The General saw only Kashmir

By Amit Baruah

The General's howitzer-style of democracy may have impressed some; but once the echo ebbs away you are left only with the sound of emptiness.

The Pakistan President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, made the right noises to the right audience. But the ambush telecast (a Pakistani establishment tactic used before) of his interaction with Indian editors, sent out the wrong signals.

If the Information and Broadcasting Minister, Ms. Sushma Swaraj, spoke out of turn and gave a wrong impression, surely the General over-reacted in his response.

The General's telecast went out on PTV and Star TV - the first aimed at the domestic audience that he was unbending and ``principled'' on Kashmir, that he had ``told'' the Indians off in no uncertain terms.

The other message was to the Indians - they must concede the ``centrality'' of the Kashmir issue or dispute or else there was little chance of progress.

It appeared that the Pakistani establishment was waiting for an opportunity to let off steam on Kashmir and Ms. Swaraj provided them with the right entry point.

Clearly, the General was his own media field commander in Agra.

His Press Secretary, Major-General Rashid Qureshi, and the soft- spoken Information Secretary, Mr. Anwar Mahmood, used all their media savvy to score points over what appeared to be a non- existent media strategy on the Indian side.

The absence of formal pre-summit contacts and a unilateral announcement by India of confidence-building measures, specially opening check-points on the Line of Control, seemed to have disturbed the Pakistanis.

And, the check-points on the LoC can only give de jure status to the de facto LoC; something the Pakistanis cannot be seen to be conceding. Suspicions of Indian intentions in Islamabad would have been high.

Knee-jerk reaction?

The invitation to Gen. Musharraf (welcome as it was) came across as a knee-jerk reaction. It was not accompanied by clarity on any new negotiating strategy as far as the Indian side was concerned.

On the other hand, the Pakistani strategy is rather simple. India must concede that Kashmir is the ``core'' issue - it must be resolved to make progress on other issues. Such a strategy has been tom-tommed not just by the khakis in Pakistan, but all the civilian Prime Ministers in the shadow of the khakis.

And, if India doesn't go along with Pakistan, then India is ``resiling'', India is ``recalcitrant'', India is ``hegemonic'', India is not interested in a solution to the Kashmir dispute.

The General, to give him his due, has been consistent. He has not compromised on the military's support to the Taliban, he has not buckled under U.S. pressure on Osama bin Laden. So, to expect him to depart from his high horse on Kashmir was perhaps too much.

In 1988 and 1989, the ``core'' status of Kashmir did not inhibit Pakistan from taking a series of confidence-building measures in the nuclear field.

And, in Lahore, Kashmir was not a foot-note, but it was not on the masthead either. The General wanted ``more'' than what was conceded to Mr. Nawaz Sharif. He could not make do with less.

The former Prime Minister, Mr. I. K. Gujral, whose understanding of Pakistan is unmatched and who has done more for India-Pakistan relations than anyone else in recent years, was correct when he said Gen. Musharraf was coming with a pistol held to India's head - talk Kashmir or else.

Such a strategy can never work. A senior Pakistani diplomat told this correspondent in Lahore in February, 1999 that India and Pakistan should not be seen to be raising the ``level'' of failure. That concern was as real then as it is now.

Unchanged doctrine

It is evident that there is no change in the Pakistani military doctrine - Kashmir by force or through negotiation.

For all the reasonable noises the General made in New Delhi, this doctrine remains unchanged.

Today, Pakistan's military strategy on Kashmir is in tatters. Bleeding India is fine, but you can't go beyond. Kargil proves that. So, what next - bluster-based negotiation to keep the Kashmir ``pot'' boiling and looking good at home.

Yes, the raw memories of Kargil should be forgotten. But India and Pakistan must never forget its lessons. For the Pakistanis, it would appear today that Kargil never happened.

So, while India maintains its contacts with Pakistan, the bottom- line must be clear - there will be no ``prize'' at the end for the General.

Just as Gen. Musharraf projects Pakistan's point of view, India must do the same. There should be no hesitation in stating your position up front.

A hopeful sign

There is an agreed structure of talks; it simply never got going. If it is refined and elevated to the political plane, all to the good.

Both India and Pakistan have been at pains to emphasise that the talks did not fail. That is a hopeful sign.

The talks must go on. And, for good measure, a further point must be made - it is also Islamabad's loss if it does not want to have normal trade relations with India - not just that of New Delhi.

The General was dismissive of trade, culture, economic links in Agra. He could see only Kashmir and Pakistan's ``right'' over it. It seems a sure recipe for another 54 years of distance and acrimony.

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