Can Sri Lanka find peace?

By V. Jayanth

WITH THE Presidential elections behind her and a fresh outbreak of violence, Ms. Chandrika Kumaratunga must now be wondering when to call parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. Though the President got over 51 per cent of the vote, she did not enjoy the support of a majority of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, with the exception of those in Jaffna (for various reasons).

In her address after assuming office, Ms. Kumaratunga gave two clear messages - she was more determined than ever to bring peace to the troubled island and the ``days of terror are numbered, and that number is small''. There was a warning.

On the very day results were announced, she was sworn in President for a second time and the same night she left for London, ostensibly for medical treatment of her right eye. The fact that she was in London gave rise to speculation that the President had begun behind-the- scenes preparations for resuming the peace process in Sri Lanka.

Sources in Colombo suggest that ``Despite the battle for Elephant Pass, the recent military reverses and above all the attempt on the life of the President, intermediaries are still active. The LTTE's ideologue, Mr. Anton Balasingham, is still in London and a couple of Labour party functionaries in the U.K. are active trying to break the impasse.'' A few weeks before the Presidential poll, Mr. Balasingham and the TULF leader, Mr. R. Sampanthan, met in London at the initiative of these Labour Party functionaries. And it was known that the TULF representative had the blessings of the Sri Lankan President for this contact.

Two weeks ahead of the elections, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar, told this writer that the Chandrika Government was ready to let a ``facilitator'' break the ice with the LTTE so that talks could be revived. But after the assassination attempt on December 18, there were doubts whether the President would want to negotiate again with the LTTE. But it must be said that a majority of Sri Lankans - Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims or Burghers - want peace at any cost and confess there can be no lasting solution without the involvement of the LTTE.

The ground situation in the northern war theatre calls for a ``de-escalation'' of some kind. Just before the election, the Tamil Tigers had virtually surrounded the Elephant Pass camp of the army. This was after retaking most of the territory captured by the armed forces during the past two years, and with it a huge haul of vehicles, tanks, arms and ammunition. According to military analysts, ``There may be anywhere from 3000 to 7000 troops in and near Elephant Pass. If that crucial base falls, the army cannot hold Jaffna. After the elections, the LTTE has launched a fresh offensive and this battle will soon enter a critical phase. It needs an understanding with the LTTE to de- escalate the situation in the north.'' On the LTTE's side, though they are high on morale and hardware, they are short of fighters and need some breathing space. That is, perhaps, why the Tamil Tigers virtually endorsed Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe's candidature, as he offered an olive branch and unconditional talks.

No one underestimates the task of getting the LTTE back to the negotiating table. The Tigers may at best talk about talks, without going on to substantive issues. Which is why Colombo prefers to let a ``facilitator'' prepare the ground. Choosing a facilitator itself may pose problems. Ms. Kumaratunga recently revealed that two facilitators had tried their best in the past two years, without any success. The former Commonwealth Secretary General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, and the Norwegian Government tried to bring the LTTE to the negotiating table. Of late, the U.K. has taken on this role. The LTTE has called for U.N. mediation and its emphasis is on ``mediation'' not ``facilitation''. The Norwegians will try again.

The Sri Lankan Government makes it clear that the ``facilitator'' must have no agenda of his own and must only create the climate for talks and ensure that both sides remain ``engaged'' till there can be a satisfactory outcome. That is a tall order. Even under pressure from India, the LTTE refused to be a party to the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement and made sure that the pact failed. The Sri Lankan Government too did not inspire confidence among the Tamil groups to make it work. Subsequently, the LTTE agreed to talk peace with President Ranasinghe Premadasa, whose main agenda was to get rid of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) - an objective shared by the Tamil Tigers. Once that was achieved and the LTTE also got a gift of arms and ammunition to defend itself against the IPKF, the honeymoon with Premadasa was over and he was ultimately assassinated in 1993.

A mega show unveiled in 1994-95 when Ms. Kumaratunga won a landslide victory in the presidential election on a peace plank. After several rounds of talks in Jaffna, the official delegation could make no headway with the LTTE and the negotiations never reached the core issues. There was an exchange of letters between Ms. Kumaratunga and the LTTE chief, Mr. V. Prabhakaran. The talks finally collapsed and another edition of the Eelam War was launched in April 1995.

That history of failed peace talks hardly inspires confidence, though international commentators believe that it takes time to get over the hump. If it can happen in South Africa or in Northern Ireland, they see no reason why it cannot succeed in Sri Lanka when the time is ripe.

It must be clear to the President that the ``war for peace'' strategy has failed. Territory is won and lost and precious young lives are lost on both sides. The army cannot obviously dominate both the north and the east. It does not seem to be a winnable war for either the armed forces or the LTTE. Having lost the confidence of a majority of Tamils this time, the President must re-establish her credibility by implementing some of her promises. For instance, the Equal Opportunities Bill she got passed by Parliament has no teeth and the Tamils feel it is not being implemented the way it should be.

It is still not clear whether Ms. Kumaratunga will take a calculated risk and call for parliamentary elections, or clear the decks for floor-crossings from the Opposition to get her devolution package passed by Parliament. But she needs to do more. A whole lot of Constitutional reforms are imperative to scrap the Executive Presidency and change the electoral system to make it more democratic. She must decide if she wants a Constitutional Assembly or even a non-binding referendum.

Above all, Colombo is acutely conscious of the ``India factor''. Any solution to the Tamil question must be endorsed by New Delhi, even if it does not want to be directly involved in the process. Having burnt its fingers before, India may only want to be briefed and kept in the picture. Of course, New Delhi may not want some agencies or countries to be involved in the process or as a ``facilitator''. After all, its strategic interests in the region have to be protected.

Sri Lanka watchers are convinced that the LTTE will not settle for anything less than ``Tamil Eelam'' and it may want to cite the East Timor case - even if there are no similarities. No Government in Colombo will ever accept secession. Unless a very seasoned and successful facilitator can find some middle ground, the battles in northern Sri Lanka will continue.

Since it is anyhow her last term as President, Ms. Kumaratunga must ensure her personal safety and security, especially after the unsuccessful attempt on December 18. The decision to eliminate her may have been taken in 1995, with the fall of Jaffna. Even if the LTTE resumes talks, it does not normally rescind its ``sentences''. Her vituperative attack on the LTTE and the opposition UNP, as well as the latest round of violence in Colombo have only vitiated the atmosphere even more.

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