Time to break the silence

AFTER THE Kandahar hijacking episode, the three Service Chiefs together had an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee . They expressed their feeling in unison that, as national security was as much the services responsibility as that of the NS advisor, they must always be included in the decision- making process. At present, the services are called in only at the last moment, to save the situation.

On January 7, BBC interviewed Gen. V. N. Sharma, former COAS on this matter. The General was fully in agreement with the views expressed by the three service chiefs, and added that the services must be fully integrated with the Ministry of Defence, in the Chief of Defence Staff concept, as is the case in countries such as the U.K., the U.S., France and Russia.

At a request from Mr. George Fernandes, Defence Minister, the three service chiefs have already submitted proposals for restructuring the Defence Ministry for amending this situation.

To say that the strategic landscape remains unsettled would be an understatement. In the 50 years since independence, the Indian military has fought three major wars, been involved in numerous ``non-traditional'' humanitarian and peace-keeping missions, tried to meet a variety of social demands such as the full integration of women in the officer ranks, all while preparing for the 21st century.

What is more, the armed services have been asked to do all this within the worst budgetary environment in 50 years.

The Indian military faces a challenge - responding up to the uncertainties of the new domestic and strategic landscapes and maintaining a healthy relationship with the civil society, even while adhering to its main objective which is to deter or win wars against the nation's enemies.

Positive response

The military had a taste of debacle in the 1962 war against China, faced two inconclusive wars with Pakistan, completed the 1984 mission in Sri Lanka and defended the country at Kargil.

At least one lesson clearly emerges. The armed forces should not withdraw into an ethical cocoon and take on a defensive posture as it appears to be the case today.

Instead, it must make a prudent and positive response to the travails imposed on it, and not shrink from articulating its views in the public forum. In short, senior military officers must reshape the very notion of military professionalism, by candidly admitting the impact of politics on the military's ability to do its job, and daring to practise constructive political engagement.

This would appear to violate the sacred code of silence by which the Indian military is bound. Strictly apolitical, it offers technical advice only, and goes out of its way to honour the principle of civilian control. But only through constructive political engagement can military professionals assert themselves in policy debates, provide a clear boundary between defence policy and merely partisan politics, and provide the Indian public with a clearer understanding of military life and culture.

Nor are constructive political engagement and loyalty to the country, civilian leadership, and the Constitution in any way incongruous.

Indeed, such constructive political engagement, far from threatening to make the military an independent actor, presupposes that the military depends upon a variety of political actors and the public at large. It is because the Indian military is under such tight civilian control that it needs to make its voice heard in civilian councils.

Any number of issues might fall within the scope of constructive political engagement, but the two most critical are the so-called ``democratisation'' of the military (the convergence or divergence between the military and society) and the problematical utility of military force in the foreign policy contingencies of the century to come. These issues are inter- connected and have a profound impact on the military's operational effectiveness.

Nothing makes the point clearer than the Sri Lankan episode, the mismanagement of which forced military professionals, especially in the army, to go through an agonising reappraisal of the meaning of the military profession.

In the broader policy arena, the failure of senior military leaders to speak out with a realistic military perspective on that engagement provides an enduring lesson for military professionals.

In the past, the role of the chiefs of staff in the decision to go to war and in its conduct, has been studied and found wanting, precisely because these ``three silent men'' do not give voice to their professional doubts, but instead bury themselves under a cloak of political deception.

Citizen first

What is forgotten is that a top soldier is a citizen first and a soldier second, and that troops under his command are an instrument of the people's will. The Indian army is really a people's army in the sense that, it belongs to the Indian people who must take a jealous proprietary interest in its involvement.

The Indian Army is not so much an arm of the executive branch as it is an arm of the Indian people. Therefore as military professionals they must speak out, give counsel to our political leaders, and alert the Indian public that there is no such thing as a cheap war.

The Army must make the price of involvement clear before it gets involved, so that the country can weigh the probable costs of involvement against the degree of non-involvement.

Most important, the military brass should feel no hesitancy about providing the President, who is also the Commander-in-Chief, with its specific and clear opinion on important military issues. Disagreements that arise among the military, the President and the Members of Parliament should not be stifled, but should be aired honestly without prejudice to the military's obedience to, and implementation of civilian directives.

Nor should the armed forces wait until a debate is under way before presenting its perspective and objections to a given policy line.

Military professionals ought to be as free to make known their technical judgments without giving the impression that they are trying to evade civilian control. The alternative, after all, is to perpetuate the timidity, extreme defensiveness, and fear of criticism from the public and Parliament that seem to pervade the military today.

Widening gap

The wide range of civil-military contacts would seem a basis for challenging the notion of a widening gap between the military and society in India. But to the extent the military and society do exist in two worlds, such a ``gap'' would only seem to underscore the need for a more politically streetwise military, one attuned to certain values and institutions.

Indeed, to ensure that the needed equilibrium between the military and society is not thrown out of balance, military professionals must engage the political process. Such engagement would lead to a clearer civilian understanding of military culture, and help correct distorted views and unrealistic images.

The real danger today is not military dominance of civil government, but rather a civilian policy elite dominating a military of which it has only the most superficial understanding, and thus imposing on the military frivolous ``reforms'' and imprudent commitments without regard to long-term consequences.

Let our army speak out in order to institutionalise decision- making. We cannot afford insecurity ridden policies, leading to polarisation and vendettas. The Kargil operation and the recent hijacking incident are good examples. Unless it is done, the existing divide between the defence bureaucracy and the armed forces will remain.

Brig. N. B. GRANT (Retd).

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