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What really happened at Amritsar?
By Sarabjit Pandher
RAJA SANSI AIRPORT (Amritsar), DEC. 31. While the week-long
ordeal following the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Airbus A-
300 has ended, possible ``failures'' of the authorities and
counter-arguments about strategies which could have been adopted
to deal with the situation at this airport have been doing the
rounds here. The most asked question is: ``Could flight IC-814
have been prevented from leaving Amritsar?''
The State police have justified their calculations regarding the
situation, which according to them was the ``only way out''
keeping in mind the security of the passengers and the members of
the crew.
Senior officers of the Punjab Police have discounted the
possibilities of a forced prevention of the flight from taking
off from Amritsar, without jeopardising the lives of hostages and
serious damage to the aircraft. Not only do they claim that there
were no clear instructions from the Crisis Management Group
(CMG), which was meeting in Delhi, the State police also did not
have equipment or trained personnel required to deal with such
exigencies.
Though sketchy information regarding what transpired between the
Amritsar ATC and the pilot of IC 814 is available, the
communication between the ATC, senior officers of the Punjab
Government and CMG, remains closely guarded, giving rise to
speculation. Reports indicate that while the CMG was closeted in
Delhi, a State-level CMG was in contact with Amritsar and Delhi.
It is being argued that had the members of State CMG left for
Amritsar, it could have contributed more to the panic, in the
absence of a channel for instructions.
A senior officer in the Police headquarters in Chandigarh asked,
``Had we resorted to blockading the aircraft, without specific
instructions to do so, whose responsibility would it have been if
there was loss of lives?''
He also dismisses arguments that the tyres of the aircraft could
have been deflated. He says, ``there are 16 tyres on such planes.
We would have had to shoot series of bullets at them to damage
them beyond use. What would have been the reaction of the
hijackers once they heard gunfire? They could have even thought
we were storming the aircraft.''
The police officers and the officials of the Airports Authority
of India (AAI), said that the only way to delay the take off was
a slow fuelling process, the progress of which had been stalled
by Delhi. The officers also feel that the delay in the appearance
of the fuel tanker could have created a suspicion in the minds of
the hijackers, which would have spurred a sudden take off.
According to information from sources and accounts of
eyewitnesses, the sequence of the events of on the fateful day
was:
At about 6-35 p.m. the aircraft is seen hovering over Amritsar
and the ATC refuses permission to land but subsequently allows
following a distress message from the pilot, who tells the ATC
that he has barely 20 minutes of fuel on board. At 7-01 p.m. the
plane lands and contact is established with the pilot.
A posse of commandos of the Punjab Armed Police (PAP) takes
position as the plane lands on tarmac 34 and comes to a halt at
the far end of the runway, which is not well-lit and is quite far
from the floodlight apron area. In his first message, the pilot
conveys the hijackers' demand for refuelling the plane.
Immediately, a senior officer of the AAI is seen making
preparations for refuelling, while a message is also sent to
Delhi asking for instructions.
At 7-10 p.m. the first contact with Delhi is established when the
Cabinet Secretary calls up giving no specific instructions except
asking the officers in the control tower to ensure that
refuelling is delayed to prolong the matters. Ten minutes later
the pilot conveyed an impression that the hijackers were
beginning to lose patience and wanted to know the reasons for not
commencing the refuelling. ATC informs him that as there was no
scheduled landing of any aircraft on that day, making
arrangements to meet the sudden demand would take time.
The ATC is told that the five hijackers are armed with AK-47s,
grenades and revolvers. And in the course of the next 10 minutes
four messages are flashed by a panicked pilot, that four
passengers had been killed, while security officials who had
surrounded the aircraft did not hear any gun shot.
Frightened officers in the control tower contact Delhi again but
are asked to carry out the previous set of instructions. The
plane suddenly took a half-turn and faced the north-south
direction.
At about 7-40 p.m. the plane takes another turn of 180 degrees
and faces south and after about 10 minutes it surprises everybody
with a takeoff without seeking clearance from the ATC or using
the entire length of the runway. It just missed the fuel tanker,
which had been stationed on the runway awaiting instructions.
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