The Hindu : Road to rapprochement?

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Monday, May 05, 2003

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Road to rapprochement?

By K. K. Katyal

The prospects for contacts have, no doubt, brightened but for meaningful results, the two sides (India and Pakistan) will have to show a strong political will.

RECALL THE headlines on India-Pakistan affairs a month ago and see the front pages of the last two or three days' newspapers and you will find a sea change. The suddenness as also the enormity of the difference seems inexplicable and opinions differ on the how and the why of it. Let this not detract from the significance of the new steps, symbolic and substantive, proposed to be undertaken by the two sides.

The "hand of friendship'', extended to Pakistan by the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, on April 18, led first to a phone call from his counterpart, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, and, then, to India's decision to reverse the process of downgrading diplomatic relations and appoint a High Commissioner in Islamabad and to restore the civil aviation links on a reciprocal basis. It is a delicate new beginning and needs to be protected from negative factors of the type that led to the undoing of the earlier two initiatives — Mr. Vajpayee's bus journey to Lahore in February 1999 and the Agra summit in July 2001.

Why did the Lahore process fail? Because the civilian government in Pakistan, headed by Nawaz Sharif, and the military establishment were not on the same wavelength, especially on sensitive matters such as relations with India. And as subsequent events showed, the two arms worked at cross purposes, and just when Mr. Sharif was talking peace with Mr. Vajpayee, the then army chief, Pervez Musharraf, was planning for occupation of Kargil in Jammu and Kashmir. Happily, there is no such danger now because of the unquestioned supremacy of Gen. Musharraf in the present dispensation. Mr. Jamali, it is clear, is acting at the behest of his "boss''.

The Agra summit failed because of two factors — one, Pakistan's insistence on the centrality of the Kashmir issue and, two, its reluctance to show an understanding of India's concern over cross-border terrorism. The Pakistani side made much of the "last-minute change" in India's stand, because of which the "agreed" draft declaration could not be finalised. This was seen as the handiwork of hardliners among the top leadership — the Deputy Prime Minister, L. K. Advani, and others of his way of thinking who were supposed to have prevailed upon the moderation of Mr. Vajpayee.

The top leaders descended on the Agra summit from above, as it were, without making use of the preparatory work by sherpas, as is customary in such cases. It was Pakistan which had insisted on top-down approach, on the plea that a directive from the political top would ensure against petty bickering by bureaucrats. India reluctantly agreed to that approach. Now Pakistan realises the utility of suitable groundwork. Gen. Musharraf then took an oversimplistic view — he could not understand all that fuss over the draft declaration, he told a press conference on his return home, adding that he would not take more than an hour to prepare a one-page document.

As for substantive matters, Islamabad, while still regarding Kashmir as the core issue, does not appear to insist on old expressions. It has now veered round to the Indian formulation, favouring a comprehensive dialogue — on all outstanding issues, including Kashmir. This marked a return to the Lahore approach, rejected by Gen. Musharraf after the coup. The earlier allergy to mentioning other issues like trade and economic ties, people-to-people contacts and cultural relations without a reference to the "core issue" is no longer there.

The delicate period between Mr. Vajpayee's friendship offer and his statement in Parliament on restoration of severed link passed off without a major mishap. In India, the new initiative was generally hailed with the exception, ironically, of the BJP. In Pakistan, too, there was no dearth of doubting Thomases.

Mr. Vajpayee's address to the BJP parliamentary party the week before last was the first opportunity to broach the delicate subject — of new approach to Pakistan — to his MPs. The members, by and large, were unenthusiastic, even sceptical, wondering whether India had given up the earlier insistence on ending trans-border terrorism as a precondition for resuming a dialogue with Pakistan. But they were restrained in their reaction. On his part, Mr. Vajpayee neatly balanced a low-key but factual narration of the developments, culminating in the phone call from Mr. Jamali. This neat balance, however, was upset by the parliamentary party spokesman, Vijay Kumar Malhotra's press briefing of the meeting. He ascribed a bluntness to Mr. Vajpayee which the Prime Minister, perhaps, took care to avoid.

The reaction in Pakistan was two-fold. Mr. Jamali was cautious in his interpretation of Mr. Vajpayee's remark. He had talked to Mr. Vajpayee, not to the BJP, he said emphasising that the party spokesman's statement would not affect the latest initiative. In any case, if Mr. Vajpayee could not visit Pakistan, he was prepared to undertake a trip to India. Official Islamabad, it was clear, was keen on keeping up the momentum, generated by the "hand of friendship" offer.

A section of the Pakistani press was not that tolerant. The Urdu papers, in particular, were not prepared to dismiss Mr. Malhotra's remark as of no consequence, seeing it, on the other hand, as a truer index of the current political reality.

Mr. Vajpayee's statement in Parliament was significant in many ways. It was the first occasion to move from the general to the concrete. It was the first pointer of New Delhi's intentions, both in the immediate and medium term. While reiterating the Indian stand as incorporated in the parliamentary resolution adopted some years ago — that the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir (including the portion under Pakistan's control and the areas ceded by Islamabad to China) was part of India — the Prime Minister signalled a flexibility when he said that he was prepared to discuss this issue in a friendly atmosphere, adding "there should be no battle on this".

Both India and Pakistan are noticeably emphatic in denying that they are acting under American pressure. Such disclaimers are understandable but by no means convincing. There is enough circumstantial evidence to the contrary. As a matter of fact, Mr. Vajpayee seemed to accept the validity of this point when he wanted the re-engagement with Pakistan to be seen in (the context of) the changed global situation, with the world standing on one pole. There had been no mistaking the post-Iraq agenda of the U.S., with priority to the Israel-Palestine problem, North Korea and Jammu and Kashmir.

New Delhi could have the satisfaction that Pakistan, too, would experience American pressure, despite Washington's certificate to Gen. Musharraf's helpful role in countering terrorism. Of course, the U.S. vision has been limited to the activities of the Al- Qaeda and Taliban cadres, and does not cover the jehadi outfits in areas under Pakistan's control. The U.S. would want Islamabad to live up to the policies enunciated by Gen. Musharraf on January 12 last year and the assurances given to its Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage. Islamabad may come out with a re-assuring statement on the subject, meant to address India's concern over infiltration and cross-border terrorism — to help New Delhi give up any pre-conditions for talks.

What could the resumed dialogue be like? The more things change, the more they are the same. The next round may, thus, conform to the format agreed upon by the two Prime Ministers of the day, I. K. Gujral and Mr. Sharif, during the June 1997 Male SAARC summit. They identified eight outstanding issues, of which the first two were: peace and security, including CBMs, and Jammu and Kashmir. The prospects for contacts have, no doubt, brightened but for meaningful results, the two sides will have to show a strong political will — and negotiating skill.

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