Dangerous nuclear uncertainties

By V. R. Raghavan

INDIA WAS declared by the Government a nuclear weapon state within hours of the tests conducted in May 1998. An effective nuclear weapon state needs an effective deterrent which, in turn, requires a nuclear weapon infrastructure. This includes weaponised warheads, delivery systems, command and control structures, early warning facilities and an institutionalised working linkage between nuclear scientists and the military hierarchy. With none of these being in place, the claim to India being a nuclear weapon state reinforced the belief that the nuclear explosions were an end in themselves for the Government which had just assumed power. Apparently, neither the long road beyond the tests had been visualised nor was an action plan thought through. Recent developments not only confirm that impression but also create serious doubts about the veracity of the Government's claims. Even more dangerous, they raise questions on the quality of India's deterrence.

Soon after Pokhran-II the Government committed the nation to a moratorium on testing. Two leading scientists publicly claimed that the May 1998 tests had provided all data required for weaponising. The fission devices exploded in 1998 did no more than confirm the capability demonstrated by the single device test of 1974. They undoubtedly improved on the quantity and quality of fission explosion data. The most significant part of the 1998 tests, however, was the single thermonuclear explosion. The thermonuclear or fusion capability is the key to a nation becoming an effective nuclear weapon state. Fusion or thermonuclear warheads include a fission device to initiate the fusion chain. In layman's language, a thermonuclear bomb includes a small atomic bomb within itself. The process is complex to manage and control.

Thermonuclear warheads are much smaller and therefore lend themselves to miniaturisation. They can be easily mounted on missiles. Smaller weight and size of fusion warheads permit longer missile ranges. Thermonuclear weapons are absolutely essential if the deterrent is to be based on submarines and inter-continental missiles. They are also, as scientists term them, elegant in concept and design. Again in layman's parlance, a fission bomb is like a big iron ball shot from a catapult, while the thermonuclear warhead is a precision weapon. The Indian nuclear deterrent will therefore be a primitive one, if it is based solely on fission technology.

The success of the 1998 thermonuclear test was, therefore, the keystone to India becoming a nuclear weapon state. For its deterrent capability to be taken seriously, the success of the thermonuclear test was a crucial necessity. Soon after the tests, there were reports in the Western media of doubts having been cast on the Indian thermonuclear claims. These were vehemently refuted by Indian scientists. Now, a former Chairman of the atomic energy establishment, Dr. P. K Iyengar, has raised questions on the completeness of the fusion explosion. In a presentation at the Delhi Policy Group recently, he made a convincing case, which raises doubts about the Government's thermonuclear claims.

According to Dr. Iyengar, the thermonuclear explosion did not fully reach its planned potential. He gives credit to the scientists, who could get a thermonuclear burn to start, in the limited explosive size which was used. He also conclusively argues that the burn having taken place, the totality of the thermonuclear process was inadequate to provide conclusive data for use in the weaponising process. The partial explosion was insufficient as a basis for manufacturing fusion warheads. Experience in the development of thermonuclear weapons clearly shows that data in greater quantity and quality is necessary to move from the explosion stage to warhead manufacturing. This could not have been available from the Pokhran thermonuclear test. Dr. Iyengar's essential conclusion is that if India wants thermonuclear weapons, they cannot be had without more tests.

The Government officially released a nuclear doctrine. But faced with some well-founded critique of that document, it retracted to say it was a draft doctrine. Some in the group which drafted the document now call it a provisional doctrine. In a significant interview to this newspaper, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, further diluted some elements of the doctrine. As of now, there is no official explanation of where the Government stands vis-a-vis the nuclear doctrine. If it disassociates itself from it, India will apparently have no doctrine even as the Government possesses nuclear weapons. If the Government endorses the doctrine, more tests will be needed to make it viable.

The Indian nuclear doctrine is based on thermonuclear capability. That alone can provide the basis of a triad which the doctrine demands. The size of the nuclear arsenal needed to sustain a no- first-use pledge, which the Government has already taken, cannot be obtained without thermonuclear weapons. The assessed volume of India's processed nuclear weapons-grade fuel can only sustain the needed arsenal through a thermonuclear ability. The Government has also given an undertaking of a moratorium on further tests. Its single thermonuclear test was on, the other hand, inconclusive. It, therefore, appears that the nuclear doctrine cannot be implemented without further tests. Under the circumstances, the Government's moratorium will be viewed with circumspection at the least and with suspicion at worst. If it goes back on its word, it would irretrievably harm its credibility.

There are now serious doubts about the nature and quality of the Indian deterrent. The questions on the thermonuclear test, the Government's ambiguous position on the nuclear doctrine and its inability to put together a credible nuclear command and control structure create serious security problems. India being an effective nuclear weapon state is wholly different from its merely being a state possessing nuclear weapons. The danger in this state of ambivalence is that the adversary can draw his own conclusions about the credibility of India's deterrence. Nuclear deterrence requires the adversary being left in no doubt about the quality and quantity of deterrence. The credibility of deterrence also depends on the clarity of thinking demonstrated on the subject.

The Government promised the people a National Security Council, a Strategic Defence Review and a decision on nuclear weapons, in that order. The decision to go nuclear was to depend on the outcome of a strategic review. It went back on that assurance and conducted the tests first. As a consequence, it has had to spend more time coping with the fallout of the tests than on creating a semblance of order in nuclear policy. Its inadequately thought- out act of committing India to nuclear weapons has left it indecisive on what to do with them. As a result, the Indian deterrent appears no less opaque than it was before May 1998.

There are critical issues which need to be urgently addressed. Should India conduct more thermonuclear tests and get the conclusive data needed for making fusion weapons? Can it be content with fission devices and forget about further testing? If so, what prevents India joining the CTBT? How effective will such a deterrent be in the judgment of its adversaries? If India is to conduct some more thermonuclear tests and join the CTBT, how many tests would be adequate? What would be the direct and indirect costs of testing after our having declared a moratorium?

The challenge lies in getting out of the nuclear maze the Government has built around itself. This has happened because of nuclear weapons having been granted an unwarranted centrality in India's security discourse. The way out lies in placing a new perspective on nuclear weapons. There is more to national security than nuclear weapons alone. The Government needs to decide not so much the extent as the limits of India's nuclear deterrent. The problem is less with nuclear weapons and more of a lack of conceptual clarity. In the interim, the dangerous uncertainty is not going to diminish.

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Section  : Opinion
Previous : The RSS gets a new chief
Next     : The President's concerns - I