Needed a recipe to lighten taxpayer's burden

POLLS TO the Assemblies in Bihar, Manipur, Haryana and Orissa have been notified and a Model Code of Conduct has come into place. Every time an election to either the Lok Sabha or to a State Legislative Assembly, either in the normal course or midterm, is announced, election-related issues come into sharp focus.

Since elections are a dynamic process it would be logical to assume that interpretations and instructions meet the changing needs of the times. The time when the ``Model Code of Conduct'' should actually come into operation has always been the centre of controversy. Instructions of the Election Commission require that transfers of officers charged with the conduct of elections should not be effected when elections are ``imminent'' which could mean that once elections become a certainty because of the dissolution of an elected House, such transfers will be stayed.

When the Lok Sabha was dissolved on the last occasion, in April 1999, and it was decided that elections should take place several months later in September and October, 1999, the Commission ruled (purportedly on the basis of certain Court rulings) that the Model Code of Conduct would actually come into operation only after the election programme had actually been announced. Also it was ruled that transfers of election-related officials would be barred only after the notification. The Commission in fact chose to look the other way when important functionaries including even senior officials in the Government of India, who would have been directly concerned with the election process, were shifted.

The Election Commission's ability to play ball with the Central Government of the day on sensitive issues even if they seek to create a contrary impression with the press and the public alike is nothing new; numerous instances could also be cited, including the reluctance of a former Chief Election Commissioner, who became a cult figure, to introduce electronic voting machines (1,50,000 machines had already been purchased even prior to his assuming office from a reputed public sector undertaking and funded by the Government as early as 1989-90 at a then cost of over Rs. 60 crores), not because there was any genuine difficulty but because the Government of the day did not prefer the use of this machine, whatever may have been the reasons. It therefore delayed an amendment to the Conduct of Election Rules, which had become necessary consequent upon a ruling of the Kerala High Court, before these machines could be put into operation. These amendments were made only in 1992.

It was as late as in 1999 that the Election Commission showed the will to put these machines to extensive use. The last general elections have shown that the same old machines are good enough and foolproof. If they had been used a few years earlier, perhaps some public money could have been saved. The same cult figure was the instrument behind the famous ``identity card crisis''. He said ``no identity card, no elections''. This was based on his own interpretation of the scope of the powers of the Election Commission to insist on such cards all over the country, based on a limited provision not even in the law or in the Conduct of Election Rules, but of all places in the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, which read as follows:

``28. Identity cards for electors in notified constituencies: (1) The Election Commission may, with a view to preventing impersonation of electors and facilitating their identification at the time of poll, by notification in the Official Gazette of the State, direct that the provision of this rule shall apply to (any such constituency or part thereof) as may be specified in the notification.

(2) The registration officer for such notified constituency shall, as soon as may be, after the issue of the notification under sub-rule (1), arrange for the issue to every elector of an identity card prepared in accordance with the provisions of this rule...'' etc.

The estimated expenditure on identity cards incurred then was about Rs. 800 crores and the use of these cards was dispensed with in subsequent elections. The Government of the day decided to expand the Election Commission by appointing two more officers. That was not the first time the weapon of appointing more Election Commissioners when a one-man Commission is found inconvenient was used by the Central Government. On an earlier occasion also when a Chief Election Commissioner (who did not run his term but died prematurely in office), was found inconvenient, the same device was resorted to.

At the heart of the matter are the relevant provisions of the Constitution on the conduct of elections. Article 324 (1) confers the ``superintendence, direction and control'' of elections on a Commission which has been interpreted as giving the Commission ``plenipotentiary'' powers on all matters relating to the elections. This gives the Commission wide discretion for interpreting and issuing instructions on matters relating to elections not specifically or unambiguously covered by the relevant laws or rules. It is here that Article 324(2) giving the President the powers to fix such number of other Commissioners as he may choose becomes relevant.

What is therefore necessary, as a first step towards electoral reform, is an amendment to the constitutional provisions so as to place the number of Commissioners outside the purview of Presidential discretion and also either by law or by clear rules provide for the smooth disposal of business in the Commission and also for a situation where the Chief Election Commissioner is temporarily absent or otherwise unable to discharge his duties so that these matters are not left to the whims of those in power or to judicial interpretation regarding the scope of the relationship between the Chief Election Commissioner and the other Commissioners (Where such Commissioners are in place, which is not always).

