Sustaining the consensus

By K. K. Katyal

WHATEVER THE outcome of the Agra summit, it has provided a precious byproduct in the domestic context - activation of the national consensus on foreign policy. Last week's meeting of party leaders called by the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, to discuss India's approach to the summit was marked by a refreshing demonstration of all-round agreement. True, foreign policy issues traditionally received all-party support and, as such, hardly figured in the election rhetoric. At times, however, notes of divergence did crop up, causing ripples in the placidity of consensual waters. In the past, bloc rivalries at the global level and differences on non-alignment were reflected in domestic politics. Of late, the nuclear tests and security-related matters led to sharp divisions, causing worry about the fate of the accord on foreign policy matters. The return to consensus was, therefore, welcome - doubly so, because it related to the highly intractable issue, India-Pakistan ties.

If this approach is kept up in the future, it would be a great service to the national interest, especially in the event of the dialogue with Pakistan taking a positive turn. The Government, in that eventuality, would need considerable flexibility and resilience for possible give-and- take (of course without bartering away the country's interests) and that would not be possible without support from the Opposition parties. It will not be able to pursue a creative approach if it has to look over its shoulders all the while for the moves of its opponents or is assailed by fears of their making a partisan use of the official handling.

There are several other subjects, requiring all-party support, that will have to be taken up in the near future. For instance, the nuclear doctrine and security factors, neighbourhood diplomacy, covering countries other than Pakistan, relations with China and the U.S., apart from economic matters at multilateral fora such as the WTO. Any of these issues getting involved in partisan wrangles could spell disaster for the country, creating new avoidable problems in the area of development, poverty alleviation. Some of the requirements laid down by the WTO, to take one example, could have considerable potential for generating public discontent, protests by farmers, entrepreneurs and, thus, provide a tempting handle for attacks on the Government by its rivals. There could, thus, be a strong desire for the Opposition parties to take up these causes which, in turn, will put pressure on the consensual approach.

With some exceptions, the record of the present Opposition is better than that of the BJP (or the Jana Sangh) when they were on the other side of the fence. Their reservations on non-alignment or the special ties with the erstwhile Soviet Union were understandable, even though not necessarily meriting approval. But they carried too far their criticism of the concepts behind foreign policy actions, even if it was not translated into political campaigns. The divergence, by and large, remained manageable, even though the Swatantra Party and some others distanced themselves from the Tibet policy or the Jana Sangh appeared to lean heavily to the U.S. and the Western camp, to cite two examples.

The Congress Governments headed by Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi saw no need for special effort to work for national consensus for two reasons - one, their majority was overwhelming and the Opposition too insignificant, and, two, the divergence did not acquire serious proportions. It is a different story now.

The polity is now balanced, not lopsided, with the Opposition only marginally outnumbered by the ruling combine in the Lok Sabha and in a majority in the upper House. There is, thus, an in-built compulsion for the Government's consultations with other parties on foreign policy matters, sensitive ones in particular. The management of external issues has far greater bearing on domestic matters, political and economic, now than was the case in the past. Unfortunately, the two Vajpayee Governments had not showed the desired awareness of the changed context. Had that not been the case, it would have given the first information of the successful nuclear tests to the Opposition parties rather than to the media. It exposed itself to a serious charge - of seeking to make use of security and foreign policy ``achievements'' for partisan ends. The Opposition parties were justified in their complaints on other matters as well - for not having been taken into confidence before the draft nuclear doctrine was announced or on the high-profile dialogue with the U.S. on security and disarmament (between the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, and the then Deputy Secretary of State, Mr.Strobe Talbott) or on its thinking on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which acquired a new dimension after the nuclear tests. It did hold some pro-forma, ritualistic discussions with the Opposition parties on the CTBT - in some cases in the wake of insistent public demands by them. Even that was no genuine interaction because they were merely informed of the decisions already made, positions already taken, there being no attempt to elicit their views for use as inputs in the decision-taking process. This lapse by the ruling side did disproportionate damage in the field of external relations because of the ever-sharpening confrontation between the Government and the Opposition on domestic matters.

The United Front Governments, which preceded the BJP-led coalition, recognised the imperatives of consultations and consensus. In 1996, for instance, when India took a firm stand against the signing of the CTBT because of its discriminatory character, the BJP, then in the Opposition, and Mr. Vajpayee, then the Leader of the Opposition, were taken into confidence at every stage. For instance, when the treaty was being finalised at the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, the drafts of the statements to be made by India's Permanent Representative used to be sent by Mr. I. K. Gujral, then Minister for External Affairs, to Mr. Vajpayee and the suggestions made by him were incorporated. Even the last Congress Government, headed by Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, showed consideration to the Opposition - Mr. Vajpayee then used to be the leader of the Indian delegation to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and his contribution and the success of his role were recognised.

The break in the consensus since 1998 led to some awkward situations. The Congress was upset - for valid reasons - by the statements of Mr. George Fernandes, in his capacity as the Defence Minister, critical of China. Mr. Fernandes had been associated with a lobby not particularly friendly to Beijing and used to support the cause of the Dalai Lama and related matters. Because of that background, Beijing took strong exception to his public comments. The Congress, which through its governments had made a major contribution to the re-building of the Sino-Indian relationship, beginning with the December 1988 visit of Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing, naturally, was keen to undo the damage. It toyed with the idea of sending a delegation to China for this purpose. However, the plan was given up when the party was accused of conducting parallel diplomacy.

On another occasion, when Mr. Vajpayee, during a visit to South Africa for the NAM summit, seemed to have had a less than cordial argument with Mr. Nelson Mandela, the Congress(I) felt perturbed. That reaction was based on slanted media reports and either because it got the correct version or because it did not want to appear conducting a parallel policy, the idea was given up. The episode, however, served to reveal pressures on the foreign policy consensus. Those situations, it is hoped, are things of the past.

Let the spirit of last week's all-party meet not be a transitory affair. Whatever the result of the discussions between Mr. Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf, India will be required to tackle some ticklish, sensitive crucial issues in its dealings with Pakistan. The Government's hands would be considerably strengthened if it and the Opposition work in unison. Any relapse to the preceding unsatisfactory situation will be disastrous for the country.

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