The Hindu : After the first round

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Friday, Sep 27, 2002

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After the first round

By Jayadeva Uyangoda

As much as the LTTE has become flexible by retreating from the project of a separate state, the UNF Government will have to keep open the doors of Sri Lanka's state for the regional autonomous entity the Tigers represent.

THE FIRST round of direct talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE has produced some positive outcomes that will have a direct bearing on how the conflict resolution process will unfold in the months to come. As anticipated, no major issues of disagreement emerged. Neither was there a settlement accord as such, signed by the two sides. Those who designed this negotiation exercise — the process designers — were obviously careful to send out positive messages through the substance as well as symbolism of talks. At the negotiation table, there were no flags. Nor were there contentious or controversial statements. The negotiation agenda in this first round does not seem to have included any controversial theme either. The so-called `core issues' were not on the agenda. At the press conference after the conclusion of talks, the two negotiating teams and their Norwegian interlocutors appeared relaxed, positive and committed to moving forward.

In the statements made at the opening ceremony of September 16 as well as at the press conference of September 18, it was Anton Balasingham, the LTTE's chief negotiator, who made the politically most significant points. Mr. Balasingham's repeated assertion that the Tamil Tigers did not operate on the categories of a separate state is obviously the most noteworthy idea to have emerged from Thailand talks. Although this statement may not have surprised close watchers of LTTE politics, it represented a crucial development in the conflict transformation process in Sri Lanka. Mr. Balasingham's elaboration of the LTTE's commitment to autonomy and autonomy-based self-determination is the first official admission by the Tigers' leadership that the so-called `sole representatives' of Sri Lankan Tamils have in fact reviewed and revised their original, maximalist goal. This transition from secession to autonomy is indeed an outcome of 20 years of a bloody war, combined with political-strategic sensitivity to radically new circumstances of global, regional and national politics.

It is worth noting that the LTTE's chief negotiator waited till the end of the first round of official talks to make the autonomy announcement. Even that was in response to a question put to him by a journalist. It may be possible that during, or even much before, the official talks, the Tigers' delegation may have divulged this political `secret' to the Colombo Government. However, Mr. Balasingham probably waited till the formal talks to take place to make this very important point public. With the autonomy announcement, the LTTE leadership has re-positioned itself vis-a-vis the Sri Lankan state in such a way that returning to the old secessionist goal would not be particularly viable. However, the trajectories of transforming the LTTE's proclamation of autonomy into a stable political commitment will be contingent on how the Colombo Government handles the future challenges of concretising the regional autonomy proposal. That indeed is a difficult process which requires substantial reforms of the existing Sri Lankan state.

The primacy of economic reconstruction in a process of peace is another significant point made by the two sides. It appears that both the United National Front Government and the LTTE have come to the conclusion that normalising life in the North and the East through economic reconstruction and the further development of the economy in the rest of the island are intertwined. Mr. Balasingham at the press conference hinted at an extremely interesting turn in Sri Lanka's North-South relations: the North needs the South to come out from destructive consequences of the war and the South needs the North to come out of its economic crisis. Both sides have linked peace to economic imperatives. This is where Sri Lanka's present peace process might look qualitatively different from previous attempts: the peace project is internationalised in a global economic sense. It is no accident that Sri Lanka's Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, was meeting investors in New York when the Government and the LTTE were negotiating in Thailand. The Sri Lankan Ministers, G.L. Peiris and Moragoda, left Thailand on September 18 only to fly to New York to join the Prime Minister's campaign of `invest in peace'. The signs are that, eventually, some of the LTTE leaders might also join with the Government team to seek global support for peace through economic reconstruction. But linking peace to the flows of global capital is not a hazard-free process, although rapid economic recovery is integrally connected to Sri Lanka's challenges of emerging from a protracted civil war.

It is quite interesting that both the Government and the LTTE delegations downplayed the importance of the idea of an interim administration. The pre-negotiation speculation in Colombo was that the talks would primarily focus on working out the modalities for a Tiger-controlled interim administration for the Northern and the Eastern provinces. There were probably two reasons why the interim administration issue was de-emphasised. First, the two sides probably avoided decisions that could have immediately generated controversy and resistance in the Sinhalese South. Second, as Mr. Balasingham himself asserted at the press conference, the LTTE is more interested in transforming its own system of administration into one entrusted with the task of reconstruction, rehabilitation and economic development. Political consolidation at home and recognition as well as legitimacy abroad seem to be at the top of LTTE's current priorities.

Some of Mr. Balasingham's remarks at the press conference also demonstrated the depth of the complexities that are to emerge in future rounds of talks. The path to regional autonomy for the Northern and the Eastern provinces entails the task of incorporating in the existing state of Sri Lanka, the military, administrative and other structures set up by the LTTE. Although many observers are still reluctant to admit it, the LTTE has established in areas under their control structures, institutions and personnel of a quasi-state. Dissolving any of these structures would be totally out of the question. In fact, the LTTE's vision and strategy for regional autonomy presupposes linking their quasi-state to the Sri Lankan state. In that sense, disarming of the LTTE, or de-commissioning of its weapons, or dissolving its fighting units might not be negotiable issues. Similarly, the LTTE is most likely to seek a framework of accommodation for its administrative structures to be incorporated into the arrangements of power sharing with the Sri Lankan state. As much as the LTTE has become flexible by retreating from the project of a separate state, the UNF government will have to keep open the doors of Sri Lanka's state for the regional autonomous entity the Tigers represent.

It is very likely that the next few rounds of talks will mainly focus on the issues of reconstruction and economic development in Sri Lanka's conflict zones. The LTTE will obviously seek a direct role, in partnership and on a par with the Government, in the formulation and implementation of policies pertaining to those tasks. In the process, the LTTE will also get an opportunity to transform its structures of administration and control into institutions of autonomy from below. However, the question of the political and constitutional framework within which this incremental change can occur will, sooner than later, have to come to the centre of the negotiation agenda. That will actually be the real core issue around which the negotiation trajectories in future may revolve. This is where Sri Lanka is very likely to provide an attractive experiment in constitutionalising autonomy claims that are already laid out on the ground.

(The writer is Professor and Head, Department of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Colombo.)

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