There are glaring differences in the procedures laid down for the removal of a Chief Election Commissioner as compared with other Election Commissioners, which do not make for healthy ``inner party democracy.'' Interestingly, it has also not been found necessary to appoint Regional Commissioners provided for in the Constitution. Such Constitutional provisions conferring enormous discretion both on the President and on the Commission themselves in some of these matters need comprehensive review.

A reform at the bottom level would constitute a pre-requisite for a good election viz. reform in the process of revising and maintaining the electoral rolls. Before, during and after election time there are widespread allegations of mass deletion and inclusions of names. But no election has been set aside on the ground of a faulty electoral roll. This is only to be expected, since the right to vote is not a fundamental right and accrues under the law from the voter's name being included in the electoral roll The non-inclusion of a number of names in the roll could perhaps not be a ground for successfully challenging the validity of an election. Technically, the law permits the inclusion and deletion of names at any time before an electoral roll is ``frozen'' prior to a conduct of an election. Revision is possible only at the stage of an annual revision or during an intensive revision which again involves extensive participation of the Government staff and a heavy expenditure. This can be taken care of with personal computers which are affordable. These machines can be engaged exclusively for this purpose in each taluka in the urban areas. Members of the public should be allowed access at pre-appointed locations and changes should be made all round the year, so that the massive volume of work involved either annually or at the stage of intensive revision is eliminated. The public will be satisfied that they have access to the roll on a screen and opportunity to point out errors all the time. Rolls stored on a data base can be regrouped even when constituencies are delimited afresh.

Apart from reform at these two levels, there are many other areas where the need for reform is clearly visible but has not even been the subject of any informed debate. One example may be cited. As an immediate consequence of the ``Model Code of Conduct,'' Governments virtually stop functioning and not only are important policy decisions postponed, but even the ordinary process of decision-making affecting the fates of individual citizens is stalled. In the Government Departments when the staff members are busy with the conduct of elections, the situation is much worse.

Among the more frequently discussed issues relating to electoral reform is making the process ``fairer,'' including the need for reducing the role of ``money power.'' Political parties have been asked to file their income tax returns and the limits of expenditure on the part of individual candidates to the Assembly and the House of People have been increased. There is a discussion on the need to increase this limit. Candidates are now compelled to file their expenditure returns, resulting therefore in some follow up of the present legal provisions. There is also the constant discussion on whether State funding of political parties should be thought of as a means to check the temptation to accept donations. There has been a steep rise in the cost of manpower, consequent upon recent wage revisions and the time is ripe for a review whether the number can be pruned without detriment to quality.

The appointment of an Election Observer and now of even financial observers, in various constituencies, all increase the cost of the election process, which has to be ultimately borne by the tax payer. Instances have repeatedly come to light where the observers make various demands on the local officers, which, if met, would also no doubt be from public funds and add to the costs. Fortunately, on the last occasion, the Election Commission ``observed'' the wayward conduct of some of these ``observers'' and laid down restrictions including the one that they could not take their families with them while on tour. In any case, whether observers are needed for every constituency or they should be sent only where they are really necessary based on an analysis of the past trends, at the level of the Election Commission, could help in deciding the number of observers that need to be sent from a State and the number of constituencies that actually need to be monitored by observers.

It may well be worth trying whether all the restrictions should be removed. As such, the candidates resort to the device of ``party expenditure'' and it is commonly admitted that expenditure figures have to be fudged. So why waste time and public money on a plethora of returns, chasing the candidates for such returns and, during election time, trailing them with ``financial observers,'' even if only in a few cases? After all, the people of India in their wisdom have shown repeatedly that they can vote against money power and despotism.

What is important about reform is its sustainability and this can be achieved only when the institutions primarily concerned with such reform are well and truly placed outside the scope of Presidential pleasure. What could be attempted, in sum, is a ``liberalisation'' of the election process making it less expensive and traumatic to the tax payer and leave something to his good judgment which he has demonstrated time and again has not failed him. Experience has also shown that high visibility in the reform process does not necessarily make for sustainability. If the main players in the game decide to spend more time on introspection than before the telecameras, better results are bound to follow.

R. CHANDRASEKHAR

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Section  : Features
Previous : Psychological research in education process
Next     : Site and Sound on Health