Strategy necessary

I SPEAK purely as a common citizen of the country and a layman. I have no great experience of security and safety measures followed in the Civil Aviation Department. However, I have been an Air Defence Commander closely associated with airforce station commanders and staff in forward airfields during hostilities. I am acutely aware that this by itself does not qualify me to comment on the hijacking of civil aircrafts.

The circumstances surrounding the hijacked Indian Aircraft at Kandahar, I feel, was matter purely for diplomatic efforts and parleys. However, as a citizen following the media reports on the subject, I, like other millions of Indians, was concerned about the fate of the hapless passengers who suffered physical discomfort, mental anguish and other personal problems. How did this come about?

In order to answer this question, we should look into the series of hijack incidents not only in this country, but all over the world from the late Sixties. It must be recognised that hijacking is an act of terrorism. It is of no avail to say that it is a heinous act, or a criminal act or an act against humanity. Though not common, wherever it has occurred, the hijackers had a definite objective and had followed the Machiavellian principle that ``the end justifies the means''.

In most hijack incidents, the end objective was political support to some revolutionary group or other or ransom or both and to persuade governments to secure the aims of the hijackers. Since it is an act of terrorism, the same principles, as is followed in anti-terrorism operations, should be applicable in cases of hijacking also with a modification that this concerns aircraft on ground or in flight. In the latest instance, the news of hijack would have been communicated to the airports at Lucknow, Delhi and Amritsar within 30 minutes of the incident. The plane, after a futile effort to land at Lahore, did land at Amritsar. Considering that the aircraft was ours, the majority of the passengers were Indians, and parked on our homeground (Amritsar) action should have been taken.

No amount of explanation can justify this failure. Had there been standing operational instructions for these types of contingencies, the total failure could have been avoided and the aircraft impounded. After all, the pilot of an aircraft of the Indian Airlines or Air India is a very responsible and a highly paid functionary. As captain of the aircraft, it is regrettable that he has no role in securing the safety of the aircraft or resisting the hijackers. In a similar situation, the captain of a ship on the highseas cannot be heard to say that pirates had boarded his ship and he capitulated without resistance put up by himself and his crew. The same will apply to an airforce pilot flying an IAFplane. The hijackers do not seem to be great experts in flying, piloting or navigating an aircraft. In such circumstances, it would not be too difficult for an experienced pilot to hoodwink them in changing directions or flying into fogs or adopting such methods as to temporarily plead disability in the aircraft's flying capabilities. It is also a pity that no system of signals (not necessarily by word of mouth) to other aircrafts or airfields by way of SOS appears to exist. If there was such a system, the pilot could possibly have communicated the details about the hijackers, the weapons and the methods they used to compel him to follow their instructions.

A significant consequence of our lapse at Amritsar was that it enabled the hijackers to fly to the safe haven of Kandahar and park themselves there in total safety without fear of any retaliation. Whatever be the assertions of Pakistan and the Taliban Governments, it was obvious from the demands of the hijackers and their proximity to the Taliban authorities, that they were co-sponsored by Pakistan and the Taliban.

After-all, it is well-known that the Taliban is the right-hand of Pakistan inside Afghanistan. The primary objective of the hijacking appears to be to acquire credibility and recognition of the military regime in Pakistan and the Taliban Governments which India had declined to recognise and with which maintains no diplomatic relations.

The Indian Government was constrained to seek the help of the Taliban and also that of the Pakistani Government to some extent. It enabled the Taliban to have a U.N. team discussing the problem with them at Kandahar as also other countries. Kashmir thus was discussed at the international level. These could not have been achieved by either Pakistan or the Taliban through normal diplomatic endeavours. From this point of view, it is a major setback to the Indian stand, apart from the exchange of militants from Indian prisons for the hostages. The failure to block the aircraft at Amritsar was a fatal mistake, disastrous to the Indian political stand and the country's prestige.

The Government should concentrate on the prevention of such instances in future. It is high time that as has been done in anti-terrorist operations in Punjab, Kashmir and the North-East as also elsewhere, definite instructions were formulated for the prevention of such instances of hijacking of aircraft and necessary detailed instructions issued to the civil aviation authorities and pilots, aircrew and airforce which can readily be followed by everyone. These should include immediate action for retaliation when a plane is hijacked. Standing instructions should be issued to pilots, flight crews and airports after formulating broad guidelines after studying instances of hijacking abroad and the measures taken by such countries as Israel, France and others to tackle it.

In this context, it may not be out of place to consider to have pilots, co-pilots trained in handling of fire arms to be used ``while on ground'', use of teargas or even chloroform when the position of the hijackers are identified within the plane. It should also be possible to destabilise the aircraft in flight so that the hijackers lose balance or cause the plane to crash-land while approaching own airfields within the possible parameters of safety. There are many other similar ways and methods which can be evolved by the expertise available with our civil aviation departments.

The policy instructions which are formulated should be updated with every hijack incident occurring not only in India, but abroad. It is also essential to identify airfields which are not security proof and afford soft options for possible hijackers to emplane. The flight crew could also be accompanied by trained commandos.

In the whole sordid episode, including negotiations, we totally overlooked two facts: against the 150 hostages held by the hijackers, we had hundreds of Pakistani/Kashmiri militants including Maulana Masood Azar, Mushtaq Zargar and others. This should have been our trumpcard.

We should have posed a counterthreat that the lives of these militants in our prisons would be in great jeopardy in view of the enraged Indian public opinion and the hijackers alone would be responsible for any harm or loss of life to the militants. Perhaps such a counter- threat would have softened the hijackers' stand and also made Pakistan/Taliban and others more forthcoming in resolving the issue.

Further, even our airforce, if it had been alerted in time, could have overpowered the hijacked plane while in flight over our own country and forced it to land within our territory.

Brig. (Retd) KOYAMANGALETH

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