Proactive policy to banish militancy

THINGS HAVE been allowed to drift for too long in Jammu and Kashmir. The political will was vacillating right from day one in dealing with crises in this trouble-torn State. Now is the right time to adopt a strong proactive policy to break the back of terrorism there. No doubt, it is a Herculean task to guard all points along the 800-odd km of our border with Pakistan. It is also impossible to end terrorism unless our political masters allow this job to be done by some organisation cut out for the purpose.

Pakistan contrived to draw the Indian Army formations from Kashmir to Kargil so that it could intensify its terrorist activities in the State. But our officers and jawans have driven out the intruders with bold and brilliant moves over the mountains. Pakistan's army is demoralised and its foreign policy moves are in tatters. The momentum is with us and hence it is high time that a cogent and proactive policy was formulated and adopted post haste to secure India from any future external threat.

The points of ingress by militants, passes at high altitude and strategic features, will have to be physically held by placing troops on ground. The likely approaches have to be mined and covered with accurate fire. To provide logistic cover for troops holding these positions, the Army Engineers and the Border Roads Organisation would construct concrete bunkers, jeepable roads and helipads. The time has now come for closely monitoring the Line of Control with watchdog satellite systems to support the activities of the troops on ground.

Local battalions

Villages in other border areas will have to be tackled on a different footing. To prevent frequent upheavals and demoralisation among the population, bunkers with overhead earth protection should be constructed on the periphery so that villgers can take shelter during shelling. They themselves can build the bunkers for which iron pickets, corrugated sheets and digging tools are to be provided by the Government. The location and construction can be done under the guidance of the Army Engineers. This is the only cost-effective method.

The army's operational moves are based on intelligence, reconnaissance and patrolling. It is therefore prudent to recruit and raise battalions from among the local population which is already accustomed to the ground on which it operates. We have the Ladakh Scouts, Naga battalions, etc, but a more energetic drive is needed in other areas to cover villages on the border. We must have battalions of Kashmiris and Ladakhis and place them at strategic locations for easy mobilisation in Jammu and Kashmir. The units should also be given an opportunity to serve in other parts to enable them to imbibe the spirit of India.

At present, the policy on local protection hinges on village defence committees (VDCs) armed with only .303-inch calibre weapons of World War-II vintage. How can one expect them to fight terrorists who are armed with AK-47 and other high grade modern weapons? The VDCs should be armed and trained to use modern automatic weapons and also equipped with sufficient ammunition to hold the predators at bay until a strike force arrives on the scene. They should also possess the best communication system. The Army has built up a cult image after the Kargil operation and the whole nation is now in a position of strength. Therefore, the Government should not lose this advantage by delaying the raising of a commando force which would take the battle to the militants and give it a clinical finish.

The commando force of about a platoon strength should be placed at vantage locations in each district which is under the sway of militancy. An independent commando formation, be it a brigade or division, should be located in Jammu and Kashmir. This force should be directly under the command and control of the Army headquarters. The commando sub-units should have the best weapons with night vision devices in the world armoury and the best communication network. The VDCs inform the headquarters of this strike force which will swoop on the militants within minutes, flying armoured helicopters or riding jeeps. Continuous flushing should be pursued until the terrorist groups are demoralised and forced to give up their activities. Since the militants are always in groups we should have matching commando elements empowered at the lowest level to take decisions themselves without looking over their shoulder. It is vital that the energy and commitment which drive the terrorists are matched by the persistence and determination of our commando force. This is how the battle can be won.

The practice of foisting on the Army the responsibility of curbing terrorism under the garb of counter-insurgency operations in J&K should be stopped. This is a nagging responsibility which will erode soldierly qualities over a period. It will also alienate the local population from the Army. This job should be given to the elite commando force (working in unison with the local police) raised from different units of the Army, designed and trained only for this purpose. Its composition, equipment and training will virtually make it a force multiplier in realistic terms. Only this force can fill the void created by rushing troops to deal with future intrusions in Kargil. The elements of the commando force may return to their parent units at the conclusion of this national mission.

