The Hindu : The Anglo-U.S. agenda for Kashmir

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Jul 22, 2002

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

The Anglo-U.S. agenda for Kashmir

By K.K. Katyal

What are the pointers, thrown up by the latest round of the Western diplomatic effort — the just-concluded visit to the sub-continent of the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, and the trip later this week of the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell? At least three. One, sustained pressure on both India and Pakistan to proceed with de-escalation; two, even-handedness in the dealings with New Delhi and Islamabad; and, three, accelerated steps to resolve the Kashmir problem. The last, the most significant, will be the newest addition to the Anglo-U.S. agenda (as a matter of fact, it had been there for a long time but may be pursued seriously now). The two Western Powers will call it "continued engagement'' with India and Pakistan. India will describe it as "facilitation'' while, to Pakistan, it will be mediation or third-party role.

Whatever the label, it will confront New Delhi with a major challenge which will require mature, creative handling. India could not afford to sacrifice any of its core concerns but it would do well to shed some of the cliches, that have been over-used, causing irritation even to its sympathisers abroad. True, India's Pakistan policy is shaped by the Government, as a whole, the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and now also the Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, apart from the foreign office but the presence here of a new Minister, Yashwant Sinha, could well be an occasion for a new style. This is not intended to be a reflection on his predecessor, Jaswant Singh, but is meant to make a case for new beginning.

The stage when India and Pakistan would possibly be "encouraged'' to address the substantive aspect of the Kashmir issue will be reached after a while and this gives time to New Delhi to formulate its strategy with greater care.

At the moment, the main concern of the two Western powers is de-escalation. They are reconciled to delay — till October this year — in any major reversal of the steps, taken by India and Pakistan, that had taken them to the brink. The period till then is intended to be utilised to ensure that the gains, accruing from small measures, are not lost and that a climate of hope is created to guard against a slide-back. The idioms currently used by the U.S. and the U.K. are meant to achieve this objective. "Infiltration is down across the Line of Control but it needs to be made permanent and further steps need to be taken." With such words, the momentum towards easing of tensions is meant to be kept up. This was the purpose of Mr. Straw's visit as also the thinking in Washington about Mr. Powell's plan for the trip to the region.

Washington's even-handedness, evident of late, was reflected by two pronouncements last week — rejection of a plebiscite as a way out of the Kashmir tangle, on the one hand, and "No'' to India's plea to declare Pakistan a terrorist state, on the other. Likewise, the U.K. (in the words of Mr. Straw), on the one hand, saw a case for further steps by Pakistan to check infiltration (and to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism) and, on the other hand, pinpointed the centrality of the Kashmir issue.New Delhi is justified in deriving comfort from the U.S. view against a plebiscite and the argument adduced in support — "In 1972, India and Pakistan reached an agreement (Shimla) that it would be a bilateral issue. We support India and Pakistan and we are working towards getting these two countries to the table to resolve this issue." It, thus, vindicated New Delhi's position that the Shimla Agreement had had an over-riding effect on the U.S. resolutions, adopted more than two decades earlier. There was reason for India to be happy on another count — the positive view of Washington on the Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir, of course, with stress on its transparency and fairness. Pakistan has dubbed the electoral exercise a "stunt''.

As against that, New Delhi found itself in an embarrassing position, with rejection by the U.S. of the plea to declare Pakistan a terrorist state. Dealing with the demand by India — by Mr. Advani — a State Department spokesman emphasised that "Pakistan has been a very stalwart ally in the fight against terrorism. President Musharraf has announced same fairly bold measures and our interest is in helping Pakistan.'' New Delhi invited this snub unnecessarily.

The U.S. stand against a plebiscite has a significance far beyond the balancing exercise of the Western Powers. It could be an important element in the solution of the Kashmir tangle, whenever it is attempted — bilaterally, with their "facilitation''. An end of terrorists' infiltration from Pakistan's side, de-escalatory steps by India and dialogue between India and Pakistan to settle outstanding issues, including Kashmir — that is the sequence the two Western "facilitators'' have in mind. This is what their diplomatic moves are about. And New Delhi has to prepare itself for all the three phases.

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