Dealing with hijackings

By G. Balachandran

ONE OF the more endearing characteristics of the community of Indian security analysts is their preparedness to comment on an ongoing crisis and the shortcomings in its handling, even as the crisis is unfolding and in the absence of any hard information. The conduct of the officials at Amritsar was discussed threadbare even though few, if any, had any information on the number of hijackers, their arsenal or demands. As one leading analyst wrote after the end of the hijack ``No attempt was made to go into the history of hijacking''. Nor were any attempts made to analyse the manner in which hijackings have been terminated so far, both in India and elsewhere, and learn from them.

Perhaps now is the proper time to understand the nature of aircraft hijackings in the past decade and prepare ourselves for the future. A senior analyst discussing their nature listed certain common features. These were (1) aircraft hijacking has become a preferred terrorist act; (2) terrorists look for vulnerable points in aircraft routes where the security system can be subverted or bypassed, in this respect developing countries provide greater opportunities for terrorists; (3) induction of wide-bodied jets have also compelled hijacking operations to become a team effort; and (4) the main objective of hijacking is to secure the release of other terrorists in custody in the target state.

The analysis had given good reasons for these features. It would be instructive to look at the historical data to validate these assumptions. Notwithstanding the prominence that is supposed to accompany airplane hijacks, there is not much historical and chronological data on them even on the Internet. The two agencies which maintain some sort of consistent data are the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) of the U.S. Of these, the FAA data is more uniform and regular. The FAA publishes annually a report, ``Criminal acts against civil aviation,'' which lists all such acts including hijacks. What does the data reveal?

First of all, airplane hijacking is not a common or preferred choice of terrorist groups. Of the 108 hijacks reported during 1992-98, only 12 could be classified as either politically motivated or terrorist related. All others were either committed for personal reasons or had criminal motives. Even when politically motivated it was often an individual action not that of a terrorist group. For example, of the four such hijacks during 1998, one was to protest oppression of Muslims in Turkey, another to protest the ban on Islamic clothing in Turkey and another to protest the treatment of ethnic Kurds. The fourth one was by some Pakistanis to protest nuclear testing.

Other evidence substantiates this apparent lack of interest by terrorist groups. The U.S. State Department publishes annually the ``Patterns of Global Terrorism'', a publication which lists major acts of terrorism. During 1993-98, more than 500 acts were listed as being ``significant terrorist incidents''. Of these only two were airplane hijacks, one when, in October 1993, four members of a Nigerian dissident group hijacked a Nigerian Airways Airbus-310 with 150 passengers and crew on board shortly after it took off from Lagos. After trying unsuccessfully to land the aircraft in Ndjamena, Chad, the terrorists ordered the plane to land at Niamey, Niger. The hijackers then released two groups of passengers. After lengthy but fruitless negotiations, Nigerien police stormed the aircraft on October 28. All four of the hijackers surrendered, but one of the crew was killed as was one of the hijackers during the rescue operation. The other was when members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) hijacked an Air France flight in Algeria in December 1994. The plane arrived in Marseilles, France, where a French anti-terrorist unit stormed the plane, ending the 54-hour siege in which three hostages were killed by the terrorists. All four terrorists were killed during the rescue.

Similarly, only one of the 28 terrorist groups designated by the U.S. State Department as ``foreign terrorist organisations'', the GIA, has ever indulged in airplane hijacking during the 90s. None of the other 27 has ever been associated with hijacks during the past decade. It is, therefore, not correct to state that aircraft hijacking, in general, is a preferred terrorist act.

Second, do terrorists shop around, i.e. operate from airports around the world where security is weak? Again, no. Almost all hijackings have been carried out by nationals of the country in which the aircraft is registered and often on domestic routes. Of the 108 hijacks during 1992-98, 80 were committed on planes flying domestic routes by nationals of that country.

Third, has hijacking become a team effort? No. Since hijacks have mainly been for personal reasons, more often than not, they have been carried out by individuals, even when they involve political motives. For example of the 12 politically-motivated or terrorist-related hijacks between 1992-98, eight were carried out by individuals.

Finally, is the main objective of hijacking to secure the release of other terrorists in custody in the target state? No. As already stated, only 12 of the 108 hijacks during 1992-98 was associated with political motives or terrorist intentions. Even of these 12, only three involve release of prisoners. No such hijack had taken place after 1993.

However, it must be pointed out that the Indian experience has been rather different. First, the proportion of hijacks involving prisoner release has been much higher. Most of the hijacks during 1992-98 involving hostage-taking and prisoner release have been on Indian planes. Secondly, the involvement of foreign agencies, not necessarily terrorist organisations per se, in the execution of the hijacks even when Indian nationals were the hijackers, has been very prominent.

This may have something to do with the very porous policy India has on prisoner release. Unlike some other countries afflicted with terrorism, the U.S. and Israel, for instance, which have a declared policy of no negotiation on that issue, the Government of India has now, and in the past, blown hot and cold. Sometimes prisoners have been released, at other times the terms have been rejected.

Now, hijacks, as other terrorist-related activities, have a strong copycat tendency. They occur in sporadic bursts. That is a universal feature and one which was experienced by India in the early 80s and 90s. The danger is that the recent hijack coupled with the release of prisoners could result in a similar spate of hijacks and hostage-taking scenarios. The absence of a clear public policy that no negotiations will be conducted on the release of prisoners will only encourage such activities.

Certain analyses have cited the release of the head of the Hamas by Israel in support of prisoner exchange. That is a false analogy. It was not a case of hostage taking and prisoner exchange. It was rather a case of classical prisoner exchange wherein each party releases certain persons held by them as result of some hostile act by both as in case of war or espionage. With Pakistan in the background actively encouraging and supporting hijacks and other hostage-taking terrorist activities, unless the Government of India comes out with an explicit refusal to negotiate prisoner release we should be prepared for such trauma for some time.

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