Some hard choices

By C. Raja Mohan

WILL ISLAMABAD persist on the low road of permanent confrontation with New Delhi that it has chosen for itself in the last decade? Or will General Pervez Musharraf heed the U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton's advice and get on to the high road of peace and reconciliation with India? The medicine that Mr. Clinton ordered for the Pakistani leadership is indeed a bitter one. Mr. Clinton has warned Pakistan that if it chooses to pursue the path of militarism and extremism it will further isolate itself from the international community.

But if the establishment in Islamabad wants to build ``a stable, prosperous, democratic Pakistan, secure in its borders, friendly with its neighbours, confident about its future'', Mr. Clinton promised the U.S. would walk with it. As the Chief Executive of Pakistan ponders over the poisoned chalice before him, he knows that all his options are indeed fraught with dangers. One option for the General would be to insist that Pakistan is in good shape and it does not need the medicine ordered by Doctor Clinton. He could tell himself as he stands before the mirror that the poisoned chalice may be an optical illusion.

The Pakistani establishment is tempted to disbelieve any proposition that Uncle Sam, who looked after it for five decades, will now dare to abandon it. Much like the Indian pessimists who have convinced themselves that the U.S. will never give up on Pakistan, the optimists in Islamabad cannot get themselves to see the ``paradigm shift'' in the U.S. policy towards the sub- continent engineered by Mr. Clinton. By declaring a new relationship with India premised on a larger calculus of Asian balance of power, by insisting that the Kashmir issue must be resolved within the framework of the territorial unity of India, and demanding that Pakistan cease supporting terrorism, Mr. Clinton has ended the historic tilt towards Pakistan.

In making it abundantly clear that the U.S. will not intervene on the side of Pakistan if it chooses to go to war with India over Kashmir, Mr. Clinton has shattered the foundations of Islamabad's approach to India in the last decade. If Gen. Musharraf refuses to recognise the poisoned chalice, he risks losing the American political and financial support that he badly needs to put the economy back on the rails and prevent Pakistan from becoming a failed state. Even more important, Pakistan will have to factor in the possibility that the refusal to drink from the poisoned chalice may drive the U.S. even closer to India.

A second choice before Gen. Musharraf is to pretend that he is drinking from the poisoned chalice. Pakistan could calculate that Mr. Clinton's days in the White House are numbered. Gen. Musharraf could believe that the paradigm shift in the U.S. policy is not irrevocable and could be reversed by the next Administration. Some in Islamabad indeed argue that Mr. Clinton has been seduced by the evil charms of India and hope that the morning after, the U.S. will come back to its first love in the sub-continent, Pakistan. But in crafting its new approach to the sub-continent, the Clinton Administration appears to have closely consulted both the Democrats and Republicans to ensure a continuity of policy after Mr. Clinton leaves the White House in January 2001.

A third option for Gen. Musharraf is to take just a few sips out of the poisoned chalice and hope that Mr. Clinton will stop putting pressure on Pakistan. Gen. Musharraf appears to be toying with this strategy as he proclaims his readiness to use his influence with the extremist groups to reduce the violence in Kashmir. But he continues to insist that he cannot undertake this as a ``unilateral measure'' and that New Delhi must respond with its own ``reciprocal actions'' such as scaling down the presence of Indian troops. Gen. Musharraf could indeed take a few cosmetic measures that will be seen as reducing the terrorist activity and then demand that the U.S. lean on India to open talks.

The Clinton Administration did not allow Pakistan to fudge the question of its aggression across the Line of Control in the Kargil confrontation. It demanded a unilateral and unconditional withdrawal of forces from across the LoC. Similarly, the U.S. appears to be telling Pakistan now that there can be no question of ``simultaneity'' in the actions by Islamabad and New Delhi. Mr. Clinton is believed to have conveyed to Gen. Musharraf that it is up to Pakistan to take the first step in ending violence and rebuilding the trust shattered by Islamabad's Kargil aggression.

A fourth option before Gen. Musharraf is to throw the poisoned chalice back at Mr. Clinton. Many extremist ideologues in Pakistan argue that it is time Pakistan ended its reliance on the U.S. and looked elsewhere for support. The jihadis in Pakistan want a strategic defiance of the U.S. and a deepening of the alliance with China and reinforcing the ties to the Islamic world. This strategy is neither credible abroad nor does it have universal support at home. Defying the West will seal Pakistan's hopes of an economic revival; and it might not bring the expected strategic dividends. China is in no position to replace the U.S. in Pakistan. Despite its real concerns about a new alliance between India and the U.S., China will surely calculate the costs of a total alignment with Pakistan and new hostility towards India.

The Muslim world too will begin to understand the shift in the U.S. policy towards the sub-continent outlined by Mr. Clinton. The Islamic nations have enough troubles of their own and the last thing they want is a Talibanised Pakistan that becomes a source of political radicalism. The large Islamic countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are likely to advise restraint to Pakistan rather than encourage its current adventurism. At home, whatever may be the dreams of the Jihadis, it is unlikely that the elite of Pakistan wants to cut itself off from the U.S. and end up an isolated state.

There is one final option for Gen. Musharraf. That is to drink vigorously from the poisoned chalice for the long-term good of Pakistan and for its survival as a nation-state. But ending violence against India and seeking reconciliation with it demand that Pakistan swallow a lot of pride, discard deep ideological prejudice, reverse a decade of adventurism, and risk the political wrath of the fundamentalists at home.

Can Gen.Musharraf do it? No one in New Delhi is betting on it. All that India can hope to do is to make it a little easier for Gen. Musharraf to swallow the bitter medicine that it needs and Mr.Clinton has prescribed. India can do this by reaffirming its desire proclaimed at Lahore last year to build a new cooperative relationship with Pakistan. New Delhi can also signal that it is prepared to resume the talks the moment Pakistan ends the campaign of terror. India has already hinted that it is ready to save the face of Gen. Musharraf by not insisting on a public proclamation in Pakistan to end terrorism. India says it will recognise the cessation of violence on the ground when it happens and respond at once.

India must also reach out to the leading nations of the Islamic world and to China to increase their stake in a positive relationship with New Delhi. Islamabad must be encouraged to find out it has nowhere to go but the sub-continent. But nothing will change the strategic dynamic in the region more than a purposeful Indian engagement with the political opposition in Jammu and Kashmir. Only a serious Indian political initiative in Jammu and Kashmir will convince Pakistan that it must begin to deal with India on the basis of political realism and ideological moderation.

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