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West Asian crisis — winners and losers

Chinmaya R. Gharekhan

The whole area will be even more radicalised than it was before the eruption of the crisis. The biggest losers are the innocent men, women, and children who are the victims of the conflict.

THE CONTOURS of a possible end to the current crisis in West Asia — ceasefire, deployment of a robust international force, demand for full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559, and return of the kidnapped Israeli soldiers — are beginning to emerge though they are still hazy. There is no uncertainty, however, about the winners and losers as and when the crisis comes to a close.

The most obvious gainer will be the Islamist forces in the region. The whole area will be even more radicalised than it was before the eruption of the crisis. Some governments in the region have been critical of Hamas and, even more so, of Hizbollah for provoking Israel into a highly belligerent mood. Even some Lebanese NGOs, reflecting public opinion, have been critical of Hizbollah for inviting Israeli wrath upon their country. Nevertheless, public opinion at large in West Asia and "Arab Street" is strongly supportive of, and has derived immense emotional satisfaction from, what Hamas and Hizbollah have done. The gain by the extremist forces will not be confined to Palestine and Lebanon; it will spread to the entire region, and perhaps well beyond. Khaled Meshaal, the Hamas leader based in Damascus, would probably believe that his position has strengthened following recent events. In today's globalised and internet-connected world, we should be prepared for some fallout even in India.

At a time when the global tensions between Sunnis and Shias are intensifying, it is ironical that Hamas, a Sunni movement, and Hizbollah, an entirely Shia organisation, appear to be cooperating with each other in what they regard as their common struggle against their common enemy.

Israel obviously expects to severely weaken, if not eliminate, the pain-inflicting capabilities of Hizbollah and Hamas. Israel knows that these two cannot be eradicated, but it hopes that they could be crushed to an extent that Israel would enjoy immunity from Qassam rockets and Katyusha missiles for a long, long time. If Israel is indeed able to destroy most of the infrastructure, particularly of Hizbollah, it would achieve one of its principal objectives. There would also probably be a deal involving return of the kidnapped Israeli soldiers and the release, with a time lapse, of Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners. In that case, all three sides would gain.

Nearly all Western analysts seem to be convinced that it is Iran which has instigated Hamas and Hizbollah into initiating the crisis. Iran and Syria are believed to have collaborated in this exercise. Iran's interest allegedly was to divert attention from its own nuclear confrontation with the West, whereas Syria's motive would have been to stress its relevance to the solution of any problem in West Asia as well as to delay, if not do away altogether with, the investigation into the murder of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri. Both Iran and Syria reject having anything to do with the actions of Hamas and Hizbollah. Iran's influence in Arab Street might increase, but it will not succeed in averting action in the Security Council, if indeed this was its objective. As for Syria, it is anxious to avoid Israeli military action against it. Syria is reported to have MIG 29s and Sukhois. Apparently, it also has a good anti-air missile system. However, Syria has been careful not to indulge in extreme rhetoric against Israel. By the same token, Israel also does not seem anxious to widen the conflict by launching air strikes against Syria at this stage. Syria will gain sympathy and some support because it has opened its borders to refugees and evacuees; not only Lebanese but also other nationalities.

Other clear and big gainers are the oil producing countries and oil companies. Correspondingly, oil consumers are the big losers.

When it comes to losers, the situation is clearer. The biggest losers are the innocent men, women, and children of Palestine, Lebanon, as well as Israel who are the victims of the conflict. In addition to the grievous human losses, Palestine and Lebanon have suffered enormous damage to infrastructure. The declared military objective of Israel is to set Lebanon back 20-30 years. Palestine had hardly anything by way of a developed infrastructure but whatever little it had has been rendered defunct. This in effect amounts to a loss for the international donor community — the European Union, Japan, and rich Arab countries — which will have to cough up more money to rebuild the Palestinian economy. Some facilities in Israel also have been hit but given Israel's enormous economic strength, it would recover in a short period of time.

The other big loser will be the forces of moderation in the region. This, of course, is a corollary to the strengthening of the extremist sentiments mentioned earlier. Palestinian President Abbas had managed to reach agreement with Hamas on the formation of a unity government and the recognition of Israel, albeit indirect, with Hamas on the basis of the so-called Prisoners Document, when the June 25 incident causing the death of two soldiers and kidnapping of one Israeli soldier took place. As a result of the ongoing crisis, President Abbas who is the most moderate Palestinian leader ever, will be considerably weakened. In Israel, the peace lobby, which had lost much of its constituency in recent years, will further lose ground. To that extent, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's decision to unilaterally settle Israel's borders will get increased support from the Israeli public as well as from abroad, especially the United States. As for Lebanon, the various political groupings had been engaged in a "national dialogue" over the past several months. One does not know whether that dialogue would have succeeded but the chances of its success now stand severely reduced and would depend on the terms on which the crisis ends. Hizbollah might have lost sympathy with some sections of Lebanese population, but since it is an important constituent of the Lebanese Government, its voice would continue to be influential. Hizbollah also would be a loser since much of its military capability would surely be eliminated, but it would remain a very potent ideological and political force in the region.

Role for the U.N.

The United Nations will have to be very careful and cautious in responding to the demands that will surely be made upon it in the coming weeks. The Security Council will not be convened until Israel gives the green signal to the United States, once it concludes that it has achieved its military objectives. (The situation is somewhat similar to December 1971 when the Soviet Union kept vetoing Security Council's calls for a ceasefire in the war of Bangladesh's independence to give time to the Indian armed forces to accomplish their mission.)

In addition to a ceasefire, the deployment of an international stabilisation force in Southern Lebanon is being mentioned. The purpose of deploying the force, in place of the existing UNIFIL, would be secure implementation of Security Council resolution 1559, in other words to eliminate Hizbullah's presence from the territory bordering Israel so that it would no longer be in a position to threaten Israel with Katyushas and other more deadly, accurate and long-range missiles. It is a foregone conclusion that any such force would be deployed with the endorsement of the Security Council. But the involvement of the United Nations itself should depend on the mandate of the force. It is safe to assume that the force would be set up under the mandatory provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. If the mandate will include forcible disarming of the Hizbullah militia, the U.N. would be well advised to outsource the operation to an external agency such as the "coalition of the willing" or NATO. The mandate will need to be spelt out without any ambiguity.

The Somalia experience is worth recalling in this context. In December 1992, the United States sent an expeditionary force to Somalia, which was a totally failed state by that time, to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian assistance in the country. The Security Council resolution, which authorised the United States and other countries to send the force, specifically demanded that the force should create a secure environment in Somalia to enable the assistance to reach the needy. Secretary-General Boutros Ghali interpreted the call for creation of a "secure environment" as a demand for forcible disarming of the militias run by the warlords. The U.S. rejected this interpretation and refused to disarm the militias as any such attempt would inevitably have cost American casualties. This was in fact the beginning of the misunderstanding between the U.S. and Boutros Boutros Ghali, which culminated in the U.S. vetoing a second term for him. While no two situations are completely alike, the U.N. will do well to keep this experience in mind while responding to the demands that will be made of it in the coming days; otherwise it could turn out to be a big loser. India too would have to weigh all the pros and cons in case it is asked to contribute to such a force, which would have to be deployed in a hostile environment.

(Author of The Horseshoe Table: An Inside View of the UN Security Council.)

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