The intelligence apparatus in the threatened districts needs revamping through central co-ordination by the commando headquarters. This will enable its commander to pre-empt, through swift action on the ground, any plan the terrorists hatch.

Indianise Kashmiris

The system of having a special status for J&K is ineffective, to say the least. Although the status has been bestowed, no action has been taken to Indianise the population or bring it into the mainstream of the polity. Hence, after creating the necessary climate by delivering the knockout punch to militancy, four or five years will have to be spent on revamping the administration to make it more efficient and meaningful. Roads and hospitals have to be built to ease the hardship of the people in remote areas. The educational infrastructure has to be given the highest priority with a clear-cut policy of inculcating the spirit of India in the coming generation of Kashmiris. This will be possible only if the curriculum at the lowest level in schools is carefully scrutinised to develop a `fresh crop' of citizenry in the troubled region.

It is worthwhile to conscript all able-bodied youth in the State for at least two years. Their serving in the armed forces will not only solve unemployability but also fortify the State against external aggression. Conscription will provide reserve manpower for easy mobilisation. Above all, this will strengthen the bond between the State and the rest of the nation.

Militancy has to be tackled on a war-footing. To attain this goal, an infrastructure which is a judicious mix of civil administration and army organisation will have to be created. A military adviser who has had experience in counter-insurgency in J&K has to be at the helm of affairs. During the two years or so when the quick reaction force or commandos rid the State of the disease that has set in the adviser should have a free hand. There is no other way. Remember, the people of Punjab were fed up with militancy and needed only a strong individual, Mr. K. P. S. Gill, who was vested with enough powers to sound the death-knell of militancy.

The civil administration, especially at the higher levels, should be in the hands of committed officers who enjoy high career profiles. The police should be armed with AK-47 or equivalent arms which are now available in large quantities in the State. Selected police teams should be given commando training along with the army personnel. They should also have a network of modern communication systems operating in tandem with the elite commandos. Cordon and search operations should be done by crack police teams armed with search warrants. The basic characteristics of civil police should, however, remain. Wheras the commandos operate to eliminate the militants physically, the police should work to frustrate their infiltration into the civilian population.

Terrorism is like a cancerous growth threatening the very foundation of this country. Like an operation performed in an emergency ward `behind closed doors', this malaise should be eradicated by restricting publicity for about two years when the clinical process is on in full swing. This will help in curbing the menace.

The existing policy lacks punch. It has almost accepted militancy in J&K as a fait acompli. At best it can be described as attempt to offer weak reactions to determined forays by foreigners into our land. Pakistan is exporting terrorism `manufactured' in its training centres dotting the border. We do not have a policy of striking at these bases to destroy the nodal points of militant activity. This is well in keeping with the edicts of international law. However, as the international community, in the post-Kargil scenario, is well-disposed to understand our view, we should adopt a strong posture towards the belligerent neighbour. Now Russia has agreed to fight terrorism on a common platform with India. The U.K. has similar views. This is a positive move to strengthen the world community in dealing with the global phenomenon of terrorism.

We can no longer adhere to a feeble domestic policy which lacks firmness. The flushing out operation has to continue even as moral support from the international community continues to be extended. The initial thrust of the Government should be on ensuring an efficient and clean administration in J&K with strong ground rules for accountability at all levels. The Kargil operation has had a direct impact on the minds of our defence planners. The Government has decided to raise a corps and place it in the State to deal with future threats. But this is an overkill. Instead, a force multiplier like the elite commando force with best weapons and sophisticated communication would be more cost-effective in the long-run. It is far easier to manage such a disciplined force which would ultimately merge with the Army to be recalled during any future crisis. The recent hijacking of an IA plane has also brought into focus the crying need for such a small and highly trained force empowered to act on its own.

Col. K. S. RAJAMANI (retd.)

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