The way ahead

Relations between India and China nose-dived after 1962, a phase examined by C.V.RANGANATHAN and VINOD C. KHANNA in their book India And China: The Way Ahead After 'Mao's India War', to be released tomorrow. By examining mutual misconceptions prevalent at that point of time, they examine the degree of charged emotions that have marked the discussions on the contentious border dispute. The challenge before India today, they say, is to develop a balanced relationship with China and drop extreme conclusions on the state of Sino-Pakistan relations. Exclusive extracts.

THERE are diverse images of China in India, reflecting the plurality of views in Indian society. At one extreme are those who see China as incorrigibly aggressive and expansionist, posing a perennial threat to India. At the other extreme, are those who perceive it as a benign neighbour, a sister ancient civilisation, more sinned against than sinning in modern times. But the great majority of Indians seems to carry in their minds a more mixed picture, with both positive and negative ingredients, the dominance of one or the other often depending on the latest developments. One thing is clear: 1962 has left a lasting scar on the Indian psyche.

Many influential Indian analysts in the fields of defence and foreign affairs project an image of a muscular China, which respects power more than any other factor and with whom negotiations can succeed only if India is seen to be equally strong. Following China's rapid economic growth and the consequent availability of larger resources for augmenting its military strength, the images of an assertive China which will pose a serious threat to Indian security, to Indian interests with neighbours and in the Indian Ocean areas have got further magnified. Examples from India's experience of dealing with China, its assistance to Pakistan in nuclear weapon and missile fields, its links with the Myanmar military, the hitherto unchanged attitude over Sikkim's integration with India, are cited as evidence of a China which continues to harbour malevolent intentions towards India. Other analysts, while not sharing the foregoing assessment completely, do conclude that China does not deal with India as an equal partner and that it seeks to perpetuate an hierarchical international system, presided over by the veto-wielding five permanent members of the Security Council, who have also proclaimed themselves as the sole legitimate nuclear weapon powers into an indefinite future.

The multipolar world, which China claims to foster, some contend, is intended to be dominated by the Five, perhaps with the addition of Japan and Germany. China's strident criticism of India's nuclear tests is held up as proof of China seeking to thwart India's pursuit of its legitimate security needs. On the basis of such an analysis, it is argued that China will use its military superiority, hostile linkages with some of India's neighbours, and strategic partnership with the U.S. to pressurise India into surrendering its vital interests. Like most generalities, all of these have grains of plausibility. However, India's policy towards China cannot be based solely on worst possible assumptions, just as it cannot be based on a return to the innocence of the Hindi-Chini bhai bhai period. Indian interests would be better served by a more balanced approach to the complex reality that is China.

To be sure, the Chinese, at policy, advisory, military and official levels, also have similarly exaggerated images of India. However, at least as far as public presentation is concerned, we do not see the kind of diversity in China that can be observed in democratic India. China's negative perceptions of India, which find articulation whenever bilateral relations deteriorate, include the following: the 1962 armed conflict was entirely the product of Indian unreasonableness and aggressiveness, India is not fully reconciled to the situation in Tibet, notwithstanding its stated policy of recognising Tibet as an autonomous region of China, India is seeking domination of South Asia, such as would preclude China from pursuing its legitimate interests in its neighbourhood. India is a poor country but its leaders, instead of solving its economic problems, seek to maximise military power in pursuit of their "hegemonic" objectives and India is deliberately using the myth of a Chinese threat to find a pretext for its nuclear ambitions. In fairness it should be recognised that public remarks by Indian ministers about occupation of Indian territory by China, or about Taiwan or Tibet, reopen "hurt" feelings on the Chinese side. Finally, there is a continuity in Chinese obtuseness in understanding the complexities of India's plural democracy, with its free expression of views which do not always represent the policies of the government. While showing increasing sophistication and finesse in coping with the system in the U.S., the Chinese have been slower in understanding India's democracy.

Popular images are, of course, vulnerable to manipulation. It would be naive to suggest that this does not happen in democracies like India. However, with some rare exceptions, Indian scholars enjoy a much greater freedom of expression. In China, official controls apart, the scholars still exercise self- censorship when it comes to public expression, and particularly if the issue is a sensitive one. The manner in which one Chinese specialist after another was quoted by the Chinese media repeating the official line regarding the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 was a recent example of this. It contrasted sharply with the position in India, where opposition political personalities, intellectuals and leading newspaper commentators, including many who supported the nuclear tests, criticised the government for the manner in which it had named China in public defence of its decision.

