Needed, a dose of realism

By K. K. Katyal

TO SAY the U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton's visit to India would give a big push to bilateral relationship is to stress the obvious. That the two sides would not let their differences come in the way of building a ``strong and cooperative strategic relationship'', to quote the U.S. Secretary of State, Ms. Madeleine Albright, is clear too. The mutual ties promise to be free from misperceptions and miscalculations - and that is a matter of satisfaction. India and the U.S. intend fashioning their relationship with an eye on the future in the context of their commonalities on fundamentals. But to ignore or even de- emphasise the differences - as is regrettably evident in New Delhi - will not do any good and, on the contrary, may lead to disenchantment on the sudden ``discovery'' of gaps in the positions of the two sides on nuclear non-proliferation and India-Pakistan relations. Drawing attention to these problems is not to strike a negative note but is a plea for a balanced appraisal of the relationship with Washington. There are good reasons to be upbeat but there is an equally strong justification to be realistic.

The plan for the presidential visit has undergone many a change since it was first mooted in 1996 on the return of Mrs. Hillary Clinton from a trip to India. The visit got delayed for various reasons - the U.S. presidential election and Mr. Clinton's bid for the second term, followed by the collapse of the Gujral Government here, the general election, the change of guard in New Delhi, Pokhran-II, last year's political crisis and another general election. As a result, new, key factors kept altering the politico-diplomatic context. For instance, the issue of nuclear tests in South Asia would not have been there had the visit taken place in 1997. Kargil and the military coup in Pakistan would not have been there had Mr. Clinton come to the region in the second half of 1998 or the first quarter of the following year. The agenda, not a formal one though, has now fallen into place.

The visit to India will be the centrepiece of Mr. Clinton's trip, first after the end of the cold war. There will be a close focus, as is evident by now, on enhancement of bilateral ties - that is what the ``vision document'' to be signed during the visit is about. In the U.S. eyes today, India has a great attraction as an economic power - its potential for growth, vastness of opportunities for trade and investment, scope for cooperation in energy and environment and the strides in information technology - and as the largest democracy with its 600 million voters. All this is certain to be reflected in Mr. Clinton's talks with his hosts and in the documents taking shape. However, the Indian side would be deluding itself if does not take into account or underestimates the strength of the sentiments against India's ``historic mistake'' - Washington's description of the 1998 nuclear tests - or America's passion for conflict prevention in the subcontinent. Through repeated references to the ``nuclear flash-point'' or the ``nuclear trigger'', the U.S. made known its stand on the negative potential of the Kashmir problem and India- Pakistan adversarial relations. It is not anyone's case that the foreign policy establishment here is not sufficiently aware of all this but what is intriguing is the tendency to play down, perhaps for domestic consumption, the importance the Americans propose to give to these matters in their discussions. Then there is the uneasy feeling that the Indian side may not go beyond the mechanical reiteration of its known - and, no doubt, valid - stand on the resumption of dialogue with Pakistan and related matters.

New Delhi's position on terrorist violence in Kashmir and Pakistan's role in it is clearly understood and appreciated by the world community but that is not the case with the rest of India-Pakistan problem. New Delhi could make use of the advantage in the first case for substantive moves on other aspects. There is a scope for creative diplomacy within the framework of the Indian policy - favouring bilateralism and opposing a third-party role (be it intervention, facilitation or good offices) - but there is no evidence of it in the foreign office. Take the present international attention on the sanctity of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. This could be turned into an opportunity for substantive moves to address the problem in its entirety. The other day, Ms. Albright was emphatic that ``tangible steps must be taken to respect the Line of Control'' for, ``so long as this simple principle is violated, the people of Kashmir have no real hope for peace''. The exhortation was, obviously, directed at Pakistan which was responsible for its violation through a systematic, well-organised proxy war. Islamabad's pretence that it was an indigenous uprising was torn asunder during the Kargil conflict which ended when the Pakistan Prime Minister of the day, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, chose to withdraw the intruders - regular troops, apart from trained mercenaries - at the U.S. instance.

That the July 4, 1999, agreement to that effect led to political turmoil in Pakistan was a different story - though quite relevant to the current posturing of the military regime. Equally notable was the restraint shown by India in not crossing the LoC, though there was a good case, militarily speaking, for it, in order to overcome the handicaps experienced by its troops. In the post- Kargil spurt in militancy, there were even stronger reasons for limited strikes by India on the other side of the Line but once again political and diplomatic discretion had the better of military compulsions. All this did not go unnoticed in major world capitals.

Now we have China's emphasis on the sanctity of the LoC, publicly affirmed through its Ambassador in New Delhi, Mr. Zhou Gang. China makes no secret of its special relationship with Pakistan, ``an all-weather friend'', and as such its call for peace and tranquillity on the Line was doubly significant. Beijing was specially qualified to speak on the subject because its agreement with New Delhi had kept the Sino-Indian border area calm, even though the boundary dispute remained unresolved and bilateral ties were subjected to strong pressures after Pokhran-II. It is, however, not clear whether China still sticks to the view, expressed by its President, Mr. Jiang Zemin, during his trip to Pakistan (after the visit to India) some years ago, urging the two countries to put the Kashmir issue on the back burner so as to be able to address the less intractable problems.

The current stress on the sanctity of the LoC could well be the starting point of a Kashmir-related Indian initiative, with the immediate aim of maintaining peace and tranquillity in a sensitive area (the ``most dangerous place on the globe'', according to Washington) on the one hand, and the medium-term objective of providing for an interim period a solution of the Kashmir problem, on the other. This could be part of a structured response by India when Mr. Clinton raises - which he is certain to do - the question of forestalling a possible armed conflict on Kashmir. The Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, would need to give a positive, credible reply.

In its opposition to third-party intervention, India need not go to the extent of discouraging others from offering useful suggestions for a longer-term solution which may well involve raising the LoC profile. True, such a solution may not square with the parliamentary resolution, affirming India's claim to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, just as it will not be acceptable to Pakistanis, fed on an anti-India rhetoric. But an arrangement, equally unacceptable to the rival sides, has a merit. As for the internal situation in the State, the Indian side will need to be prepared for an appropriate response to a possible U.S. plea for a political rather than military solution.

On the nuclear issue, the present tough talk by Washington proves wrong the assumptions made on the basis of the Jaswant Singh- Strobe Talbott dialogue. In the run-up to the Clinton visit, the Indian side tended to gloss over the matter. New Delhi has a strong case which needs to be put across categorically - in full public gaze. There is no warrant for sugar-coating a bitter reality.

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