Agenda for peace in Kashmir

THE PROPOSED talks between Gen. Musharraf and Mr. Vajpayee, besides being crucial, are in a way a big gamble. Talks on such a sensitive issue at subordinate levels can use the leverage of consulting their respective governments when confronted with unacceptable proposals, providing a convenient route of withdrawal. No such luxury is available when the talks are held at the highest decision-making levels, and the stakes are very high. In case these talks fail, there is no other follow-up level at which such talks can be undertaken, at least for sometime. If Gen. Musharraf is handicapped by the lack of a democratic mandate of his people (and there is always a question mark about acceptability of decisions arrived at by future Pakistan Governments), Mr. Vajpayee's freedom of action is restricted by the ``unanimous Parliament resolution of 1994'' which considers the entire undivided J&K as part of India. There will be pressure on both leaders to show some ``success'' after the talks, difficult considering the intractable position officially maintained by both the sides. It should absolutely be clear to any trained military mind on either side of the border, that to wrest that portion of J&K which is with the opponent is militarily not viable, given the modern trend not to allow conflicts to escalate into prolonged full-scale wars, and the existing ``nuclear power'' status of India and Pakistan.

How should the talks then be structured, given the known stand of Pakistan on this issue? Suppose we analyse possible solutions to the Kashmir problem into various categories of acceptance, such as (a) complete (fully satisfactory) solution (b) acceptable solution, after give and take from both sides (c) minimum acceptable, the ``bottom line'' solution (d) totally unacceptable solution under any circumstances. It will be prudent to examine the implications of each of the above options to crystallise our thoughts, and to develop a broad consensus - both political and national. It will be essential to create, in advance, necessary ``public awareness/opinion'' for peaceful acceptance of the solution finally arrived at after negotiations, to avoid the kind of genocide witnessed during the partition of the country! There will inevitably be charges of ``sellout/surrender'' raised on both sides, which will have to be handled with tact, maturity and firmness by the ``leadership'' in both the countries!

Complete solution

Both India and Pakistan see the merger of undivided J&K with them, as the complete solution. In 1994, Indian Parliament had unanimously adopted a resolution reiterating, ``all of Kashmir, including the region beyond the Line of Control (LoC), now occupied by Pakistan, is an integral part of India''. We have often said that Kashmir is an integral part of India, and the only thing to be resolved is the Pak-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The fulfilment of this ``unanimous'' Parliament resolution will mean a full scale long-drawn-out war, as Pakistan cannot be expected to voluntarily part with the territory. The ``nuclear capability'' should be a critical factor to consider, before either country considers war option! Suppose we do succeed in getting PoK, are we ready to deal with about two million hostile Muslim population, who will have no loyalty to India? Instead of solving the problem, as it exists today, will we not face a steep escalation of the problem assuming unmanageable dimensions? We should not forget that the Armed Forces, who are to win this territory in war, did give the benefit of negotiating from a position of strength, both in 1948 and in 1971 with decisive military victories, which were not exploited for whatever reasons by the political leadership on both occasions. Can anyone guarantee that it will be different after a military victory this time? Are we then serious about this ``unanimous Parliament resolution'', or paying only lip service by keeping this ``resolution'' alive, and for whose benefit? Such an ``ideal solution'', considering the ground reality, may not only be impractical but also undesirable!

From the Pakistani perspective too, this option is least likely. Given Pakistan's inability to change the status quo by force in 1965, 1971, and Kargil wars, the world community's reluctance to pressure India to settle the issue to Pakistan's satisfaction, and the Kashmiri people's (not militants') own quiescence, and considering that in the last 20 years the balance of military capability has shifted heavily in India's favour, any further attempt by Pakistan to take Kashmir by force would be disastrous to the very existence of Pakistan as a nation!

Keeping LoC as base

Keeping the LoC (which has practically served as the International Border since 1971) as the base, India and Pakistan can negotiate and settle for a process of fresh delineation of the borders with adjustments. Each considers some areas/features of strategic/tactical importance as vital for its security, which can be negotiated and agreed upon by senior military commanders from both sides, as was done after the 1971 war.

From the Pakistani perspective, wisdom should dawn on them that the Jammu and Ladakh constituents of J&K would never be willing to join Pakistan and hence all that Pakistan is fighting for is the relatively small territory of the Valley, dominated by Muslims, for which it is paying a heavy price in diplomatic isolation, and the threat of being perceived as a nation aiding and abetting terrorism. Pakistan's strategy that the ``fatigue factor'' caused by terrorism/insurgency, sponsored by it in J&K, will drive India out of Kashmir is indeed fallacious!

