The Hindu : LoC and its conversion as border

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Jan 20, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

LoC and its conversion as border

By K.K. Katyal

The very vehemence of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front president, Amanullah Khan's protest against the perceived implied approval by the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, of the idea to convert the Line of Control into the international border suggests that the proposal was, perhaps, not altogether baseless or mischievously speculative as it used to be described in the past.

"No smoke without fire" was the comment of the Pakistani observers whenever a similar indication of the official thinking was available in the past. This is not for the first time that such a proposition had been mooted by quarters, remotely, if not directly, connected with the Pakistan establishment. It would be premature — and unrealistic — at this stage, to interpret such reports as evidencing firm official support or sponsorship, but nonetheless, these are not to be rejected summarily. A former president of the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and chairman of Pakistan's Kashmir Committee, Qayyum Khan, who had been supportive of the conversion idea, has reiterated his point again now. It is, however, far-fetched to see the government's backing behind his latest statement simply because the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Riaz Khokar, met him a day earlier.

In India, Farooq Abdullah came out openly in support of the proposal during his tenure as Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. In both the countries, sizeable sections have commended this idea in private, off-the-record conversations though they have yet to pick up the courage to go public. There are signs of departure in Pakistan — among non-officials — from the tough line of the former Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar, who used to describe the LoC "as a problem, not a solution". During the negotiations of the Shimla Agreement in 1972, then Pakistan President, Z.A. Bhutto, as has been mentioned in these columns more than once, was agreeable to the idea of treating the LoC as the permanent border but wanted time to prepare the public opinion in his country. That he went back on his word later is a different story.

The governments of both the countries take a tough line on the subject. India cites a resolution of Parliament, laying claim on the entire State, including the areas under Pakistan's control and those given by it to China. Pakistan on the other hand, rejects any deal, saying it is not a territorial dispute but an issue "related to the aspirations of the people for freedom from Indian control". It is understandable for them to take the tough position, otherwise they run the risk of weakening their bargaining position in any future dialogue on the Kashmir issue.

There are reasons to believe that other countries, including the major powers, would like the problem to be resolved by treating the LoC as the border, along with other measures, like maximum autonomy for the people of Kashmir and the PoK, and easy movement by them across the dividing line. Though none of the outside powers is explicit or specific, but most of them including the known friends of Pakistan, have openly suggested give-and-take or compromise. And, of course, all of them, including the known friends of India, want the two countries to resume their dialogue, even as they understand New Delhi's concerns over continued infiltration and Islamabad's failure to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure.

The reality in the subcontinent, however, is far from encouraging, there being no prospect of contacts between the two countries in the foreseeable future. Islamabad shows little evidence of translating into reality the assurances given by Gen. Musharraf to put an end to infiltration, now and permanently. On its part, New Delhi has taken an inflexible stand — no talks till the infiltration ends.

In doing so, New Delhi has been indulging in pretences. It has played down the insistence of the world community on initiating talks with Pakistan and played up their reservations about Islamabad's policies and role. This is evident from India's projection of the recent statements of a senior U.S. official, Richard Haass. It picked up his concern over continued infiltration but ignored his plea for acknowledging the "positive" aspects of Pakistan's policy and Gen. Musharraf's "vision" to reform Pakistan or the U.S. disapproval of the policy of pre-conditions for talks.

Many in the ruling camp, officials not excluded, talk of the prospects of Pakistan's isolation. How does it square up with the recent pluses of Islamabad — election to the U.N. Security Council, growing proximity to the U.S., the Iranian President, Mohammed Khatami's visit to Pakistan (seen in Islamabad as a positive turning point in bilateral relations) and plans for Gen. Musharraf's visit to Moscow in the first week of February?

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