Saving the light combat aircraft

REPORTS LAST month that India was to be an equal partner with Russia in the development of a rival to the American Joint Strike Fighter made the headlines because it supposedly indicated our coming of age. It is not clear whether India has signed any such agreement with Russia or if the cash-strapped, but very talented, Sukhoi aircraft design bureau is indulging in some inspired kite flying. Talking of being cash-strapped, where will India find the resources for such a major project when the on-going purchase of the multi-role SU-30MKIs is already eating up a large proportion of its defence budget? Interestingly, the US defence department is currently conducting an intensive review of what other aircraft programmes it needs to cut or curtail to find the money for the JSF! Where does all this leave ``our own'' Light Combat Aircraft?

What is the significance of the LCA? The IAF needs an effective fighter capable of theatre air defence and close air support of ground operations - a modern MiG-21 - that it could use for at least a couple of decades. A long life implies that the aircraft should not only be modern when it enters service, but also be suitable for periodic upgrades. The LCA fits the bill on both counts. It is small and uses advanced composites extensively, making for low observability; it is extremely manoeuvrable and comes with modern avionics. Secondly, and most importantly, indigenous development means that all the design know-how and know-why is available with us when it needs to be upgraded or adapted to meet new needs.

The LCA would be an effective complement to the large and expensive Sukhoi-30 which is designed to be a long range strike and air superiority fighter capable of taking on all comers. On a different note, while electronics and missiles have made short range ``dog fights'' rarely necessary in modern air combat, with the right armament, the stealthy little LCA is probably more than a match for the American F-16.

The LCA project has taken much longer than it ought to have partly because India has not undertaken anything similar since the advanced, but ill-fated, HF-24 supersonic fighter of the 1950s and 1960s that ``failed'' for want of a suitable engine, and because we decided to do most of the development on our own in spite of our ill-developed infrastructure. On the other hand, this autarkic attitude has paid rich dividends in terms of learning modern technology particularly in the areas of advanced composites and avionics. We did, however, take the help of the French firm Dassault in the early project definition phase and America's Lockheed Martin for the flight control system. In addition, the first few LCA prototypes will fly with GE 404 engines from the US - engines that were paid for and delivered before the post-Pokhran embargo. Incidentally, talks did take place with Sweden to jointly develop what has become the Swedish LCA, the Saab Gripen (which also uses a variant of the same General Electric engine), but the Swedes withdrew when they realised the slowness of our decision-making!

Development of the LCA was entrusted to the created-for-the purpose Aeronautical Development Agency, with Dr. S. R. Valluri as its head and design leadership coming from the talented, and very experienced Mr. Raj Mahindra. Unfortunately the appointment of a new Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence almost killed the project because between him and Dr. Valluri forced the latter and Mr. Mahindra to resign from the ADA. These and related developments probably set back the project by five years. The 1998 U.S. embargo probably added another eighteen months resulting in the first flight of a prototype only in January.

With flight testing well under way, there have been at least ten since the first flight in January, slow development of the Kaveri engine is now the major stumbling block, but it must be realised that this is not a uniquely Indian problem - engine development is generally a much longer process than airframe development even in the US, Europe and Russia. For example, the M 88 engine that powers the latest French fighter, the Rafale, first ran in January 1984, but it was December 1996 before low volume production began. That is, nearly thirteen years after ``bench'' testing started! This long gestation period was foreseen early on, which was why American engines were purchased for the first two LCA prototypes, but it has now got to the stage where the LCA itself may die if suitable engines are not available soon for production versions of the aircraft.

Why should this be so? Even if we optimistically assume that bench testing of the prototype Kaveri engine is completed by 2003 that will need to be followed by tests in a flying test bed. Assuming that all goes well with both these stages, ``certification'' of the engine will have to follow before it can be installed in a prototype aircraft and it will probably be 2005 before flight tests of the combination can begin. A newly certified engine flying in a prototype aircraft calls for extensive testing, and inevitable modification, before both can be declared ``acceptable''. This can easily take as long as five years. It is only after that will the generally, and understandably, risk-averse IAF decide if it wants to formally order the aircraft.

If the Ministry of Defence then finds the resources to authorise immediate production, it will take at least another two or three years before tooling-up can be completed and production of the aircraft actually begin. In other words, it will be nearly a dozen years before the LCA can ``join'' the IAF. All in all, a sure-fire way of killing off the aircraft.

Is there a way out? Yes and we can have aircraft in service in 2005! If we can purchase about fifty GE 404 engines, enough to equip two squadrons plus some spares, the whole process can be shortened by up to seven years because we will be using a proven, and largely already integrated, engine throughout the testing process. We can leverage our new found ``friendship'' with the U.S. to indicate that we like to do so and commercial self- interest will take its inevitable course. Alternative range from the French M88 engine to the Eurofighter's Eurojet 200 and the Russian RD-33 all, and any, of which could be used to play one off against another.

Paradoxically, this process will probably save the Kaveri engine as well because it will allow concurrent development of engine and airframe without the need to take the foolish, and dangerous, short cuts that have often been the bane of our technical development.

A win-win strategy? Only if our decision makers have the guts to grab the bull by its horns and realise that national interest (that much abused phrase!) means that both the LCA and the Kaveri are worth saving, if only because the combination will cost a third less than anything comparable. Let's hope they are up to it.

C. MANMOHAN REDDY

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