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Countering the revivalist spirit
Revivalism of the fundamental type is not a modern phenomenon. In
fact, it is antithetical to modernity, even if it is in harmony
with globalisation. What has contributed to its progress is its
communal character and its strategy of religious mobilisation.
Will it succeed in subverting the secular-democratic polity of
India? That remains to be seen, says K. N. PANIKKAR.
THE politics of religious identity has gained unprecedented
influence in the country in recent times, as evident from the
rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power. It reflects a
qualitative change in the state of consciousness in civil society
and a departure from the political culture so far practiced.
After a protracted struggle against colonialism, India emerged in
1947 as a secular-democratic state and had set out to preserve
and reinforce the rich heritage of its multi-religious and multi-
cultural society. The foundational principles of the State and
society that the nation then adopted as its credo were non-
discriminatory with regard to caste, creed and religion, which
imparted to Indian nationalism a territorial inclusive character.
Both political culture and social relations initially drew upon
these principles, and despite certain aberrations, sought to
respect them in practice. The situation has radically changed
today. Religious symbols and sentiments are invoked for political
mobilisation and democratic principles are shrouded in
majoritarianism. The secular territorial concept of nationalism
is also under siege; it is sought to be replaced by an
exclusionist notion of religious-cultural nationalism.
Although the political assertion of the Hindus is a recent
phenomenon - the earlier attempts like the Hindu Mahasabha and
Ram Rajya Parishad were unsuccessful - its cultural and
ideological roots have a long history, going back to the 19th
Century. The religious bonds during the pre-colonial era were
localised and within fragmented communities, with both
communication and mobility confined within local limits. The only
attempts to transgress were through pilgrimages to religious
centres, which being sporadic did not lead to any continuous
interaction or connection. A qualitative change occurred during
the colonial period, when, influenced by a variety of initiatives
by both the State and civil society, the boundaries of community
consciousness were considerably enlarged.
The changes witnessed in the religious domain during this period,
with multiple tendencies embedded in them, were particularly
important in this context; they were revitalising on the one hand
and revivalist on the other. Both were occasioned by colonial
domination, which brought home the need for a social and cultural
regeneration. A neo-Hinduism emerged out of this quest which,
inter alia, sought to construct a homogenised religious
community, by attributing to it certain common ideological and
cultural traits. The reformation of the existing religious
practices which neo-Hinduism attempted by identifying a common
scriptural source and by formulating common modes of worship laid
the ideological foundation for the incorporation of the hitherto
disparate sects and castes into a single Hindu community.
Although religious reforms did not mitigate sectarian tendencies
within Hinduism, a consciousness of being part of a larger
community did emerge out of them. Hindu revivalism, which made
great strides during the course of the 20th Century, drew
considerable sustenance from this historical experience.
A major catalyst of Hindu religious consolidation was
colonialism: both the social engineering and cultural
hegemonisation it attempted contributed to the formation of a
community consciousness among the Hindus. Its interventions in
the social and religious practices created a sense of cultural
umbrage, widely shared within the Hindu community, despite the
absence of uniform perspectives on social change. The discourse
they brought into being was conducted within a commonly shared
religious idiom. The initiatives of the colonial state to abolish
sati and child marriage and to prescribe a minimum age for the
consummation of marriage, for instance, generated a debate about
the authentic cultural practices of the Hindus in the past. Both
sides, who opposed and supported these moves, invoked the same
religious texts, reinforcing, even in opposition, a consciousness
rooted in religion. Unlike in the past, the controversies
generated by these issues involved people across the country,
enlarging thereby the boundaries of religious communitarian
experience.
The response of the Hindus to the colonial cultural
hegemonisation was essentially inward looking, seeking to
revitalise the indigenous practice through a critical
introspection about the cultural resources of the past. In such
an introspection, culture was treated as synonymous with that of
the ancient Hindu past, creating in the process a sense of pride
in the achievements of a golden age associated with the Hindus.
Hindu religious thought during the course of the 19th Century, as
expressed by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Dayananda Saraswati,
Vivekananda, Arabindo Ghosh and several others reinforced this
tendency. Their interest in spirituality and comparative
religion, instead of promoting universalism, led them to
recognise Hinduism as a superior, universal religion. More
importantly, they equated the regeneration of the country with
the revitalisation of Hindu religion. That the Hindus constituted
a nation and that religion defined the ideological parameters of
nationalism were born out of this perspective.
