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Nehru and Indo-Soviet ties

By Inder Malhotra

Coinciding with the visit to this country of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, is the publication of the 31st volume in the second series of Jawaharlal Nehru's Selective Works. The most remarkable of its several notable features is the unveiling, for the first time, of the record of conversations between Nehru and the first two Russian (Soviet) leaders, N.A. Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, ever to come to this country or, for that matter, to any ``non-Socialist developing country''.

The extended visit of ``B & K,'' as the duo was then called, was an international sensation, not least because of the extremely enthusiastic popular welcome to the Soviet leaders. Nehru's own accounts of the event refer repeatedly to what happened in Kolkata. Welcoming crowds there were unimaginably huge. The VVIP car could move only at a snail's pace until it broke down completely. India's most honoured guests had to be taken to Raj Bhavan in a Black Maria of the Kolkata Police.

In the available space it is not possible to excavate the treasure trove that the 31st volume is on a host of subjects, ranging from States reorganisation to the preparation of the Second Five Year Plan, besides the all-important visit of the Soviet leaders. Even the conversations between Nehru and his senior colleagues on the one hand, and Khrushchev and Bulganin on the other, cover so vast a canvas that it would be foolhardy to attempt a comprehensive discussion on them. For the present, therefore, let me concentrate on only one critically important item on the agenda, with only slight introductory digression.

In the preceding paragraph, I have reversed the order in which the two Soviet leaders were officially mentioned all through their Indian journey. This has been done only because, as the minutes of three long meetings show, Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party, was Panditji's interlocutor, not Bulganin, the Prime Minister. The relevance of this fact increases because the only subject from among many that I am singling out is the ``role of the Communist Party of India'' that, Nehru said, was ``often in conflict with the nationalist sentiment and, therefore, aroused ``ill-feelings against the Community Party''. These affected Indo-Soviet ``friendship and cooperation'' and he did not want this to happen.

Nehru recalled in some detail the CPI's conduct during World War II. He fleetingly mentioned the CPI-led insurrection in Telengana in 1948-49, and pointed out that ``until this year (1955) the Communist Party was saying that Indian people were not independent; they even opposed our National Day celebrations''. Acknowledging that since his own visit to the Soviet Union, the Indian Communists were ``confused'' about what they should do, he rubbed in three points.

First, whenever Indian Communists were confused, according to their own statements, they ``had to get instructions from the Soviet Union''. Early in 1951-52, ``some principal leaders of the CPI'' had gone to Moscow ``secretly and without passports.'' On return, they said they had ``got directions from Mr. Stalin ... The line then laid down was one of full opposition to Government and, where possible, petty insurrections.'' According to ``fresh instructions'' brought by A.K. Ghosh from the Soviet Union, the CPI was ``playing down'' opposition to the Government but remained ``ready to start insurrection again when necessary.''

Secondly, the CPI got ``considerable sums of money from outside the country.'' It had few sources of income in India, but had purchased valuable properties. Nehru's third point was that the peace movement had become an instrument to ``promote Communism, not peace.''

Khrushchev's response, as elaborate as his host's presentation, was a masterpiece of courteous evasion. He began by joining Nehru in regretting that anything done by the CPI should come in the way of the ``growing friendship' between Indian and the USSR.

There was, he hastened to add, ``exaggeration' about the ``part which the Soviet Communist Party was supposed to be playing in leading Communist parties in other countries. With the abolition of the Comintern there was no organisation for leading Communist parties in other countries. The Cominform never got together ever once.''

The Soviet leader then said, ``on his word of honour'', that the Soviet Communist Party had ``no connection with the Indian Communist Party.'' He knew ``by name the Secretary of the CPI, Mr. Ghosh''. He had seen ``him but never had an opportunity of a discussion with him.'' And so it went on.

Even in the midst of most-friendly discussions, Nehru was rather unhappy with Khrushchev's ``exuberant speeches'' criticising nations friendly to India. He did not say this directly to B & K but the message was somehow conveyed.

The other side of the coin was best summed up in the opening paragraph of Nehru's letter on the subject to Edwina Mountbatten.

The visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev, he wrote, ``has raised the temperature of some of the British papers or their writers... . I associated some restraint and some balance of mind with them but evidently this is lacking now. I am distressed.''

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