The reaction of the fundamentalist and `jehadi' groups, however, was expectedly negative. The dissenting voices there, though louder and emanating from a larger area, did not detract from the quality of the overall support. The print media presented a mixed fare, with sober, moderate comments and analysis, on the one hand, and hawkish, unbalanced writings, on the other. No great expectations are pinned by either side.

The mood in both the countries varied between cautious estimate and scepticism about the outcome. Another common factor - suspicions about the motives, in the domestic political context, of Mr. Vajpayee here and of the military ruler in Pakistan. The Congress(I) president, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, for instance, was ``flabbergasted at the total turnabout of the Government... from refusing to talk a few months ago, they have now come a full circle''. There was intense speculation on the how and why of it. Was it part of a well-planned strategy to offset the adverse impact of the Assembly poll results on the NDA or to neutralise the damage done by the Tehelka expose?

In Pakistan, the political parties were unhappy that the engagement with India would give legitimacy to the present rulers and, thus, come in the way of the country's return to democracy or help the military regime to perpetuate itself in a democratic garb. Come to think of it, these apprehensions were not baseless. Gen. Musharraf felt a deep sense of hurt all the while because of New Delhi's refusal to do business with him - first evident from its veto over the SAARC summit, due to be held towards the end of 1999 (India did not want a coup leader in the company of democratic or otherwise legitimate heads) and, later, from its refusal to conduct dialogue with the military ruler. Gen. Musharraf badly needed New Delhi's acceptance of his legitimacy - and was happy about the invitation on this count, apart from other factors. The military regime had ascribed New Delhi's foot- dragging on the SAARC summit and the dialogue resumption to doubts over its durability. The Vajpayee invitation was seen as a tacit recognition that the General was in full control and was in a position to deliver on his committed word, without worrying about the reactions of corps commanders, the mainstay of the military rule apparatus.

In any case, New Delhi's strategy, based on a reluctance to deal with the military regime, had begun to wear off. Gen. Musharraf had been able to reduce his isolation in the world community. Major powers - the U.S., with which India's ``new beginning'' had forged ahead, and Russia, a consistent supporter, among them - raised doubts about New Delhi's continued negative approach. The Russian Foreign Minister gently made that point during recent talks with his Indian counterpart, Mr. Jaswant Singh, in New Delhi. The U.S. publicly called for the resumption of dialogue - before and after the change of guard in Washington. Some firm evidence was needed to accept the theory of American ``advice'' behind the Indian action. The mere coincidence of New Delhi's announcement of the invitation a day after the return of the Foreign Secretary, Mrs. Chokila Iyer, from the U.S. after foreign office-level consultations was not sufficient for such a conclusion.

The Musharraf invitation was very much Mr. Vajpayee's idea, the offshoot of his penchant for peace moves - Lahore, the Ramzan ceasefire and the like - the manifestation of his desire for a place in history. New Delhi could not afford to send a negative signal and hence the importance of a countervailing positive step. By now, the sense of outrage over the Kargil betrayal had weakened - at the end of two years. Mr. Vajpayee was, thus, able to persuade himself to deal with the architect of Kargil. As this tide reversed, the old theories came to the fore - that it was easier for India- Pakistan problems to be resolved when the BJP was at the helm in India and the military in control of the administration in Pakistan. In varied forms, this theory had been doing the rounds since 1978, when Mr. Vajpayee, then the External Affairs Minister in the Janata Party Government, undertook the Pak. yatra for talks with the military dictator, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq - a mission that worked.

Each side has closely scrutinised the other's communication - the Vajpayee invitation in Islamabad and the General's acceptance in New Delhi - and there was perceptible satisfaction over the various formulations, over the texts and the tone. The two Foreign Ministers stated their maximal position - Mr. Abdus Sattar was the first to rake up the U.N. Security Council resolutions and Mr. Jaswant Singh recalled the parliamentary resolution, that the entire princely State of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India. Fortunately, the space for creative diplomacy has not shrunk as a result of their utterances. Despite all manner of constraints, there is scope for a new beginning, especially if the mistakes of the past are avoided. Neither of the leaders could afford a failure to begin the dialogue - and neither could afford to be seen as a cause for the failure. There is, thus, an in-built compulsion for a move towards conciliation. Contrary to its earlier stand, Islamabad now affirmed its adherence to the Lahore Declaration - according to Mr. Sattar, ``Pakistan, like India, is not running away from the Lahore Declaration''. That suggests one line of action - updating Lahore through, say, a New Delhi Declaration, without disturbing its basic postulates.

There could be other openings as well. One, resumption of the dialogue on ``outstanding issues'' - eight were identified in the past, beginning with peace and security, including confidence building measures, Jammu and Kashmir and Siachen. Pakistan's fears of slow motion could be addressed through appropriate mechanisms - like the appointment of authorised representatives to conduct discussions. Two, back-channel diplomacy could be resumed, after an open round. The Pakistani interlocutor, Mr. Niaz Naik, though deputed by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, enjoyed the confidence of the armed forces. This was evident from his participation in track II processes in Kathmandu and Colombo after the military coup. Three, mutually reinforcing measures could be devised, with the aim of bringing about a significant reduction in the activities of militants and enabling India to make a start with thinning out its security forces in the State.

Next month's summit, hopefully, could be the beginning of frequent top-level contacts. At least two opportunities will be there in the near future - the U.N. General Assembly session, beginning in September, could take both of them to New York at the same time and, later, the SAARC summit in Nepal.

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