The rationale for demarcating the Hindus as a nation was mainly
drawn from two historical constructs. First, the Hindus are heirs
to an uninterrupted lineage from the time of the Vedas and
secondly, the members of other religious denominations by virtue
of being the descendants of those who migrated from outside or
converted to alien faiths do not belong to the nation. The roots
of the nation were traced to an ancient glorious past in which
the Hindus had attained a high level of civilisational
excellence. The other religious denominations that became part of
Indian society, either through invasions of conversions, were
considered alien and hence outside the nation. Such an
interpretation of history thus became an important source of
justification for defining the nation as Hindu. The colonial
construction of Indian past in religious terms and the
Orientalists' discoveries of Hindu cultural heritage gave
credence to this view.
If the Hindus had such a creditable past, their contemporary
condition called for some explanation. The Hindu ideologues did
not consider colonial domination as a possible reason. Instead,
they traced the decline of the Hindus to the medieval times when
the tyranny perpetrated by the Muslim rulers adversely affected
the social and political fortunes of the Hindus. The Muslim rule,
it was held, meant for the Hindus the loss of political power,
forcible conversion to Islam, desecration and destruction of the
places of worship and the stagnation of knowledge systems like
Ayurveda and astrology. If the Hindus had lost their past glory,
it was essentially because of Muslim aggression and logically, a
pre-requisite for the revival of the Hindu nation was a clear
demarcation from and consolidation against the Muslims. The Hindu
revivalism, therefore, went beyond regeneration and internal
consolidation. It took on a clearly communal character by
stigmatising the Muslims as enemies. A series of developments
like the Hindi-Urdu controversy, the cow protection movement, the
use of religious symbols for political mobilisation and above all
sporadic communal riots reinforced such a perspective.
Almost simultaneously a process of consolidation was taking place
among the Muslims also, though for different reasons. The
colonial intervention in their social and cultural life was not
acutely felt, but the intelligentsia was conscious of the
economic and educational backwardness of the community, for which
they sought a solution through the instrumentality of the
colonial rule. At the same time they were apprehensive that the
prospects of the community would be adversely affected, if the
political power were to be vested with the majority. The colonial
rulers naturally exploited this fear and encouraged the growth of
separatist tendencies among the Muslims resulting in the
formation of the Muslim League in 1905. Such a development among
the Muslims not only set them on a communal path but also
provided further anchorage to Hindu revivalism, which found its
political articulation in the Hindu Maha Sabha, founded in 1914.
Reclaiming the glory of the Hindu nation, which, it is claimed,
had surpassed the achievements of all other civilisations in the
past, but now enfeebled by the onslaughts of foreigners, was a
major concern of revivalism. It naturally subsumed within it the
resurrection of the cultural past and the creation of a polity
which privileged the Hindu. The Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangam
(RSS) formed in 1925 undertook the former, whereas the latter was
initially pursued by the Hindu Maha Sabha and the Jana Sangh and
currently by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Both these
projects, the cultural and the political, are mutually
complementary and coverged on salvaging the Hindu pride and
interest.
The ideological and theoretical foundations of this quest were
laid by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, a former revolutionary and
nationalist, who, in his later life was influenced by the racial
theories of Adolf Hitler. In the book Hindutva-Who Is A Hindu,
published in 1923 he traced the cultural, racial and political
attributes of Hindus which constituted them as a nation. He
claimed that the "Hindus are bound together not only by the tie
of love we bear to a common fatherland and by the common blood
that courses through our veins and keeps our hearts throbbing and
our affections, warm, but also by the tie of common homage we pay
to our great civilisation... We are one because we are a nation,
a race and own a common sanskriti (civilisation)." According to
him, the Hindus were bound together as a nation not only
culturally but also politically when Ramachandra, the mythical
god, was crowned the emperor of Aryavarta. Since then the Hindus
have succeeded in preserving the nation against the invasion of
foreigners from the time of the Shakas to the British. Savarkar
detailed the saga of this heroic resistance, through which the
consciousness of belonging to a nation crystallised in the Hindu
mind, in an influential work entitled, Six Glorious Epochs of
Indian History. Much before Muhammad Ali Jinnah evolved his
political strategy based on a two-nation theory, Savarkar had
already propounded it. He had argued that the non-Hindus, even if
they were born and brought up in India, could not belong to the
nation. The RSS pursued this exclusionist idea of the nation by
advocating that the minorities are not entitled to equal
citizenship rights.
