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Kashmir: To the summit without sherpas

B. Raman

PROACTIVE on Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), reactive on other issues.

That is emerging as the likely negotiating strategy of General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive and President of Pakistan, during his forthcoming summit with Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Indian Prime Minister, at Agra.

As part of his preparations for the summit, he has held discussions with carefully-selected groups of mainstream and religious political leaders, religious leaders (Ulema) without any political affiliation and leaders of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) a nd heads/representatives of pro-Pakistan overseas Kashmiri organisations.

To assuage the anger of Hurriyat over Gen Musharraf allegedly succumbing to Indian pressure in not inviting its leaders for a meeting in the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi, he has invited the Hurriyat representatives in Pakistan for his interacti ons with PoK leaders. The President also reportedly intends meeting leaders of the so-called United Jihad Council -- a conglomeration of Pakistan-based terrorist organisations headed by Syed Salahuddin, leader of the Hizbul Mujahideen -- to reassure them that there has been no change in Pakistan's attitude towards the Hurriyat and no softening of its stance on Kashmir. This meeting was originally not in his programme.

He has reportedly held a secret meeting with the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) last month when he visited its headquarters at Muridke along with Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, a Corps Commander at Lahore.

No political or religious leader of the northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan was invited to his meetings. Nor did the Gen. invite many of the prominent leaders of Sindhi, Balochi and Pakhtoon organisations, which have been demanding provincial autonomy or independence.

Even though the interactions were supposed to cover all subjects likely to figure in the summit, the discussions were largely confined to Kashmir, except in the meeting with the Ulema, during which the latter virulently criticised the former Pakistan Pri me Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, for importing sugar from India and accused him of covertly promoting normalisation of trade with India in violation of the national policy of ``no normal trade till the Kashmir issue is resolved''.

The Pakistan Foreign Office has set up a number of inter-ministerial/departmental co-ordination groups, presided over by the concerned official, to prepare background/position papers on various subjects such as J&K, the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, normalisation of bilateral trade relations, reopening of the Indian Consulate in Karachi and the regular functioning of the Pakistani Consulate in Mumbai, the Wullar barrage and Siachen issues, and greater people-to-people contacts, which could figure in the summit.

At the same time, the concerned officials have been saying the fact that such co-ordination groups have been set up need not necessarily mean that all these subjects would figure in the agenda. According to them, as of now, the agenda is unstructured, wi th the only certainty being that the main focus will be on J&K.

However, Usman Aminuddin, Minister for Petroleum, is in Washington, reportedly to find out, inter alia, whether the existing US sanctions against Pakistan and Iran could come in the way of implementing the pipeline project. He is reported to have told Pa kistani pressmen in Washington that the pipeline project is on the agenda of the summit. Justifying its reported inclusion in the agenda, he said Pakistan stood to financially benefit from it.

Surprisingly, there are no reports of any co-ordination group on nuclear confidence-building measures. Gen. Musharraf, however, held a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, of which he is the Chairman, which could have discussed this subject.

After completing these interactions, Gen. Musharraf has started taking, almost daily, co-ordination meetings with the Ministers, members of the National Security Council and senior officials concerned. It is noticed that most of these meetings are also b eing attended by Lt Gen Muzaffar Usmani, another Mohajir, who is the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff. He is reportedly playing an active role. The active association of Lt Gen Usmani with the brain-storming sessions is partly meant to rebut speculation in India about differences between Gen. Musharraf and him over the summit and over the general taking over as President.

The summit is being projected as Kashmir-centric; sherpaless in the sense of the pre-summit role of bureaucrats being reduced to the minimum, unavoidable and almost paperless in the sense of there being no previously-worked out drafts of declarations or communiques even before the leaders meet in the summit.

Gen Musharraf's present thinking in so far as it could be gathered seems to be on the following lines:

*He would try to keep the focus largely on J&K.

*He does not expect any solution or even the initial contours of a possible solution to emerge from the summit. He would be satisfied if the summit sets in motion a high-level political process under a mutually-agreed framework with a mutually agreed tim e-frame to work out a solution for the Kashmir problem in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiris.

*While the solution would emerge from this time-bound process, the status quo cannot be the solution. The flexibility which he might be prepared to show is in respect of the manner of determining the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

*There is no question of his issuing an appeal to the jihadi organisations to stop their jihad in J&K till a solution is found. In Vietnam and Afghanistan, talks on a political solution and the fighting went on simultaneously till an agreement in the neg otiations was reached; so too in J&K, the jihadis would insist on continuing their jihad till a political solution was in sight. Moreover, these jihadi organisations are indigenous and not amenable to the influence of Pakistan.

*While he himself would not take the initiative in raising other issues, he would show readiness to discuss any other issue raised by the Indian Prime Minister and be accommodating to the extent that the Indian Prime Minister is accommodating on the Kash mir issue.

*While he might be willing to go ahead with the pipeline project, he would be against it being linked to the normalisation of bilateral trade, which would have to await a solution of the Kashmir problem.

The high-level political process to find a solution to the Kashmir issue, which he has in mind, could be a ministers' group. If there is an agreement on this subject at the summit, his choice to represent Pakistan in this group could be either Lt Gen Moi nuddin Haider, a Mohajir and his alter ego, who is the Interior Minister, or Mr Abdul Sattar, Foreign Minister, or Mr Shaukat Aziz, Finance Minister.

When he met the PoK leaders, some of them reportedly insisted that any high-level political mechanism that might be set up to find a political solution to the Kashmir issue should confine itself to J&K, which is part of India and should not take up the q uestion of PoK and the northern areas or India's allegations of cross-border terrorism. According to them, since the jihad was the result of alleged Indian atrocities, it would automatically stop once a political solution was reached. Gen Musharraf did n ot seem to have reacted to this demand.

To keep the drips flowing, Gen Musharraf has to show to Pakistan's creditors and the IMF that the Agra outcome was not totally negative. To prevent the mullahs and jihadis from crying for his blood, he has to show them that Agra was not a clone of Lahore or Shimla and that he stood his ground on J&K. To keep India interested in a sustained dialogue, he has to convince it that he is a man with whom it can do business. He would come to India wanting and hoping to achieve all these objectives.

(The author is former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India).