The ceasefire with the Nagas

By Murkot Ramunny

THIS IS not the first time a ceasefire has been introduced in Nagaland. Lessons of history have not been learnt while facts are being twisted by some media experts, particularly the electronic media, misleading the present generation of Nagas and the rest of the people of the Northeast, India and even the world. The main intention here is to set the record straight, to explain the short-term and long-term effect of the recent order extending the ceasefire to Naga-inhabited areas of neighbouring States.

Sir Akbar Hydari, then Governor of Assam, visited Kohima, headquarters of the Naga Hills district, on June 27, 28 and 29, 1947. He had long discussions with leaders of the Naga National Council (NNC). The result was the Nine-Point Understanding between the Governor and the NNC. Its main points were decentralisation of administration to the NNC, with special powers regarding land and its resources.

Points number six and nine need special mention. Point six said: ``The present administrative divisions should be modified so as (1) to bring back into the Naga Hills district all the forests transferred to the Sibsagar and Nowgong districts (of Assam) in the past; (2) to bring under one unified administrative unit, as far as possible, all Nagas. All the areas so included would be within the proposed agreement''.

The administrative situation in the Northeast at that time was that Naga Hills was a district of Assam, so was Mizoram known as Lushai Hills, present Meghalaya consisted of two districts Khasi and Jaintia Hills and Garo Hills. Arunachal Pradesh was then the North East Frontier Agency, technically a part of Assam but administered by the Governor through an Adviser. Manipur and Tripura were princely states. Changing the borders of the districts of Assam ``as far as possible'' (according to the Understanding) would have posed no problem. I do not think, at that time, anyone thought of touching Manipur, then under the Maharaja.

The ninth point of the Understanding was ``at the end of ten years the Naga Council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people arrived at''. There was vehement opposition from one section of the NNC. To this minority, the ninth point meant ``the Naga right to self- determination at the end of the agreement period''. Seeing that the majority of the members had been persuaded, the then Deputy Commissioner, Sir Charles Pawsey, and P. F. Adams, Secretary to the Governor, both British ICS officers, put the issue to vote. The agreement was approved by a small majority. Negotiations ended, with the opposition still protesting.

The Nine-Point Agreement was sent to Nehru saying ``The ten year period envisaged in this understanding will promote integration of the hills and plains. With a sympathetic policy, financial assistance, and right type of administrative officers, this could be achieved''. Nehru's reply was ``I congratulate you on the success you have achieved. The note on the discussion and understanding arrived at Kohima will be sent to the Constituent Assembly''.

The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution dealing with the tribal people of the Northeast formed them into District Councils but gave them all the powers, in fact more than that envisaged in the Agreement, the Understanding was, however, not mentioned anywhere.

The point to note is that Governor Hydari's discussion, the Agreement, or the Constitution did not concede that contiguous areas would be added to Nagaland. It was just a pious wish according to point six of the Agreement, ``to bring under one unified administrative unit as far as possible all Nagas''. To say that in 1947, India had promised all contiguous Naga- inhabited areas would be incorporated in Nagaland is incorrect. Nehru met the moderate Naga leaders who organised the Naga People's Convention on September 25, 1957, and told them ``The Government of India was prepared to consider changes in the administrative setup in the Naga areas, which may involve changes in the Constitution. The Government were not prepared for any scheme based on independence''. The Prime Minister accepted the proposal for setting up a centrally administered unit with Naga Hills district and Tuensang Frontier Division of the then NEFA, which was also centrally administered through the Governor. The new unit came into being on December 1, 1957.

This administration continued for about two years, while the Naga Peoples Convention consolidated its position and from October 22 to 26, 1959, met and passed ``a sixteen-point resolution to form the basis of negotiation with the Government of India for the final Naga political settlement''. This has been misinterpreted by some media (particularly private electronic media) that this was a ``Sixteen-Point Agreement'' and that it included a Constitutional guarantee for including neighbouring Naga- inhabited areas in Nagaland.

The Naga delegation met the Prime Minister on July 26, 1960, and when the first resolution - ``The territories of NHTA, and any other Naga area which may hereafter come under it shall form a state within the Indian union, known as Nagaland'' - was read, the Prime Minister said ``Yes it shall be a state within the Indian union'' but added ``Regarding the question of other areas, which may hereafter come under it, we do not know which areas will come. You do not want to be part of another State, while it is a State''.

Each one of the 16 points of the resolution was read and there were agreements on some; on some like ``There shall be a council of six Ministers and three Deputy Ministers'', the reply was that the Constitution does not lay down the number of Ministers. This is given as an example to show that it was not a ``16-Point Agreement'' but a resolution consisting of 16 points, some of which were accepted, some did not need acceptance, and some were rejected. Point number 12 of the resolution was for transfer of reserve forests which had gone to Assam. The Prime Minister's reply was ``This is a complicated issue. The Government of India cannot decide unilaterally since Assam Government was involved. They have to be consulted''.

Point number 13 of the resolution said ``The other Naga tribes inhabiting the areas contiguous to the present Nagaland can join that State, if they so desire''. At the detailed discussion at the official level, regarding the 13th point, the delegation was told, ``When a State was formed, areas have to be precisely given. If there were to be any additions Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution have to be followed''. These articles indicate that the President has to refer to the Legislature concerned.

The present fear of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh are of short-term and long-term nature. The short-term implication is of law and order which is a State subject. Going by the ground rules agreed by the Government, camps of the NSCN will not be attacked. Other militants when chased could take refuge along with the Naga groups, in their camps or in their villages. Militants of other States will get a boost, assistance and refuge.

The long-term danger is the NSCN demanding ``greater Nagaland''. This was prevented up till now. According to the NSCN leaders, at present the problem does not come up. They do not vouch for the future. The NSCN (I-M) general secretary, Mr. T. Muivah, has a personal interest. He belongs to the Thankul tribe of Manipur; his village is in that district of Manipur. There has been relative peace in Thankul area. We have to see what will happen when he moves freely there.

The lesson is that if the Government of India gives in on small matters, the militants expect to gain the upper hand on bigger issues. At one stage during the ``cessation of operations'' in the 1960s, the Prime Minister was asked to go to Calcutta Airport and meet the Naga militants. Indira Gandhi refused, and asked them to come and meet her in her office. They did. Today the representative of the Prime Minister, a former Home Secretary, travels to foreign countries to meet them.

(The writer, an IAS officer, retired as Adviser to the Governor of Nagaland.)

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