The Hindu : AN UNRELIABLE ALLY

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Mar 22, 2004

Opinion

Opinion - Editorials

AN UNRELIABLE ALLY

THE INDIFFERENCE DISPLAYED by the United States to India's sensitivities and concerns has deflated some of the hype about a strategic relationship between the two countries. While U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell might view the decision to designate Pakistan a "major non-NATO ally" as having little more than symbolic value, he could not have been unaware that New Delhi would react negatively. If the Ministry of External Affairs had imagined it could act nonchalant or brazen its way out of an embarrassing situation, it was not allowed to do so by the State Department and the Opposition parties. With the State Department declaring bluntly that Mr. Powell had not taken his host into confidence during his recent visit to India, the Ministry could not make out that it had not been left out of the loop. That provided the Opposition the opportunity to criticise the Government for both its failure to anticipate the decision and its hyperbolic utterances on the health of Indo-U.S. relations. The Government did not retrieve any ground by registering its disappointment. At one level, the response implies that official India continues to regard any concession made to Pakistan as ipso facto detrimental to its own interests. At another level, it raises the possibility that New Delhi will grab the chance to acquire the same status if Washington makes an offer (as it has vaguely hinted it might). Official India will be doing itself a favour by learning lessons from Pakistan's experience as an American ally.

The grant of a special status is part of a carrot and stick policy that the U.S. has pursued to make Pakistan take on a more pro-active role in the campaign against extremist Islamicist groups. While Islamabad has resisted pressure to permit American troops on its soil, it has launched a strong offensive against Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. These operations seem to have been quite effective. However, the Pakistan Government has to contend with increasing opposition from religious parties that have agitated in parliament and on the streets. With armed tribesmen from the Frontier agencies joining the militants in the fight against the paramilitary forces, Islamabad is not in a mood to listen to Washington's exhortations that it should intensify the offensive. The Pakistan Government sought to fend off this demand by noting that it had committed 70,000 troops to these operations while there are fewer than 13,000 foreign soldiers on the western side of the Durand Line. However, the U.S. is not bereft of additional leverage since it has sufficient evidence to demolish the myth that the military-dominated establishment was unaware of, and uninvolved in, the nuclear proliferation activities of Dr. A.Q. Khan's network.

While Islamabad welcomed the U.S. gesture, it has not forgotten the bitter lesson taught by history. The alliances that the two countries struck in phases over the past half-century were abruptly ended once the superpower attained its objectives. Mr. Powell promised that the new relationship would endure since the U.S. had a stake in assisting Pakistan achieve a democratic order, eradicate poverty, and curb internal strife. However, promises of this nature will not be sufficient to enthuse a Pakistani establishment that is looking for more substantive benefits. Its reservations will be eased only if the new relationship leads to a resumption of military supplies, especially spare parts for an ageing fleet of F-16 aircraft. Pakistan might have become eligible to acquire advanced weaponry from its patron, but it lacks the finances to pay for these purchases.

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