In the years preceding the nuclear tests, China had, however, clearly scored over India in one respect: many Chinese leaders belonging to the highest echelons had personally visited India in the last decade. This indicated a political consensus and continuity in attaching importance to developing relations with India, despite the unresolved problems. Investment was thus being made in the relationship with India in one of the most effective ways known in China's culture and in her practice of foreign policy, namely, structuring relations through high level political exchanges. The vagaries of our coalition politics seem to have stymied reciprocity from India in sustaining high level governmental political contacts.

If we look at the post-1978 period, the most important change in China's domestic politics was the transition from Maoist radicalism to Dengist pragmatic moderation. The sweeping economic reforms at home were accompanied by a new approach to foreign policy, which was now required to make the maximum possible contribution to economic development. The primacy accorded to economic growth logically necessitated working for a peaceful international environment. So, there is nothing cynical about the recurring Chinese assertion that peace and development are two top priorities in the world today.

Particular effort has been made to improve relations with neighbours. Thus land borders have been successfully negotiated with almost every neighbour. Where it has not been possible to resolve an issue peacefully, China has been willing to shelve it. China's relations with Vietnam and India have been major examples of this approach in recent times. However, like any major power, the Chinese are not willing to surrender or compromise on what they consider to be their legitimate interests and entitlements. The strident display of military might during the March 1996 crisis across the Taiwan Straits announced China's continued willingness to use force to back what it has declared to be its irreducible vital interest. The point is that China's behaviour on the international stage, even when hard and uncompromising, does not follow some erratic, inexplicable path.

There is little doubt that it is China's ambition to acquire even greater influence in world affairs. It regards this as its historical, cultural and demographic entitlement. It is also willing to work to earn its place at the top table. The Dengist revolution is premised on the assumption that this place can be better achieved through economic growth and modernisation and this would not only improve the welfare of the Chinese people and guarantee domestic political stability, but would also enhance China's international standing. The Chinese say that international politics today is characterised by "the competition for comprehensive national power", which is a combination of military, political, economic and technological strengths. China feels America alone can delay or even thwart what China sees as its natural entitlement, can use militant and economic tools to do so, and is the sole hegemonic power seeking global domination. Therefore it is an important goal of China's foreign policy to make common cause with other powers actual and potential - in opposing such domination.

However, given its economic and technological backwardness, and the scale of its problems at home, China is not about to become an equal of the U.S. in power terms in the near future. Even if we accept that the Chinese GNP will become the largest in the coming decades, the per capita income will still remain very low, and the surplus available to the state for projecting China's power abroad would not go up dramatically. However, notwithstanding all these caveats, the fact remains that China has already emerged as an influential and powerful nation, and will clearly become even more so in coming years.

What does all this mean for Sino-Indian relations? Today, in one way or another, all major powers seek to pursue a policy of "constructive engagement" or even "strategic partnership" with China because they realise that this is in their own political and economic interest. None of them surrender their vital interests in the process. They seek to negotiate mutually beneficial solutions to problems. This quest does not always succeed, but the danger of conflict is minimised and of cooperation to mutual advantage enhanced. There is no reason why India should not be pursuing the same route.

There are some analysts who seem to believe that the rising Chinese power presents some sort of a unique challenge to Indian aspirations. They refer to China's undoubted military superiority; and some of them combine this with the much cited proposition of the ancient Chinese strategist, Sun Zi that "to win without fighting is the acme of skill". But the importance of Sun Zi's classic, Art of War, goes beyond the insights it may give into contemporary Chinese military thinking. It contains some universally applicable principles, and should be compulsory reading for diplomats and military strategists alike. The moves he recommends are not a Chinese monopoly, nor are they mysterious prescriptions, which others cannot follow to their benefit.

An ability to protect and promote your country's vital interests in the face of the superior military power of a potential adversary is one of the defining features of successful diplomacy by any country, other than the strongest. It is not the contention of the authors that capabilities are not important, nor that they are less important than intentions. But to them it is common sense that capabilities and intentions have to be considered in tandem. It is true that intentions can change, but it is not necessary that they change for the worse; they could also change for the better. Indeed, that is the premise on which foreign policy and diplomacy are based. There must be constant endeavour to ensure that the intentions of a country which has the capability to threaten one's security in fact change for the better. Intelligent foreign policy further requires that such a network of relationships be built that, should the intentions of a potential adversary change for the worse, it would be possible to draw on the reservoir of relationships with powers which can countervail the threat. Equally, it is necessary to build up a network of relationships covering diverse fields with the potential adversary, so that vested interests are built up in each country which would act as moderating factors if things turned out for the worse.

The possibility that the intentions of governments may change for the better is as important as the fear of their worsening. Starting in the early Eighties, Deng was able to alter the nature of the U.S.-Soviet Union-China strategic triangle, in which China had become heavily dependent on U.S. because of the perceived threat from a Soviet Union which was very much stronger at that time. He made a fresh evaluation of the nature of the Soviet threat and downgraded it even though there had been no change in the Sino-Soviet military balance. Indian strategic thinkers could also attempt a fresh look at the nature of so-called Chinese "threat" by taking into account the basic fact that, despite undoubted superior military capability - including a nuclear advantage - China has made no significant military move against India in the last 37 years. To base policy on worst case assumptions cannot always be equated with realism. It could be counter-productive.