By interpreting Indian history as the record of a successful
struggle of the Hindus against the foreigners, Savarkar was
seeking to establish two historical "truths." First, India is a
nation of the Hindus, which they have defended against all comers
in the past, and second, there is enough in the history of India
to prove, if proof is needed, that the Hindus have an inherently
brave and intrepid character. They have become weak, passive and
divided only because of their subjection to "foreign rule' for
about one thousand years. Reclaiming the militant spirit of the
past is, therefore, essential if the Hindu nation had to regain
its former glory. Vivekananda had realised it, as evident from
his call to the Hindu youth to improve their physical prowess in
order to build a powerful nation. The RSS was quite conscious of
this necessary mission, as evident from the importance it
attaches to physical culture in its training. Its militant and
disciplined cadre epitomises the new image of the resurgent,
aggressive Hindu. The change in the representation of Sri Ram in
the recent revivalist iconography from a serene, smiling god to
an angry, aggressive warrior holding a bow and arrow is also
symbolic of the new militant spirit.
The torchbearer of Hindu revivalism is the RSS, a para-military
outfit, founded by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar who had undergone some
training in terrorist techniques in Bengal. In its constitution,
the RSS describes itself as a cultural organisation with "abiding
faith in the fundamental principle of tolerance towards all
faiths" and dedicated to welding together the diverse groups
within the Hindu society. But its actual activities went much
beyond the stated objectives in the constitution. In reality it
is an organisation wedded to the concept of a Hindu state from
which all the other religious denominations are excluded. Its
cultural work is only intended to prepare the Hindus to achieve
such a goal, by imparting to them self-confidence and physical
strength.
The cultural and ideological work undertaken by the RSS and its
feeder organisations during the last 75 years have led to the
internalisation of revivalist ideas in civil society. It is not
easy to ascertain the number of these organisations, present in
almost all spheres of cultural and social activities. Functioning
under different denominations, they are actively engaged in
creating a social consciousness rooted in Hindu revivalism. In
this scheme, education, which helps to mould the mind of young
children, is accorded a prime place. It is estimated that about
20,000 schools are now under the management of the RSS in which
the curriculum is so conceived to foreground a Hindu revivalist
agenda. Moreover, the BJP governments in the States and at the
Centre have been quick to seize the opportunity to initiate steps
to Hinduise education, by changing the syllabus and rewriting the
textbooks. In an effort to "Indianise and spiritualise"
education, these governments have sought to change Indian history
into Hindu history, make Sanskrit a compulsory subject and
incorporate Vedic knowledge in science courses. A separate
pattern of education to impart training in domestic chores is
envisaged for girls, which betrays a feudal, pariarchial
perspective.
The communal content of Hindu revivalism has become more
aggressive during the last two decades. The formation of the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad in 1964 heralded a particularly militant
phase of Hindu revivalism by trying to marginalise the minorities
from the mainstream and stigmatising them as enemies of the
nation. The Parishad set out to remedy the "historical wrongs"
committed by the minorities in the past, which led to the
demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, and the physical
intimidation and attack of Christians more recently. By
foregrounding the Hindu grievances and interests, these
initiatives have given an unprecedented fillip to the communal
mobilisation and have consequently yielded considerable political
advantage. Without that, the BJP's electoral success would not
have been possible.
Hindu revivalism is not a "modern" phenomenon. In fact, it is
antithetical to modernity, even if it is in harmony with
capitalist development and globalisation. Obscurantism is writ
large in its social agenda. Nor is it opposed to imperialism,
although its origins can be traced to the colonial cultural and
intellectual hegemonisation. What contributed to its progress is
its communal character and its strategy of religious
mobilisation. The cultural crisis of a fast expanding middle
class provided it with an influential social base and the
pathology of economic development, which, denied to a vast
majority of people even the minimum of life, has ensured to it an
expanding electoral support. Hindu revivalism is now well
entrenched, politically powerful and socially influential.
Whether it will succeed in subverting the secular-democratic
polity of India is the puzzle of the next century.
* * *
Correction:
In the article"Culture Shock and culture wars: The search for
identity" by Maria Couto, that appeared in the Sunday Magazine,
Edition dated December 19th, the sentence in the paragraph
beginning "It may well be that ... enclose her again" should read
as "... But it did enrich our lives", and not as published.
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