Interpreting nuclear India

George Perkovich's book is an objective analysis of the issues concerning disarmament and a pointer to American thinking about nuclear non-proliferation. A review by V.R.RAGHAVAN.

HISTORY will perceive the 20th Century to be one characterised by conflict.

A major part of it saw the clash of arms. Two world wars which covered a major part of the world, also defined the first half of the century.

The nature of the second half was determined by the conflict in the first. The Cold War that followed determined the fate of a large part of the globe. There was armed conflict all over, unprecedented in frequency, through the second half of the century.

A major development in international affairs was the emergence of independent nations out of the colonial empires. Relations between states were determined more by which side of the ideological divide they were on. The century witnessed the economic struggles between the rich and poor nations, and when within nations, between the privileged and deprived segments of the population.

The century was marked by ideological conflict between capitalism and communism. Security in the second half of the century was closely linked to the possession and denial of nuclear weapons, which changed the security outlook of both those who possessed them and those who did not. Nuclear weapons introduced a balance of terror and came to be seen as symbols of power and international influence. Nuclear weapon states did everything (and still do) to deny the technology to others while those who felt insecure did everything possible to obtain the weapons through overt or covert means. Overall, the last century was an anarchic one, notwithstanding major initiatives taken to create some semblance of order through international organisations.

The conflictual context is relevant for interpreting nuclear India, a task George Perkovich's book sets out to do. Independent India was born in the interplay of national and international conflicts. The freedom movement was a political conflict at a subcontinental level and unprecedented in its scope and non- violent nature. That epic, but unarmed, struggle took place during the two World Wars in which India was involved through the men and material it assembled for the allied effort. After independence, the Cold War directly affected India, even as it attempted to keep out of it through a policy of non-alignment. As a consequence of Cold War dynamics, India had to fight wars with Pakistan.

The Cold War impacted on the misunderstandings between India and China on the border issue and led to a war. China and Pakistan combined efforts in military and technology fields to exert pressure on India. The security perceptions of the Indian political leadership were influenced by these realities. These and the new anarchy of nuclear hegemonism are often cited as the reasons for India becoming a nuclear weapons state. Perkovich's book greatly expands the understanding of the evolution of India's nuclear weapons policy. It places India's actions in the global perspective of non-proliferation and disarmament.

The book traces the evolution of India's nuclear weapons programme and the decision making processes which led to the 1998 tests. The decision to go nuclear was momentous and its consequences felt for decades to come. Whether the decision to do so was right will also be debated. The motives were not solely external security threats, there being a substantial domestic political dimension too. The nuclear establishment, or, in Perkovich's effectively borrowed phrase, the strategic enclave, also played a major role. The history of the Indian nuclear programme is incisively examined in the book, a more valuable contribution which identifies the motives which drive a nation state to seek nuclear weapons. It comes to conclusions on the close relationship between nuclear proliferation and disarmament. India becoming a nuclear weapons state has made a serious dent in the circle of the five major nuclear weapons powers, which are also permanent members of the United Nations. The consequences of one small set of nations retaining nuclear weapons, while asking others to abjure them, has been candidly shown by Perkovich. He effectively highlights the risks of proliferation that are inherent, in that the major powers continue to value nuclear weapons.

An interesting part of the book is the examination of the reasons why the nuclear weapon powers are not able to give up such weapons. The book challenges the assumption that removing the security concerns which cause proliferation will undo proliferation. It puts forward the valid thesis that nuclear weapons change the nature of the state which acquires them. Such weapons create an array of interests which must be addressed before a state can give up the weapons. More often than not, these interests remain beyond the capacity of the state to manage. They are even more difficult to overcome in democracies. That makes the prospect of what Perkovich calls "unproliferation", quite bleak.

Each nation state seeks security through measures which allow it autonomy in pursuing its policies. No nation can also be wholly free from the influences of the world and the times it lives in. India's nuclear policies were affected in good measure by the role played by major powers. The role of the

United States in pushing India towards developing nuclear weapons has been considerable. Its preference for non- proliferation instead of disarmament as the instrument for global security and stability is analysed. In some ways this forms the most fascinating part of the book.

Perkovich questions the premise that the nuclear policies of the major nuclear powers have had no bearing on India's security. As Perkovich terms it, the "security first narrative" of the U.S. is not shared by everyone. India has viewed nuclear policies more as a "political narrative" in the context of equity in international relations.

Domestic factors that influenced India's decision to test and declare itself a nuclear weapons power were many. These are examined in detail and backed by a mass of references and numerous interviews.

An interesting, and not inaccurate, interpretation of 1998 is on the alternate routes to great power status, which successive Indian governments perceived to be available. Mr. Narasimha Rao and others had correctly perceived that economic and political strengths mattered more than anything else. They had read the true meaning of the decline of Britain, France and even Russia despite their nuclear weapons. They had initiated and kept going the economic reforms, to give India the economic choices so desperately needed. They came close to conducting nuclear tests on security considerations but held back on economic reasoning. Some others felt that the economic route was long and uncertain and fraught with political costs. They needed another, shorter, dramatic and instant route to great power status, at least in the eyes of the Indian public. Nuclear weapons were thought to offer that shortcut. The Bharatiya Janata Party Government in particular, which was coming to power and wanted to get off to a good start, took the shortcut. The long route had not, however, been thought out.

Consequently, the arrival of nuclear weapons in fact showed up India's security choices to have become lesser rather than greater.

The book makes three interesting conclusions. The first is about the limited influence of external security threats as the driving force behind nations acquiring nuclear weapons. It posits that domestic compulsions play as great, if not a greater role, in moving the leadership towards the climactic decision to go nuclear. At least in the case of India and Pakistan, it has been amply proved. Now that Perkovich has said it, this may be more widely believed, even if similar analysis by other Indian commentators were earlier ignored.

The second concerns the umbilical relationship between proliferation and disarmament or "unproliferation". He makes a clear case on the need for the nuclear powers to move forward on disarmament, if nuclear proliferation is to be stopped.

The third is that as nuclear weapons are acquired, states will find it increasingly difficult to give them up.

A point is made that giving up nuclear weapons is even more difficult in democracies, in the face of the vested interests that come up. The major nuclear weapons States prove this. Now that nuclear weapons are available, nothing less will do for the Indian nuclear establishment, than massive arsenals packaged as a minimum credible deterrent. It is, therefore, no surprise that Indian nuclear scientists are already clamouring for funds to make "Star Wars" a reality.

The political leadership which drove India to a nuclear weapons status has now to cope with the responsibilities and consequences of that choice. Now that leadership is groping for direction and a content to the nuclear policy. It is unclear on what is to be done about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and how to go about building a nuclear consensus. Its hastily announced and speedily diluted nuclear doctrine is a case in point.

The leadership is yet to realise the limits nuclear weapons have already placed on its military choices. Kargil and the intensifying conflict in Kashmir have left it unsure of a future course.

It is now reduced to taking recourse to reinventing the notions of limited war, when that choice is forever denied by the possession of nuclear weapons. India, therefore, needs to work more on disarmament and less on nuclear deterrence. It will have to be aware that nuclear weapons do not enlarge but diminish the autonomy available in making available security choices. That is the message of Perkovich's definitive book. It is a message meant as much for major nuclear powers, as it is for India.

India's Nuclear Bomb, The Impact on Global Proliferation, George Perkovich, University of California Press, 1999, p.597.

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