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THE DRAFT COMMUNICATIONS Bill, approved recently by the Group of Ministers, is a watered-down version of the draft Information, Communication and Entertainment Act of India, 2000 proposed earlier by the Group on Convergence, headed by Mr. Fali Nariman. The new Bill paves the way for a `super regulator' -- the Communications Commission of India -- for various communication services. Except for the firm indication that the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, the Telecom Regulator y Authority of India, 1997 and the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 would be repealed after the passage of this Bill, it is hardly of any significance. Its biggest drawback is its failure to address the key questions re lating to `convergence' of broadcasting, telecommunications and Internet technologies.

The creation of the Communications Commission, which will be empowered to issue independent licences for network, application and content application services, without spelling out its role in the context of `convergence', makes mockery of this authority . Thus, in its current form, it will merely be an amalgam of all licences granted in the field of telecommunications, broadcasting and the Internet. Unlike the ICE Act, which defines `broadcasting service', `local delivery service or cable TV service' an d `basic service' in the context of a `Convergence Service Operator', the Communications Bill ignores all these. The ICE Act has even gone one step further by creating an Information, Communication and Entertainment Authority of India which is expected to have two wings -- the Carriage Bureau (representing the telecommunications field) and Content Bureau (for broadcasting and TV) -- each to be headed by independent commissioners. In contrast, the Communications Bill only lays down some broa d functions of the Communications Commission.

While the ICE Act spells out clearly the objectives of the ICE Authority, the Communications Bill does not even refer to the objectives of the Communications Commission. The lack of clarity on the objectives of the Communications Commission is probably t he weakest link in the Bill. The ICE Act dwells on fairly significant objectives of the ICE Authority, ranging from the need to keep the technology, licensing and decisions related to competition issues in the public domain, creating conditions to allow investors to invest in a competitive market where competing technologies such as cable modems, digital subscriber lines, terrestrial wireless, satellite and others, provide consumers with real alternatives to the removal of the ban on IP telephony and vo ice-over IP (Internet Protocol). Probably the only common aspect of the ICE Act and the Communications Bill is the spectrum management and assignment functions. The motive force for vesting the spectrum management function with the Communications Commiss ion/ICE Authority was the need to divest the Wireless Planning Commission of this power. But on the modalities of spectrum management, the ICE Act and the Communications Bill differ completely. The ICE Act wants the spectrum management function vested wi th the Office of the Spectrum Manager, an independent body accountable to the ICE Authority. But the Communications Bill seeks that the Centre notify a competent authority to carry out the spectrum planning, co-ordination and assignment functions, defeat ing the need to vest this power with an independent non-government authority.

Ultimately, it appears that the Communications Bill, in the present form, without addressing the key issues of convergence, will probably be an exercise in futility. The need to create a `super regulator', the Communications Commission, without spelling out its objectives and functions in an environment of convergence, hardly justifies this piece of legislation.