Agra summit and Kashmir

By Muchkund Dubey

ANY SUMMIT between Heads of Government of two important and relatively large countries is a major political event. This is particularly so in the case of India and Pakistan which have over the past 50 years been carrying the heavy baggage of the bitterness of the past and where the outside world perceives an imminent danger of a nuclear war since both have acquired nuclear weapons. The summit has, therefore, naturally aroused expectations not only in the two countries but all over the world. The Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, who took the initiative for inviting Pakistan's President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has been acclaimed on both sides of the border as a statesman who has been moved by a genuine desire to bring peace to this troubled region.

However, there is something peculiar about the origin of the summit as well as the posturings of the two sides in the runup to it. The invitation to Gen. Musharraf was extended as though it was a substitute for the non-extension of the ceasefire in Kashmir. This conveyed the impression that India had come to the end of its tether in dealing with the situation in Kashmir and invited Gen. Musharraf for talks because it saw no alternative to seeking Pakistan's assistance for getting out of the morass in which it finds itself in Kashmir. Pakistan saw this initiative as evidence of India's fatigue in controlling the insurgency in Kashmir.

Over the past few months, developments in Kashmir have followed a very unfortunate course. First, the Union Government botched up the issue of autonomy raised by the Chief Minister, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, by rejecting it without even giving it serious consideration. Then, the Centre dissipated the initial gains from the ceasefire it announced by unduly delaying the start of the peace process. It also could not capitalise on the advantages it claimed to have gained from its much-publicised clandestine talks with the Hurriyat leaders. Finally, the peace process started by Mr. K. C. Pant not only came too late but was also fundamentally flawed. It is more like a commission eliciting well-known diverse opinions with a view to compiling a final report, than a serious attempt to creatively engage those who really matter. Such an engagement, at least to begin with, has to be in the nature of probings behind the scenes and away from the limelight. The Government seems to have stumbled upon the summit after all its misconceived and misdirected efforts to solve the problem with our own Kashmiris failed. Thus, so far as the Kashmir issue is concerned, we have painted ourselves into a corner at the summit.

The moves by the two sides during the last few days in the runup to the summit reveal yet another aspect. India has made unilateral offers for enhancing people-to-people contacts and trade exchanges, strengthening and stabilising the peace along the Line of Control and discussing nuclear and other military confidence-building measures. These will remain empty gestures until there is cooperation from Pakistan. Gen. Musharraf has given enough indication that Pakistan has no interest in such measures until the Kashmir issue is well on the way to solution. He has stated that ``the horse had to be put before the cart.'' Pakistan has stepped up its propaganda against the alleged violation of human rights in Kashmir by security forces. Moreover, the Pakistan President has expressed a desire to meet the Hurriyat leaders in New Delhi, much against the wishes of his hosts. Thus, the two sides are trying to set the agenda for the summit according to their own priority and to put the other side in an awkward position in the eyes of the world. This game of oneupmanship on the summit eve is not a good augury. Apart from appealing to their respective domestic constituencies, these moves seem to be designed mainly to appeal to and seek the assistance of the outside power which, according to several reports, particularly those emanating from Pakistan, has played a major role in bringing about the summit.

Whatever the motivations, a summit of this kind can very well acquire its own agenda. For, beyond a point, the two leaders cannot afford to ignore the expectations of their peoples. There is indeed the possibility of the summit adopting a large number of positive measures - in the areas of trade, economic collaboration, energy, information flows, culture and people-to- people contacts. The summit also provides an opportunity to clinch issues such as Siachen and Tulbul on which agreements had been reached in the past at the expert level. Besides, several constructive ideas figured in the outpouring of suggestions from different quarters on the summit eve. All those who cherish the vision of peace and prosperity in South Asia would wish that most, if not all, of these suggestions are adopted and implemented subsequently. However, it is unrealistic to expect that Pakistan will agree to anything without being satisfied that the Kashmir issue will be addressed seriously. Pakistan may accept a formulation on Kashmir which recognises the centrality of the issue and sets in motion a process which would enable it to be addressed in a structured manner and within a timeframe. Even if India agrees to such a process, Pakistan is unlikely to offer any worthwhile quid pro quo, including a restraint in the activities of the ``jehadis,'' until it discerns a progress towards solution of the Kashmir problem.

It is true that India is committed to settling the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. However, the only way to solve the issue with Pakistan consistent with India's basic position is to put itself in a position in the State where Pakistan would be left with no alternative but to accept the status quo. We could have done so only by having the Kashmiri people on our side, thereby making it impossible for Pakistan to carry out its ``jehadi'' activities. The successive Governments of India have failed in this effort both militarily and politically and the present Government seems to be trying to extricate itself by seeking outside assistance and negotiating directly with Pakistan on the fate of Jammu and Kashmir. Once an agreement is reached with Pakistan, it will be sold to the nation on the ground of there being no alternative, even though we have had several opportunities during the last five decades to solve the issue by coming to terms with our own Kashmiris.

Clearly, negotiating the fate of Kashmir with Pakistan is qualitatively different from negotiating it with our own Kashmiris. It is a tragic irony of history that we are not willing to give the fullest possible autonomy to our Kashmiris, but are prepared to bargain with Pakistan the dispensation of the State.

India's Kashmir problem will get infinitely complicated with the entry of Pakistan into the equation. Once the process of negotiation with Pakistan gets under way, the alternative of settling the issue domestically can be taken to be as good as given up. Besides, Pakistan will not be satisfied with any solution which does not lead to an eventual secession of the State to Pakistan on the basis of religion. This will also be the denouement of any solution based on the trifurcation of the State on religious grounds.

Besides, in any negotiation with Pakistan within the framework to be agreed upon at the summit, outside powers will be breathing down our neck, including a power with whom the present Government is over-anxious to forge a strategic partnership. In this situation, it is extremely important to have a national consensus on the final fall-back position on the Kashmir issue. That fall- back position has been pretty obvious all these years but is in the danger of being jettisoned. And it is that any solution to the Kashmir problem must be consistent with India's national ethos of democracy and secularism and must not undermine its territorial integrity and unity.

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