The Hindu : LTTE, Hurriyat & self-determination

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Tuesday, Oct 01, 2002

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LTTE, Hurriyat & self-determination — II

By Ajay Darshan Behera

No state, within its capacities, is going to allow its sovereignty to be challenged by allowing secession as a right to self-determination... But, there is also no escape from good governance if people's alienation is to be addressed.

MOST POST-colonial states have been bedevilled by the effort to define nationality in terms of common language, ethnicity, religion etc., as these are insufficient to explain the existing patterns of loyalty to the contemporary "nation-state" — because a sense of nationality is and can only be subjective and a nation cannot be built but only felt.

It is this lack of feeling due to which nationalities have asserted their rights in South Asia as well. Indeed, the two most enduring conflicts in South Asia — the Kashmiri and the Sri Lankan Tamil secessionist movements derive sustenance from the principle of national self-determination. The Kashmiri secessionist leaders have tried to make a political case out of the fact that Jammu and Kashmir was not part of the colonial Indian state and the controversy surrounding its accession. The decision to accede to India was made by the ruler and was not the choice of the people and therefore the people of Jammu and Kashmir should have had a right to decide their political future. Reference is made to the plebiscite clause inserted in the U.N. resolution on Kashmir. It is a different matter that the U.N. resolution has been overtaken by events. But what is not understood is that the plebiscite actually does not allow the people to make their political choices as it allows only two options — accession to either India or Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Hurriyat still refers to the plebiscite as a right to self-determination in the same breath. If anything, the plebiscite is a "pre-determined self-determination". The LTTE-led secessionist project in Sri Lanka is constructed around the recognition of Tamils as a nationality, a Tamil homeland and their right to self-determination. Both these movements are diametrically opposed to the larger concept of a multi-ethnic nationhood.

These aspirations partly had been raised by the rush of post-Cold War secessions, which had implied an approval if not acceptance of the principle of national self-determination. The international community's acceptance of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and according recognition to the seceded territories has conferred to the notion of self-determination certain popularity, if not legitimacy. This may have emboldened secessionist movements to derive strength from the hope that struggles for nationality rights were more likely to secure meaningful external support than lower-keyed appeals for group rights or autonomy.

Further, the vigorous campaign to uphold human rights had provided some legitimacy to the violent struggles of secessionist groups. While states were censured much more severely for human rights violations, the terrorist acts of secessionist groups were mostly overlooked or received mild opprobrium. That perspective was already changing and since September 11 may have significantly changed. The Human Rights Conference held in Geneva in March 1997 recognised the violent methods used by secessionist groups as a violation of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening the territorial integrity and security of states, destabilising legitimately constituted governments, undermining pluralistic civil society and having adverse consequences for economic and social development of states. Even though the use of violence in furthering the national aspirations of ethnic communities no longer receives much political support, the lack of both normative and moral clarity may have been responsible for at least some of the intensification in secessionist violence. This was also the reason why support for such violence could be passed off as support for a movement for self-determination as Pakistan has been doing.

Despite the intensified violence neither the Indian nor the Sri Lankan state succumbed to secessionist demands, as it would mean the self-destruction of the state itself in the case of Sri Lanka and what the Indian state stands for. No state, within its capacities, is going to allow its sovereignty to be challenged by allowing secession as a right to self-determination. But one would be burdened by tremendous moral problems in opposing the principle when massive human rights violation takes place. Or even when reasonable demands for local self-government or group rights get arbitrarily rejected by a central government. There is also no escape from good governance if people's alienation is to be addressed. A multi-national state can have a moral right to oppose self-determination as long as it is able to demonstrate that group rights are genuinely protected.

If culture, language, tradition and group rights can be genuinely protected and promoted within these multi-national states, is the demand for a separate statehood necessary? Given the existing plurality even amongst those groups claiming separation, where does one draw the line for the right to self-determination? Would the Kashmiri secessionist Muslim leaders be willing to grant the right of self-determination to the Dogras, Ladakhis and others? Would the LTTE grant the same right to the Muslims? With the spread of democratisation in whatever form, is it not possible to link self-determination to political participation within post-colonial states? If group identities can be protected and appropriate mechanisms instituted for democratic self-government to guarantee effective participation by all in the economic and political life of a country, it would obviate the need for separate statehood. After years of guerrilla struggle the Indian state was able to contain the expression of Mizo nationality by granting greater autonomy to Mizoram.

The LTTE, even while restating one of the Thimpu principles — the recognition of the Tamils right to self-determination — has come out with a qualified position at the Sattahip talks, that is, it would still favour secession if autonomy were denied. The optimist would look at it as the LTTE's willingness to re-interpret national self-determination within the confines of the Sri Lankan nation-state. The pessimist may soon get reasons to believe that, as usual, this is another tactical move by the LTTE, if it insists on dominating the interim administration without a franchise. Those who claim to speak on behalf of their nation should be able to demonstrate their mandate through free and fair elections. This goes without saying for both the Hurriyat and the LTTE. The Hurriyat's claim to being the sole representatives of the Kashmiris is contested and India's institutionalised electoral machinery will throw up leaders who represent the aspirations of the Kashmiris. The LTTE, so far, has emerged as the sole representative of the Tamils by establishing hegemony over the other militant groups by force. There are serious doubts whether the LTTE would be able to lay the foundations of a more just and equitable political and social order. Even if the Sri Lankan Tamils share this pessimism, the Sri Lankan state has to take the LTTE seriously.

There is a fundamental difference in the way the Sri Lankan state treats the LTTE and the Indian state treats the Hurriyat. While the LTTE controls the means of violence, the Hurriyat has been riding piggyback on means of violence controlled by other actors and the Pakistani state. Even if the Hurriyat were to ever gain an independent nation-state, it would still not have the monopoly over the means of violence. It has not understood the implications of this. One can have a dialogue with the LTTE because it has the capacity to call off the violence. The Hurriyat even if it desires is not in a position to do so. Only a state willing to make grave compromises would carry out a dialogue with the Hurriyat.

Neither the Hurriyat nor the LTTE is in a position to impose a secessionist right to self-determination on the state. The LTTE perhaps has realised this and therefore is probably willing to discuss the extent of autonomy within the confines of the Sri Lankan state. The Hurriyat hoping that Pakistan and the international community would come to its aid has failed to understand how much the world has changed. The LTTE has made a positive first move and rekindled hopes; the Hurriyat, if it still wishes to remain relevant, should start thinking of a non-secessionist right to self-determination.

(Concluded.)

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LTTE, Hurriyat & self-determination — II