Of course, a country of India's size and aspirations must have a certain minimum credible capability of her own. But it does not need to attempt military parity with China, for that would only drag it into the kind of ruinous course which bankrupted the Soviet Union. Indian strategic thinkers quite rightly point out that the defence requirements of India and Pakistan cannot be equated, as India has also to enter other factors into its calculations, such as its long borders and coast lines, and China. By the same token it is useful for us to keep in mind the security environment confronting China. It is the only country which has been subjected to nuclear threat by both the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union. It has more immediate neighbours than any other country except Russia. Of these at least five, seen from Beijing's perspective, would fall in the category of "potential threats" - Japan, Russia, Vietnam, India and Taiwan - though its Defence Minister may not be as indiscreet as George Fernandes in publicly identifying them as such. If to this you add the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of U.S. strategic thinking came to be based on identifying China as a major long term adversary, then objectively it must be admitted that China has to contend with a very complex external security environment. It is therefore somewhat misleading to compare India and China on a simple one-to-one basis.

To keep arguing that China seeks to confine India into a South Asian straitjacket misses a fundamental point. Whether or not India becomes a global actor depends on India alone. This would require a combination of political cohesion, economic prosperity, social justice, adequate military capability and intelligent diplomacy. It is not a status anybody - not even China - can deny India. But, alas by the same token, no one is gratuitously going to confer it on India, not even her smallest neighbour. If in the years ahead, India fails to promote its interests on a regional or global level this will be due to its domestic and diplomatic failures. Any Chinese role in this will be marginal.

This is particularly true of South Asia. As our study shows, the simple fact is that China is just not in the same class as India as far as the long-term needs and interests of our South Asian neighbours are concerned. The facts of geography, culture, and ethnicity, reinforced by economic compulsions, tie their destiny much more with India than with China. So long as these countries do not perceive India either as seeking to exert hegemonic pressure on them, or, at the other extreme, of being politically, economically and militarily too weak to be of consequence, there is no reason for them to turn to China in any manner inimical to Indian interests. If one looks back to the Sixties, as our study shows, fears that China will roll down the South Asian plains from the Himalayan kingdoms had been utterly exaggerated.

It is true that Pakistan is still an exception to these general propositions about South Asia. Two extreme conclusions on the state of Sino-Pakistan relations need to be avoided: one that China would abandon Pakistan for the sake of friendship with India, and the other that Sino-Pakistani relations are invariably aimed against the interests of India. In the past, doubtless, the Chinese were responsible for fostering certain illusions about the extent or quality of their support to Pakistan, when the latter engaged in armed conflicts with India. This circumstance, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, has changed qualitatively.

The present situation is characterised by complex factors, which China needs to take into account in maintaining an overall balance in the conduct of its relations with both Pakistan and India. These are, first, China would not like to see a situation of permanent hostility between India and Pakistan, worse still armed conflicts, or situations where China is called upon to take sides. Second, China does not want an internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute, because such a situation affects China and promotes, as she fears, Western intervention, particularly American, on her periphery. The experience of Iraq and Kosovo leaves China most uncomfortable in spite of being a permanent member of the Security Council. Third, China cannot but be alive to the variety of threats posed by religious fundamentalism, armed terrorism and spread of narcotics to the social and political fabric of its sensitive border regions. There are shared Sino-Indian interests in dealing with these challenges, which are also a source of serious concern to Russia, the Central Asian states and Western countries. Be that as it may, the truth of the matter is that we have to improve relations with both China and Pakistan.

From the above we would infer that India-China relations are not an all-or-nothing proposition, but a mixed bag of issues with varying degrees of solvability. Insofar as the roles of China and India on the larger international stage are concerned, with a few difficult exceptions, such as nuclear non-proliferation, the interests of China and India need not inevitably clash in future.

Even where it is unrealistic to expect that there would be an identity of views on how each looks at the world, it should be possible for these two most populous nations of the world to pursue their respective interest within a larger cooperative framework. What India needs is self-confidence and not paranoia. India is too great a nation to kowtow to anybody; but by the same token, it must behave with the maturity of a major power, capable of interacting in a balanced and rational manner with the international community, even where our interests do not coincide.

Extracted from : India and China, The Way Ahead, After 'Mao's India War', Chapter IX, C. V. Ranganathan and V. C. Khanna, Har- Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., D-9, Anand Niketan, New Delhi- 110021, Rs. 295.

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