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Chandrika Kumaratunga, Ranil Wickremesinghe and V. Prabakaran... the principal players.

A COMMENTATOR described it as Sri Lanka's ``peace process No. 5''. After three failed attempts and a fourth deadlocked initiative to bring about a lasting solution to the island's ethnic conflict between 1987 and 2001, the Government of Ranil Wickremesinghe has set the ball rolling for yet another process for talks with the LTTE aimed at finding a political settlement.

Following its December 5 election victory, the United National Front (UNF) Government has been quick on announcements with regard to the peace process. Norway was invited to resume its facilitation of peace talks and a delegation arrived on January 10 after a meeting with Anton Balasingham, LTTE representative in London, on January 4.

From Tuesday, essential supplies and civilians will be permitted to move with few restrictions across the lines that separate LTTE-held areas from those under the Government in the north, thus meeting a long-standing pre-condition set by the Tigers for talks.

And the two sides are working through the Norwegians to convert the truce unilaterally declared from December 24 into a structured ceasefire that will last indefinitely, and not just for a month. The Prime Minister has announced the setting up of a cell comprising the Constitutional Affairs Minister, G. L. Peiris, and the Economic Reforms Minister, Milinda Moragoda, to work on a political solution.

There is speculation that peace talks could begin as early as March with the LTTE floating the stunningly audacious idea that the negotiations be held in India.

Mr. Wickremesinghe has said that in taking steps that address the day-to-day needs of the Tamil people, his Government was ensuring that the talks would not get bogged down on these issues as in the past, so that the two sides can get down to the brass-tack political matters as soon as they sit at the table.

Rapid progress though all this indicates, it may not be to the advantage of either side to begin discussing a political solution immediately or even in the foreseeable future. The Government has nothing to offer, while for the LTTE, the mere fact of discussing a political solution would mean a commitment on its part to an alternative that is less than Eelam. That is a commitment the LTTE is not ready to make.

But for both sides, there is a pressing need to remain engaged in the peace process. For the Government, it would help attract local and foreign investment back to repair the economy, which is in a state of paralysis after registering negative growth last year. For the LTTE, being seen as talking would in itself give it some international respectability.

A breakdown in the process is in the interests of neither. The Government is not likely to press for discussions on ``core issues'', nor will the LTTE bring up matters such as the removal of Sri Lanka's ban on it. The LTTE now even has the luxury of being represented in Parliament through the Tamil National Alliance, which can raise such issues on its behalf and keep them alive without threatening the peace process.

Both sides are fully aware that the alternative to being in the peace process is war, not a viable option for the Government given the parlous state of the economy, or for the LTTE in the current international climate.

Thus, the immediate priority for both would be to somehow keep the ceasefire going beyond the declared one-month period. It is likely that the main focus of the peace process would be to put in place a structured ceasefire within a mutually agreed framework, in place of the present truce being unilaterally observed by both sides.

In the Sri Lankan capital, the buzzword now is an ``interim solution'' rather than a final settlement. The People's Alliance Government is seen as having made a strategic mistake by putting all its cards on the table, setting out its proposals for devolution in a one-shot package as the final solution to the conflict. It split the Sinhalese and once it was rejected by the LTTE, there was no meeting ground between the two sides, and the only option left was to go to war. Though there are no contours yet to this proposed interim solution, Mr. Wickremesinghe talked of an ``interim administration'' for northeast Sri Lanka during his election campaign. More and more influential voices are now being heard in favour of giving the LTTE a prominent role in running such an administration.

An interim solution would not necessitate any final commitments by either the Government or the LTTE, and could continue indefinitely, its proponents argue, especially as it would give the Tigers de facto control of the Jaffna peninsula. Opposition to this from the Sinhala majority is not expected to be unmanageable, if done before Mr. Wickremesinghe's honeymoon with the voters ends. The UNF could even claim a mandate for it as large numbers voted for the party knowing this might happen.

In any case, it is all in the presentation, observers say. During the last peace talks in 1994-95, there was a proposal for a task force on reconstruction and rehabilitation for the northeast in which the LTTE was to play a key role. The talks broke down before the task force could take off, but this suggests a kind of ``interim solution'' that could be implemented without raising too many Sinhala hackles.

The scenario unfolding now is in keeping with Mr. Wickremesinghe's image as a politician who might be better at conflict management rather than conflict resolution. It may leave those looking for a full and final settlement to the ethnic conflict a trifle disappointed, but if the Government and the LTTE continue with the cleverness they are now demonstrating in wanting to remain engaged, peace process No. 5 could run and run.

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