A tale of two summits

THANKS TO indigenous media flare-up, the other summit almost failed to be noticed by the Indo-Pak press and television alike. Mr. Jiang Zemin and Mr. Vladimir Putin met and embraced each other in Moscow in greater desperation than Gen. Pervez Musharraf and Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee did in Agra, the city of love. Over both the summits fell the American shadow _ in the umbral and penumbral mode! A refiguration of geo-political constellations has, nonetheless, taken place.

The Agra summit has been recognised as "neither success nor failure''. Both India and Pakistan are "disappointed'' and yet jubilant over what happened and what did not happen at Agra. It is as it should be. In a topsy-turvy world, lack of agreement is more valuable than having an agreement. This is the lesson of Tashkent, Simla and Lahore. Relaxation of visa restrictions, distribution of largesse among the Pakistan academics on India's part and freeing of Indian prisoners languishing in jails on the part of Pakistan go to prove that unimplemented agreements are worse than implemented disagreements, or to put it positively, "implemented disagreements like Agra'' are to be preferred to "unimplemented agreements like Simla''.

Why were both Gen. Musharraf and Mr. Vajpayee so eager to meet, forgetting, but not forgiving, past bitterness left by the memories of 1965 and 1971 wars, and more recently of Kargil strife and the humiliating hijacking episode (for India) and dismemberment of Pakistan? In world diplomacy shadows play a more important role than the players themselves. Though both India and Pakistan have denied any third party pressure, denial in modern diplomacy more often underlines conceding a point and, in spite of all the professed opaqueness, the reality has a way of revealing itself from behind the veil of secrecy. Actions speak louder than words; silence is more articulate than speech.

A revealing fact

A most revealing fact about Indo-Pak "lack of agreement'' is that, for the first time, Pakistan has started talking about "mutual'' understanding to settle disputes or outstanding "issues'' without the intervention of any third party. Earlier, it used to be only an Indian refrain. Both India and Pakistan now have started to agree that the third party settling of disputes is full of risks and dangers. The American involvement in Ireland, the Balkans and Palestine has not ended the strife in any of these places and dependence on the "third party'' appears to last forever. Gen. Musharraf and Mr. Vajpayee, perhaps gaining from the aforesaid experience, wisely thought of winning consensus among political groups and endorsement from their own people directly for future "friendship''. Gen. Musharraf, the Army dictator, has greater fear of American intervention than Mr. Vajpayee, the executive head of the largest democracy. Both have found and sensed that popular consent is the surest talisman to keep the spectre of third party intervention at bay.

Though Gen. Musharraf's winning the media war has received more than full attention, the fact is that his every move during his Indian visit had deep domestic political significance. His visit to his Naharwali Haveli in Delhi's Darya Ganj was aimed at dissipating his military mask. His hugging the long lost "Anaro'', significantly also known as "Kashmiro'' and pronouncing her as "Amma'' certainly achieved its purpose of tearing off the mask _ "the butcher of Kargil'' _ he has been wearing both in India and Pakistan for opposite reasons, and projected the image of a tender boy, "a muhajir boy'' at that, of four years (ah! memory of 1947) who left his vatan in Hindu India and made it good in the "holy land'' of the Muslims, Pakistan. His visit to the Taj Mahal in the company of his wife projected the image through the electronic media of a loving husband, a universal persona, soaring far above the secular-communal (religious) divide and appealing to millions upon millions of hearts on either side of the border.

But the real tour de force was Gen. Musharraf's cancellation of his "pilgrimage'' to the Dargah of Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti at Ajmer. He was more concerned with the blessings of the Pakistani "awam'' than those of the Gharib Nawaz. Each year it is a minuscule minority of Pakistani muhajirs who visit Ajmer Sharif for blessings and fulfilment of wishes. Gen. Musharraf, the would-be elected leader of Pakistan, felt it was too much of a risk to identify himself completely with the muhajir minority. He also wanted to project himself as a leader far above the Shia- Sunni divide in his country. Also, 65 per cent of those who visit the dargah every year are Hindus! Such a pilgrimage is definitely contrary to the purposes of a ruler of an Islamic state.

Strategic summit

A dictator cannot afford to be casual. He has to remain alert. Could he then be unaware of the China-Russia summit in Moscow on the same day as India-Pak summit in Agra? While India-Pak summit was only political in nature, the Sino-Russian summit was avowedly strategic. Its major concern as pronounced by the agreeing partners was the promotion of "global security''. Russia has been and still remains a friend of India. China has been and still remains a "friend'' of Pakistan. Pakistan has been used as an "ally'' by the U.S. and the Pakistan military fattened itself on American prodigality. India has endorsed the American NMD but is scared of being used as an "ally'' against China as Pakistan was against Russia. Both India and Pakistan find themselves in a quandary. They have to keep close to these powers and also far at the same time. Pakistan, politically, economically and diplomatically is really in a rickety position, losing its stranglehold over Afghanistan and narco-terrorism.

Poppy growing in Afghanistan has been halted, according to the recce by the Food and Agriculture Organisation. Pakistan too is under pressure from the U.S., China and Russia to stop growing poppy. This would mean the staggering of the economic prop for the Pakistani Army, and its ISI activities, and its state- sponsored narco-terrorism in India, Russia and parts of China too. There are other more pressing reasons for Russia and China coming together belittling the importance of Pakistan as any ally or friend in Chinese eyes. The "Shanghai Five'' Group which has Russia and China as its prime movers has noted the U.S. venturing into Central Asia with millions of dollars to lay a pipeline for the Kazakhstan via Turkey completely ignoring and sidestepping Russia to exploit the commercial potential of Central Asian oil. Both Moscow and Beijing are committed to keeping the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty alive and in place.

Diplomatic victory

It is clear that Pakistan and India were at cross-purposes yet under compulsion to move in the same direction. India's aim was to score a diplomatic victory which it did. It invited Gen. Musharraf, the `untouchable' Army dictator. It talked peace. It vocalised the issue of "terrorism'', already an accepted evil force to be countered by all major powers. It did not yield ground on the Kashmir issue in the manner of a "mighty'' nation. Most of all, it accomplished a tactical move by meeting the army dictator on its own soil instead of having been "forced'' or "persuaded'' to meet in New York on the sidelines of the U.N. meet on other powers' initiative. India gained a notch in its rise to the status of world power. Pakistan gained a notch in proclaiming to the world that it is under a benevolent dictator who is "popular'' even if devoid of a popular government.

Dr. JITENDRA KUMAR SHARMA

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