Overcoming hiccups, over to Agra now

By K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, JULY 13. The pre-summit developments - the hiccups and related matters - signify both the strength and weakness of the process set in motion by the Prime Minister, Mr.A.B. Vajpayee's invitation and the Pakistan President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf's acceptance. At least three problems arose in the week, preceding the General's arrival, none auguring well, which could spoil the atmospherics but the substantive interaction is unlikely to be affected on that count.

The outcome of the summit, it was clear, would be determined by the current dynamics of the bilateral relationship. And there was no reason to revise the earlier estimate of a very modest result. This is the outlook when the countdown is about to end.

That some irritant might crop up at the last stage in the run-up to the summit was not ruled out but those engaged in the preparatory work were confident of tackling it. However, the situation of the type that has arisen on the Hurriyat issue was not anticipated. It has sharp political overtones and may well leave a trail of bitterness and acrimony.

Looking back, it was avoidable. The Pakistani side could have done without calling the Hurriyat leaders to its High Commissioner, Mr. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi's ``high tea'' for Gen. Musharraf. That was a crude act, as it did not take into account the sensitivities of the hosts and the spirit of the initiative for the summit.

Islamabad, obviously, intended to make a political point - according to the Hurriyat the status of the sole representative of the Kashmiri people and seeking to give, though indirectly, a trilateral dimension to the dialogue.

New Delhi, as was known, was opposed to any deviation from the bilateral concept. India could have confined itself to questioning the validity of Pakistan's action and left it at that.

Unnecessary over-reaction

The decision of the National Democratic Alliance and other parties to stay away from the High Commissioner's function was a case of unnecessary over-reaction. An act of folly could have been dealt with differently. The NDA decision was taken at a meeting presided over by Mr. Vajpayee. This gave a sharp edge to New Delhi's response.

This was one of the three summit-eve problems but the most serious. The other two were: one, the sudden, sharp outburst by the foreign office in Islamabad on ``repression and oppression'' in the Kashmir valley, just a week before the summit and, two, the unilateral CBM episode.

The Islamabad statement came out of the blue, as it were, without a prior warning. The motive was not immediately clear though later it was seen as a bid by Pakistan to keep the summit focus, almost exclusively, on Kashmir. The statement came shortly after Islamabad announced confirmation of its decision to invite the Hurriyat leaders. The repression chant, however, did not leave a major scar.

Ironically, the effect of New Delhi's unilateral CBMs and goodwill gestures in Islamabad was far from positive. Whether it was the decision of the Director-General of Military Operations, Lt. Gen. G. S. Sihota, to go to Pakistan to discuss security- related issues like steps to reduce infiltration through the Line of Control and to initiate regular contacts between the armed forces of the two countries or designation of entry points along the LoC for divided Kashmiri families to come to the Indian side or scholarships for students or trade concessions or simplification of the visa regime, Islamabad saw a deeper game behind - to deflect the attention from Kashmir (to which Pakistan intended to accord centrality) and to set the agenda for the summit from New Delhi's standpoint.

There may have been a faux pas in announcing the visit of the Indian DGMO without even conveying the suggestion officially to Pakistan. New Delhi may have been carried away by its zeal in announcing the CBMs without intimating Islamabad, but none of the proposals could be faulted on merit.

Pakistan could have reciprocated the Indian moves and, with that, one phase would have concluded on a happy note and the stage set for moving over to other items - especially Kashmir to which Islamabad gave the highest priority.

It did not happen that way. On the contrary, Pakistan's public stance perceptibly hardened. This, one suspected, was a deliberate step, meant to counter the alleged Indian design to push Kashmir to the background. In the process, New Delhi got negative signals. Fortunately, the dust stirred by this episode has subsided. The Hurriyat invitation remained the only major hiccup.

India, as the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, said at a Press conference, was disappointed by the bid to introduce extraneous elements in the summit process. But the two sides, it was clear, would proceed with the substantive part of the top- level exercise. Over to Agra now.

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