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Thursday, May 19, 2005

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Dangers of the LTTE's air capability

R. Hariharan

That the LTTE has flouted the spirit of the peace process with total impunity to strengthen its ability to wage war should be a matter of concern for the international community.

SINCE THE end of last year, the Sri Lankan media have reported off and on about the newly acquired air capability of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In February 2005, a press report said President Chandrika Kumaratunga had even told the two former American Presidents, George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton, about this in the course of her briefing on the tsunami disaster and relief work organised by her Government.

The Sri Lanka Air Force Chief Air Marshal Donald Perera had briefed the President on the LTTE's capability from information gained through surveillance by unmanned aerial vehicles some time in November 2003. The surveillance revealed that the Tamil militants had built an airstrip near Iranamadu tank in the Wanni area and a light aircraft was seen there. A number of reconnaissance missions are reported to have shown a paved 1250-metre-long runway at the site and video footage of at least one light aircraft landing at the airstrip. One more light aircraft was probably based there. Air Marshal Perera had said the two planes spotted on the new airstrip were similar to the Czech-built Zlin Z-143. He also said the Tigers were training their own pilots and were well on the way to establishing a full-fledged air force.

The runway length indicates a capability to operate medium-sized aircraft such as Dorniers with ease. Dorniers used by Indian security forces have the capability to lift one section of commando troops (12 to 14 persons) with their load or about 1.2 tonnes of cargo. Basically, the LTTE gaining air capability will mean loss of the Government's sovereign control of Sri Lankan airspace.

Apart from this, it provides the LTTE capability to strike at a place of its choosing without telegraphing its intentions. Thus even with limited air capability, a commando raid of the type carried out by the LTTE at the Katunayake airport becomes much easier to execute. A light aircraft can evade radar surveillance because of its minuscule signature and low flying capability. Some of the more deadly uses of a light aircraft should be causing sleepless nights to those in charge of security at Temple Trees, the official residence of the Sri Lankan President. Even in the U.S., where the airspace above the White House is well sanitised, on more than one occasion light aircraft have penetrated the safety systems.

Deadly uses of light aircraft

Apart from the extreme use of an aircraft for a suicide attack as was done during 9/11, even light aircraft give LTTE a number of added operational capabilities. Airborne commando missions both on land and at sea, ability to fly in arms and supplies from abroad, surveillance of naval ships and troops, airborne direction of artillery fire, evacuation of casualties, and spiriting away leaders at short notice are some of these.

The LTTE appears to have built the airstrip between mid 2003 and end 2004. In this period, the LTTE was vociferously demanding the resumption of the peace process. This is so typical of the LTTE, which has refined the art of doublespeak springing strategic operational surprises even while involved in a peace process.

Technology as a force multiplier: At all times, whether peace or war, the LTTE has been on a quest to acquire new military technology. This process helps it in three ways — it keeps up the morale of the fighters, opens up new areas and methods of operation, and achieves tactical and strategic surprise upsetting the enemy. It also becomes a good bargaining ploy when trade-offs are required in a peace settlement.

The LTTE has always had ambitions of air power. Even during the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) operations in 1988, we had recovered assembly parts of micro light aircraft from LTTE hideouts along with plans with manuals. Subsequently, during its operations Sri Lanka forces had also found an LTTE engineering workshop with aircraft spares. In late 1988, the LTTE acquired surface-to-air missiles, which were used effectively in the later years against the Sri Lankan air force. Since then it has moved on to augment its artillery, radar systems, and naval capability. So acquiring air capability was a logical sequence in LTTE's vision for creating a full-fledged armed force.

Vision of Tamil Eelam: Undoubtedly, the LTTE acquiring air capability improves its image as the world's best organised insurgent force. It also shows that the LTTE is giving form and content to its vision of land, air and sea operational freedom. The fact that the LTTE had invested precious resources of time, energy and money to acquire the air capability indicates that it would continue with the process of technical refinement and technology acquisition to improve its fighting capability despite the ongoing peace process. In short, the LTTE as a fighting force will continue, whether in the end the Tamil Eelam that comes out as an entity is within a federal set-up or otherwise. So much for LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakaran's much heralded readiness to accept a solution within the federal framework!

Ability to beat the U.S. sanctions: The LTTE has shown that despite U.S. and European Union sanctions, it has the ability to internationally muster large scale financial and technical resources required for its projects and move them to Sri Lanka clandestinely. This is not a happy situation for Sri Lanka or India, the immediate neighbour.

The LTTE's record shows that it used every peace pause to acquire more weapons. After the current peace process began, by the first half of 2004 the LTTE had received 11 shiploads of arms. The fact that the LTTE has flouted the spirit of the peace process with total impunity to strengthen its ability to wage war should be a matter of concern for international community. It also highlights the ineffectiveness of the present terms of operation of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, a toothless entity with its capability limited to issuing watered-down statements.

The lack of unity among Sri Lankan political parties on the question of talks with the LTTE is delaying the resumption of the peace dialogue. The LTTE has put this delay to good use by augmenting its strike capability. Thus when the peace process is resumed Colombo's negotiators will face a stronger LTTE in a better bargaining position.

The LTTE's single airstrip and a few light aircraft may not be a major threat to Indian security in the conventional sense. However, India should take a hard look at it at two levels — vis-à-vis its Sri Lanka policy options and the security measures against the LTTE's offensive terrorist capability, which has been augmented.

The LTTE has emerged as a more ruthless and much better organised killing machine since the IPKF days. So the validity of foreign policy dispensations of IPKF vintage needs a fresh scrutiny. When the Sea Tigers came into being as a naval force, the Government of India blissfully ignored it despite it becoming a third naval force that could intrude into the waters of India and Sri Lanka without any legitimacy whatsoever. This perhaps enabled the LTTE to get it legitimised in the eyes of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, which had tried to equate it with the Sri Lankan Navy.

Viewed in this context, it was disappointing to note External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh's bland statement, "We are concerned about the LTTE having built an airstrip and having two aeroplanes and there's news about more coming," in the course of his recent interview ( The Hindu , May 7). However, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, at his meeting with Erik Solheim, the Norwegian peace envoy, in New Delhi on May 11, is reported to have stated that India was "bitterly opposed to LTTE dictatorship." It is time the Government of India came out with a detailed and unambiguous statement on the various aspects of the Sri Lankan issue including on the LTTE, the Tamils right to be their own masters in a federal Sri Lanka, and the peace process. Otherwise, the LTTE would only be encouraged to strengthen its armed capability much to the detriment of peace in this part of the subcontinent.

As regards the security aspects, proactively we need to initiate security measures taking into consideration the LTTE's augmented capability to launch and carry out commando operations using its air capability. Those who consider this alarmist would do well to remember the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, plotted and executed with precision by the very same organisation after Indian troops pulled out of Sri Lanka. Precautionary measures could include tightening surveillance of less used airstrips, deploying intelligence assets for gathering specific information on procurement of aircraft spares, aviation fuel, and training of LTTE pilots in Tamil Nadu and adjoining States. Of course, India should also maintain a continuous surveillance of the activities at the airstrip.

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