What price for peace?

The government claims that the present decision is intended only to widen ceasefire area, without any commitment whatsoever to alter existing State borders. This still begs the question why it took the risk of provoking unrest outside Nagaland at this stage. Why pursue this negotiating strategy? THE RECENT Central Government's decision to apply its ceasefire agreement with NSCN(I-M) to areas of Manipur and Assam "inhabited by Nagas,'' betrays a certain shortsightedness, if not ignorance, about the ground realities of Northeast (NE) politics. For non-Nagas in the surrounding areas of Nagaland, the message implicated by the decision is immediately clear peace with the Naga insurgents at any cost. How else would they have read the `writing on the wall'? "Ceasefire'' with the Naga rebels has been extended to their own `homesteads', over the heads of their home-grown insurgents, whose numbers and disruptive capacities are considerable, if not equal to that of the NSCN's. How is this going to help them attain peace in their areas?

At the same time, for the NSCN stalwart, Thungaleng Muivah, a Tangkhul Naga from Manipur, this decision could be counted as one of his crowning achievements in the longish history of his insurgent existence. For, it is no mean feat, even for a hardcore rebel like Muivah, to have been able to pull off an "annexation'', albeit by way of "ceasefire,'' of virtually two- third of Manipur to his cherished dream of "greater'' homeland for the Nagas. That too, not by sword but by "diplomacy''. This is the stuff of brilliance in negotiation rarely surpassed even by the best of our diplomatic brains abroad.

The less useful half

Our man or men in Bangkok and those in North Block who have been mulling over their briefs might argue that the NSCN, in both its (Muivah) and (Kaplang) incarnations, is the wellspring of insurgencies in the Northeast; that it has been the main trainer of other insurgents in the region and a facilitator of arms supply to them, either by way of purchases, rent or grant; that, therefore, once ceasefire is secured and peace is put in place with the Naga rebels, it may follow with the rest, and so on. This is at best half of the truth and the less useful half at that.

The other half of the truth is that there have long been genuinely autonomous insurgency movements in both Assam and Manipur. The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur, particularly, have been hustling and, at times and places of their choice, hurling havoc at our security forces for years. Of the numerous "banned'' insurgent outfits in the NE, most of which are specific tribe- oriented (such as Hmar People's Conference (HPC), Kuki National Army (KNA), Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), etc.), these two insurgent groups, ULFA and PLA, can be said to have acquired the capacity to force a level of `accommodation' with the local authorities. The ease and the confidence with which they collect funds and "taxes'' even from high officials and politicians and the extent of influence they wield on overground politics are the unmistakable evidence. At least, these two groups need to be reckoned with, for any meaningful `ceasefire' to be effective in Assam and Manipur, parts of which are now "covered'' by the ceasefire agreed with the NSCN(I-M).

The real issue

The real issue at stake, at any rate, as is seen in Manipur, is not about ceasing fire; it is about the five-decade-old demand by Naga rebels of all factions for the integration of the "Naga occupied areas'' into Nagaland. This will involve incorporation into Nagaland of most of three districts of Manipur, namely Ukhrul, Senapati and Tamenglon, and a large chunk of North Cachar Hills district of Assam. Of course, the non-Naga inhabitants of Assam and Manipur, whether located `underground or above ground', vehemently oppose this. Thus, the inclusion of these areas in the ceasefire arranged with Muivah and his associates cannot but be seen by them as a ploy to find a way to accommodate the insurgents' demand.

Given the sensitive ramifications and the intractability of the issue, any conclusive discussion on matters pertaining to outside the borders of the present Nagaland should have been kept as one of the last items of the agenda at the Bangkok talks. The fact that NSCN's claim of "vital connectivity'' to outside Nagaland had now been discussed, though for a seemingly innocuous purpose of securing a wider ceasefire area, gives rise to several complex issues. The attitudes of non-Nagas affected by the claim are likely to harden. It has given a common cause to oppose to rebels and non-rebels alike in the affected areas, particularly in Manipur. If the ceasefire idea is pursued, the collective fury it provoked at Imphal recently may turn out to be a starter only. Any non-Naga politician in Manipur seen to be acquiescing in any concessions made in the present talks will now be extremely vulnerable.

Indeed, it has raised a new political issue in the NE, that is, the issue of the permanence or otherwise of the existing arrangements of borders amongst the NE States, which are mostly of mixed ethnic populations. Questions such as these are bound to be asked: If the Nagas of Manipur are added to Nagaland, what about the Mizos of southern Manipur, bordering Mizoram and so on? What will Manipur be like, then? Among others, this is likely to generate a new and popular anti-Delhi movement amongst the youth especially in Manipur, which was hitherto largely confined to the underground. Above all, it has served as a sort of confirmation of a lingering impression, widely prevalent in the NE, that the Centre does not understand the mindset and sensitivities of the communities of the NE and that if it does, it does not seem to care. That such an appraisal, however biased and unjustified, of the Centre's handling of the NE affairs should still be possible, after over 50 years of our freedom, reflects the unsettled state of affairs in the NE-Centre interaction.

The government claims that the present decision is intended only to widen ceasefire area, without any commitment whatsoever to alter existing State borders. This still begs the question why it took the risk of provoking unrest outside Nagaland at this stage. Why pursue this negotiating strategy? The decision to resume talks at Bangkok must have presumably been based upon the assurance by the Nagas that a peace settlement should be sought within the framework of the Constitution. The two substantial concessions that can be made within this framework are territorial gains and enhanced political autonomy. And territory is one of the cardinal demands of the Naga rebels. If this is not a beginning of territorial concession, then why make the gesture now? Will it not at least partly foreclose the negotiations? The way the government is now trying to explain away its decision appears to be doing just that.

The language of pressure

Besides, what cannot, and should not, be taken lightly is the apprehension in the NE that the government might one day "reward'' the NSCN simply because the latter is perceived as the most tenacious of the insurgents. A way has also to be found to dispel the notion that the only medium the Centre understands is the language of pressure, lawful or lawless. Any deal to be done at Bangkok will, therefore, have to be mindful of its potential for the domino effect. It should not lose sight of one of its own starting premises that the Naga rebels had been, and still are, an inspiration for a host of insurgent groups in the NE, some of which are strategically viable to become as tenacious as the NSCN. It should remember that "Northeast'' is not Kashmir and is not likely ever to be.

It is also important not to draw a parallel with the only `peace accord' the Centre has managed to conclude with an underground group in the NE to date, with that of the Mizo National Front (MNF) of Mizoram in 1986. That was no `peace accord' but an MoU concluded with an increasingly demoralised insurgent outfit, and essentially structured to facilitate `the honourable return' of Laldenga and his men, while at the same time paving the way for the consolidation of the Congress party led by Lal Thanhawla. No `reward' of any significance was therefore necessary. The political concessions given to the MNF were hardly more than those already made available for Meghalaya and Arunachal, both of which had not resorted to insurgency.

Alienation of the people

The troubled Northeast does seem to deserve a well thought out and comprehensive plan to tackle its countless problems. If there is such a one, no one has heard of it in the region. Such a plan could go into the underlying reasons behind the `alienation' of the people in general. It could seek ways to combat insurgency at its sources arms supplies, funding, poor management of Indo- Myanmar borders, misinformation, and so on. It could fine-tune and upgrade perhaps the most potent weapon against insurgency economic management of the region, among others, by devising the Centre's system of disbursement of grants and aid less amenable to gross abuse by local politicians. And, above all, it should find means to co-opt the innocent and law-abiding majority through various NGOs and voluntary organisations.

L. T. PUDAITE

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