`Bottom line' solution

For a long time now, India seems to have reconciled to the existing ground reality of the divided Kashmir, and the delineated LoC! Her acceptance of the LoC despite being in a most advantageous bargaining position after the decisive military victory in the 1971 war with 92,000 prisoners, the return of captured PoK territory after past wars, the self-imposed restraint not to cross the LoC during Kargil war, and construction of border fence in J&K along LoC (similar to border fencing along the International Border in Punjab) are clear indications of our thinking on this issue. India's occasional claim to PoK appears to be essentially a talking point, and may well be used as a bargaining chip for getting a fair deal in any ultimate settlement of the issue. Hence for India, conversion of the LoC into International Border (IB) should be the minimum acceptable ``bottom line'' solution!

From the Pakistani perspective, this may be resisted as there is nothing more to gain in terms of territory in Kashmir, after all the struggle and the heavy ``investment'' made so far. Pakistan fails to see the changed circumstances and the existing ground reality as was evident during the Kargil conflict, when not only the U.S. but even China, Pakistan's ``all weather ally'', advised Pakistan to withdraw behind the LoC. Pakistan will harp on the Security Council resolutions on Kashmir but should be made to see the ground reality that the last such resolution was adopted in the U.N. 44 years ago in 1957, and has not been admitted since then.

Pakistan may well attempt to play her trump card ``self- determination for the people of Kashmir'', self-determination restricted to opting for India or Pakistan, ruling out an independent option for undivided J&K. For the sake of argument if the independence for Kashmir became an option to be discussed, would Pakistan place its part of Kashmir, including Gilgit and Baltistan (parts of J&K merged into Pakistan despite an adverse ruling of their Supreme Court) and 5,180 sq. km. ceded to China, as negotiable item on the conference table? It is highly unlikely, and the APHC, and other Kashmir parties should realise that it would only be a matter of time before an ``independent J&K'' is annexed by Pakistan. Pakistan has recently stated that an independent J&K is not part of the U.N. resolution! The external ``Jehadi'' forces fighting in J&K are interested not only in expelling India from Kashmir but also in ``Islamising'' its people, on the Taliban model, regardless of whether or not they desire it! It is highly unlikely that the APHC, and other parties have not given a thought to all these aspects, and if their aim, hidden or otherwise, is to merge with Pakistan, then where is the need in wasting time in ``talks'' with them? We may as well directly talk to Pakistan!

Unacceptable

It is not clear whether Pakistan wants the plebiscite in the entire undivided J&K, or the Indian J&K! Pakistan is confident that a plebiscite in undivided J&K would guarantee the merger of the entire state into Pakistan, with its Muslim majority in PoK offsetting the Jammu and Ladakhi dissent votes. In the Indian J&K, the Hindu citizens have been driven out of the State by Pak- sponsored terrorism, and are scattered all over India (and abroad) as refugees, and Ladakh is sparsely populated, as against the Muslim domination in the Valley. Unlike Pakistan, the Indian government(s) did not annex parts of disputed J&K, or permit Indians from other parts to migrate into J&K! Hence a plebiscite will be a fraud on our people in J&K. Besides, a prerequisite for plebiscite is the total vacation of Pakistan from PoK, a condition Pakistan has not implemented till date!

The one prerequisite for any agreement should be to insist on ending all forms of cross-border terrorism, indulged in by Pakistan.If it refuses to stop assistance to ``Jehadi'' forces, Pakistan will be admitting to waging a proxy war against India in Kashmir and elsewhere! On the other hand, if Pakistan pleads inability to control the Jehadis, it will in effect be saying that it has no chips with which to bargain, and therefore no place at the negotiating table. Some observers in Pakistan feel that if the government of Pakistan moved to restrain the Jehadis, they would turn their guns against their mentors, and plunge Pakistan into a civil war. Their goal is to ``Islamise'' people and places, according to their own version of Islam, and if Pakistan stands in their way, they would not be loath to remove it. If true, the menace of cross-border terrorism may well continue in our territory even after Kashmir problem is resolved, as a means of employment for these forces. Since Pakistan will never get the entire Indian J&K, it may well use the excuse that the ``solution'' arrived at does not meet the legitimate aspirations of the people of Kashmir. This is a problem created, nurtured, and therefore to be solved by Pakistan. It will be prudent for Pakistan sooner than later, to find a way of controlling the Jehadis and other fundamentalist groups if it is to preserve itself from further disintegration as a nation!

Brig. (Retd.) V.R.P. SARATHY

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