The Hindu : Kashmir, the U.S. and Pakistan

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Tuesday, Aug 20, 2002

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Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Kashmir, the U.S. and Pakistan

By V. R. Raghavan

The challenge for the U.S. rests in emphasising the importance of the electoral process vis-a-vis a Pakistani commitment to armed action in Jammu and Kashmir.

THE INDEPENDENCE Day speeches of Pervez Musharraf and Atal Behari Vajpayee this year provide insights into their future strategies on Jammu and Kashmir. Elections in the troubled State are due in less than a month. The electoral process is to take placeeven as the armies of the two nations are poised for war on the question of Kashmir. A higher level of violence in the State in the coming weeks cannot be ruled out. In this charged atmosphere, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, will shortly be visiting New Delhi and Pakistan. This visit follows one by the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, which had set significant yardsticks by which the Kashmir issue would be judged in the future. The role the U.S. will play will therefore be an important one, both in the run-up to and after the elections in Jammu and Kashmir.

Mr. Powell had established a linkage between peaceful elections in the State and a dialogue between New Delhi and Pakistan. He had emphasised on letting the electoral process be free from violence and on widest participation by political groups in the State. Elections were to be followed by dialogue rather than dialogue being the condition for peaceful elections. Gen. Musharraf's speech on August 14 belied the hopes that might have existed, of the electoral process being made the catalyst for a serious dialogue between the two countries. He gives no credence to either the electoral process or its importance to New Delhi. His speech lays out the route map he would follow in obtaining an outcome on what is to Pakistan the core issue with India.

Gen. Musharraf has clearly indicated his unwillingness to align his policies to the changed global strategic realities. He is convinced his case of an ongoing freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir would be endorsed. He is equally confident that the U.S.' needs of managing Afghanistan and eliminating Al-Qaeda can be leveraged to continue the policy of conflict with India. This confidence is reinforced by the presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. In Gen. Musharraf's estimate, these factors have and will continue to limit the choices available to the U.S. and the Indian leadership against Pakistan. Clearly, the General is set on keeping the Kashmir issue on the boil in the coming years. The inevitability of his leading Pakistan for at least five years after the October elections has obviously played an important part in the reassertion of this strategy.

Gen. Musharraf rules a Pakistan which is difficult to govern. There is, in addition, greater U.S. military presence in and around Pakistan, which the U.S. is committed to maintaining for long. There is within Pakistan not just political but religion driven turbulence. The right wing and armed Islamic groups will continue to challenge the General's policies of supporting U.S. action against the jehadis. Incidents of targeting foreigners and of fighting to retain a presence in Pakistan for groups such as Al-Qaeda will gain strength. If Gen. Musharraf is to keep a precarious peace within Pakistan, he needs to foment violence in Jammu and Kashmir as a trade-off with the jehadis. That sets the terms of reference for his Kashmir strategy. Successful and peaceful elections in the State run counter to this strategy.

Mr. Vajpayee's August 15 speech emphasises the importance his Government places on the coming elections. He has prefaced his strategy with the phrase "J&K is on a decisive crossroad". This phrase indicates a Kashmir policy which takes into account the realities in Pakistan. If Gen. Musharraf is to lead Pakistan for five and possibly more years, his strategy of forcing a dialogue on New Delhi through a policy of violence in the State requires a new response. India's response will have to be clearly rooted in its democratic credentials. This places a major responsibility on New Delhi, the Farooq Abdullah Government in Srinagar and the political groups in the State. Mr. Vajpayee's commitment to free and fair elections is designed to fulfil this responsibility.

New Delhi is also engaging with political groups in the State on an unprecedented scale. The talks by the Kashmir Committee led by Ram Jethmalani with the Hurriyat Conference are a major part of that initiative. These talks are expected to obtain from the Hurriyat its perceptions on what would amount to fair and free elections. The strategy apparently is to make it as feasible as possible for the Hurriyat to be part of the political process under way in the State. The other side of the same coin is that the Hurriyat would make itself irrelevant if it is unable to break free of its Pakistan-linked positions. Mr. Vajpayee asserted in his speech that the new Jammu and Kashmir legislature would be seen as the main voice of the Kashmiri people.

There are thus two dimensions to New Delhi's Kashmir strategy being brought into play. One relates to the enhanced role being given to people's elected representatives in voicing the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. The other is based on the readiness to take special measures to meet such aspirations.

The military dimension of the Kashmir strategy is demonstrated by New Delhi deciding to retain the deployment for war on the border. The manner in which this will manifest into military action after the elections remains to be seen. New Delhi has a range of military options available to it. None of those options is also free of the risk of escalation amounting to instability beyond India and Pakistan. New Delhi cannot also accept any longer Pakistan continuing its strategy of supporting armed conflict from its territory into the State. Indian and Pakistani leaders are thus both looking beyond the elections in Jammu and Kashmir.

The essential question remains whether New Delhi and Pakistan are seeking to find a way out of the Kashmir conflict, or, merely continuing with the dangerous standoff. The Indian leadership's choices, even as its strategy looks at new initiatives in Jammu and Kashmir, are not wholly unconnected with domestic political calculations. Gen. Musharraf's political difficulties are also well known. In this complex web of national interests, security needs and domestic political dynamic, the U.S. is attempting to influence an outcome on Kashmir.

The challenge for the U.S. rests in emphasising the importance of the electoral process vis-a-vis a Pakistani commitment to armed action in Jammu and Kashmir. The U.S. would like to see fair, free and credible elections in the State. These cannot come about without Pakistan ensuring the electoral process is not derailed through violence. The U.S. would like conditions created for the widest participation in the elections. Such participation is unlikely from the Hurriyat without its handlers from Pakistan allowing it to happen. As things stand, the U.S., more than any other major state, will have to exercise a judgment on free and fair elections in Jammu and Kashmir. If it decides positively on it, what will be its options against Pakistan whose strategy is to label the elections a farce? If it decides to term the elections as not free and fair or of a mixed kind, it would have reinforced Pakistan's misplaced claims of a freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. Either way, the U.S.' credibility would come under strain in more ways than one.

It is as important to look beyond the elections as it is to emphasise the electoral process in Jammu and Kashmir. A commitment to move Pakistan from its strategy of backing terrorism in one direction while fighting it in another, would have to remain the cornerstone of a strategy for peace. That cannot happen without a substantial initiative by major powers led by the U.S. That requires choosing the side of peace and not taking sides with those who seek to destroy every attempt to seek it.

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