A time to talk?

By Radha Kumar

GENERAL MUSHARRAF'S recent offer of talks with the Indian Government merits more careful consideration than it has thus far been given. Coming, as it does, on the heels of his statement in an interview to the Financial Times, that he would be prepared to push the Kashmir militant groups to de-escalate the conflict, it could - if the Indian Government were to respond positively - begin to pave the ground for a step back from the current hostilities on the Line of Control, in the Valley and Jammu. These, most analysts agree, are at such a disturbing high that war psychosis is rife in Pakistan, while several Indian officials have spoken fatalistically, and to many ears fantastically, of the possibility of a ``limited war''.

In itself, General Musharraf's statement acknowledges that Pakistan not only has leverage over the militant groups which are fighting in Kashmir - an issue which he had until now tried to clumsily sidestep - but also that he is willing to use that leverage in the interests of peace. For a man who has spent the past couple of months oscillating madly between averring that Pakistan has little to do with militancy in the Valley and arguing that jehad in Kashmir is a noble cause for all Muslims, this is a radical departure.

When looked at in relation to other recent moves, it would also appear that his offer is not merely a rhetorical gesture. It follows cautious moves to curb support for some of the fundamentalist madrassas; and a ban on the public display of weapons which, while domestically directed, might have an indirect effect on the Kashmir conflict if it were to lead to further measures to curb the illegal flow of arms. In this context, his offer brings to light the missing piece, of the Kashmir militant groups based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and indicates that the Pakistan authorities might be willing to return to the immediate pre-Lahore context of seeking a peaceful solution through bilateral negotiations. And now the Pakistani Interior Minister, General Moin Haidar, has said Pakistan will hold an inquiry into Kargil.

The Indian Government is of course right that Pakistan does not need talks in order to halt support for the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba or the Hizbul Mujahideen. Their mistrust is also understandable: if a Kargil could happen in the much more propitious climate of the Lahore process, then what might not happen in the highly acrimonious climate of today? Yet it is this very question that makes de-escalation a priority. The daily toll of lives which the post-Kargil intensification of the Kashmir conflict takes has now lasted almost a year. In the first three months of this year alone, between 1,500 and 2,000 people have died. Civilians, militants and security forces are dying in almost equal proportions. Nor, as the massacre of Sikhs shows, is any group immune. Public and official opinion are united in believing that this is an unendurable toll, but both are divided and confused over how to control it.

Basically, there are three available strategies under consideration. The first, to combine counter-insurgency with the isolation of Pakistan, has been tried over the past six months and has failed to curb the rising scale of death in the valley and Jammu; instead, it has contributed to a renewed alienation of the valley, and a dangerous sense of humiliation amongst Pakistanis which is feeding the war psychosis in that country. The second, which the Indian Government has until now opposed but has reaped the benefit of, is for other countries - most notably, the United States - to do the talking. The results of these talks can be seen in General Musharraf's, changed stand. They are likely to be followed during the FBI director, Mr. Louis Freeh's ongoing visit to the sub- continent. But third party pressure can only go so far if the space it opens is not made use of. This space can either be extended through international mediation, or through bilateral negotiations.

The Indian Government has long argued for a bilateral solution to its disputes with Pakistan, but it has rarely been able to take negotiations from procedural wrangling to matters of substance. Yet if bilateral negotiations are to be a viable strategy, they have to be comprehensive and substantive, which can only be achieved step by laborious step.

Since Kargil and the military coup, the Indian Government has refused all negotiations, whether bilateral or track two, on the grounds that Pakistan must first tender evidence of its good faith by ending training, material, arms and fire cover for cross-border militancy in Kashmir. This demand has been pooh- poohed by many Pakistanis as a naive ignorance of realpolitik and as intransigence. As a matter of fact, some tender of good faith is generally a prerequisite of all engagement, whether between equals or not. The question is, is the Indian Government placing its premiums too high?

It is an oft-repeated but little understood truism that the fortunes of Pakistan and Kashmir are inter-related. If Pakistan's Kashmir policy has brought Pakistan to the brink of disaster, there is little room for Indian chauvinists or hawks to celebrate because it is also bringing Kashmir to the brink of disaster. In other words, neither Kashmir nor Pakistan can stabilise if the other does not. The Pakistani authorities are beginning to show some appreciation of this point, but it is not clear if the Indian Government does.

At the moment, General Musharraf has, again under international pressure, asked for bilateral talks. In accepting his offer, the Indian Government could, for example, ask him to take immediate notice of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba's threat to intensify attacks on Indian security forces and Kashmiri Government infrastructure. It could also acknowledge what its officials have long known, that the task facing the Pakistani authorities is a formidable one and they will need both international and domestic support if they are to grapple with it. If talks will help Pakistan reform its Kashmir policy and prepare domestic ground for a commitment to peaceful negotiations, then why not begin them at the earliest possible moment?

Arguably, this is as good a moment to begin talks as any before. The international community and the Pakistani authorities are both moving to a position that can help to stabilise Kashmir: that a solution can only be found through peaceful means, and with a respect for human rights. After the Anantnag massacre, this must surely be as pressing a concern for the Indian and Kashmir Governments as for the rest of the world. The appointment of a police inquiry into the massacre is welcome, but rumours that the Indian Government has refused to exhume the bodies of the four alleged militants killed in a shootout after the massacre even before the inquiry had determined whether or not to ask for them are disturbing. So is the crackdown on civilian protest and the preventive detention of Kashmiri leaders.

However much the army or the security forces might resent protest, the use of draconian or extra-judicial measures cannot be allowed to go unpunished indefinitely. It took sixteen far too long years and a handful of determined activists for a judicially ordered inquiry into deaths in Punjab to recommend the punishment of some 300 officers. That should have taught the Indian Government that the task is easier on a case- by-case basis at the time itself. It is also likely to arouse less resentment amongst the security forces if done case-by-case rather than en masse and long after the event (as it does not allow the feeling, oh we did their dirty work and now they are safe they want to punish us, which is rather how the British army feels about the Bloody Sunday inquiry in Northern Ireland). And it ought to revive morale: every security force needs to believe it is legitimate if it is to be effective.

Again, this is as good a moment as any to try to begin to restore what few human rights are possible in the current situation in Kashmir. The intensification of militancy in the Valley over the past year had built a fund of international sympathy for the Indian Government's problems in the region. If Pakistan can be nudged to produce a ``tangible'' tender of good faith - by, for example, persuading militants to deescalate - perhaps it is time for the Indian Government to show the Kashmiris some good faith too?

(The writer is Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York.)

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Section  : Opinion
Previous : Seize the opportunity
Next     : The CPC Amendment Act