|
Online edition of India's National Newspaper Saturday, April 15, 2000 |
|
Front Page |
National |
International |
Regional |
Opinion |
Business |
Sport |
Entertainment |
Miscellaneous |
Features |
Classifieds |
Employment |
Index |
Home |
|
Opinion
| Previous
| Next
Sonia Gandhi and the Congress(I)
By Sudhanshu Ranade
THE KNIVES are out again in the Congress(I). Mrs. Sonia Gandhi is
once more being targeted. There has been a steady trickle of
Congressmen away from the party over the years, and there are
signs of unease among those who remain - about the quality of her
leadership and whether the party is safe in her hands.
Still, the fact of the matter is that, fighting almost single-
handed in 1999, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi was able to get eight million
more votes for the Congress(I) than it got in 1998. Strictly
speaking, it is too much to give her all the credit. The
Congress(I) still has a solid phalanx of second-rung leaders. Mr.
Salman Khursheed, who engineered the Congress(I) comeback in
Uttar Pradesh in 1999, is specially worth mention. There are many
others doing their bit to market the Congress(I). Still, there is
no doubt that their task was made a great deal easier by the fact
that Mrs. Sonia Gandhi was at the helm. In this respect,
Congressmen have not been misled by their instincts.
What makes Mrs. Sonia Gandhi's performance in the general
elections of 1999 all the more creditable is that she was able to
accomplish what she did even though the BJP, and people such as
Mr. Sharad Pawar, had gone hammer and tongs at her, personally,
on the question of her `foreign origin'. But Congress(I) got
eight million more votes; while BJP votes dropped by seven and a
half million. The share of the Congress in votes polled climbed
from 25.8 per cent in 1998 to 28.3 per cent in 1999; while the
BJP share fell from 25.6 per cent to 23.7 per cent.
As the results of the 1999 elections began coming in, the
inclination was not to attach much importance to this evidence.
For more than a decade, the Congress(I) had been on a path of
decline. The party, it appeared, no longer stood for anything; no
longer represented anyone; it was no longer an appealing brand.
In consequence, the most it was capable of was to manage a thin-
spread increase of votes, which would be of little help in
bringing it back to power. But now that the Election Commission
has released the detailed reports of the 1999 general elections,
matters appear different. It was held that the drop in the BJP's
vote share was due to the party's conscious decision not to
contest a large number of constituencies, which it anyway had no
chance of winning. The data tell a different story altogether.
In Karnataka, the Congress(I) simply swept the polls; winning 18
out of the 28 Lok Sabha seats. It also swept the Assembly
elections, and is now firmly in control of the Government of
Karnataka; having earlier, before the Lok Sabha elections,
delivered the BJP a stunning blow by walking away with the three
BJP `strongholds' of Delhi, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.
Congress(I) votes dropped in Maharashtra, because Mr. Pawar
split. But, while the NCP polled seven million votes in the Lok
Sabha elections in Maharashtra, the Congress(I) lost only four
million voters. When Mr. Pawar left the Congress(I), Mr. Bal
Thackeray had tauntingly `welcomed him back to State politics';
and now, it transpired, from the results of the Maharashtra
Assembly elections, that even this goal was beyond his reach.
Since Mr. Pawar was also unable to cash in on the growing
uneasiness in the BJP about its alliance with the Shiv Sena in
Maharasthra, he ended up throwing in his lot with the very party
that he had just the other day broken away from; to form the
Government in Maharashtra, as a junior partner.
In Gujarat, which Hindu radicals imagine to be their bastion,
total votes polled by all parties together actually fell by
almost three million between 1998 and 1999, as turnout plummeted
from 59.5 to 47 per cent. Clearly the people of Gujarat are less
than enthusiastic about the crude sort of hindutva running amok
in their State. Votes polled by the BJP fell from 7.8 million in
1998 to 7.1 million in 1999; but the Congress(I) inched its way
up from 5.9 million to 6.2 million votes, despite the drop in the
total number of votes polled.
In Uttar Pradesh, the Congress(I) took in 4.6 million more votes
in 1999, even as votes in favour of the BJP plummeted by 5.4
million. Only about one million votes were lost by the BJP on
account of understandings with its allies; how does one explain
the loss of the remaining four and a half million votes, in a
State that the BJP once believed to be its stronghold?
Since the Congress(I) had been almost completely wiped out from
Uttar Pradesh earlier (it got only 6 per cent of the votes polled
in 1998), even the large increment of votes in 1999 was able to
pull it up only to an apparently hopeless 14.7 per cent. But,
thanks to the fact that these votes were a positive mandate for
change, rather than the outcome of vague sentiment, as many as
2.6 million of the 4.6 million additional votes that the
Congress(I) raked in were concentrated in just 19 `winnable'
constituencies (of the total 85). Because of this, the party was
not only able to bag as many as ten Lok Sabha seats (it got none
in 1998), but also found itself within striking distance of
another nine seats. A similar picture emerges when one splits up
the votes for the 1999 Lok Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh
according to their Assembly constituencies. The Congress `won' as
many as 40 such seats, and came within striking distance of
another 22. Not bad for a party which was able to win only five
Assembly seat in 1996.
In short, there can be no doubt that Mrs. Sonia Gandhi is good
for the Congress(I). Her record as a vote-catcher is very
impressive indeed. This is obviously her strong point; and both
the party and she herself should make the best use of it; perhaps
specially by trying to reach out to women over the next two to
three years. This is a constituency that is just waiting for
someone to tap it; and it could enable the Congress(I) to get at
votes which traditional party loyalties would otherwise place
beyond its reach.
In respect of `organisational' matters, however, Mrs. Sonia
Gandhi has been doing none too well. Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav was
quite unnecessarily rubbed the wrong way in the run-up to the
1999 elections. Mr. Pawar could have been handled more tactfully.
The handling of Bihar has been slipshod. The failure to reach out
proactively to Ms. Mamata Banerjee to ensure her victory in West
Bengal in the coming elections was unfortunate. Mrs. Sonia
Gandhi's handling of what is left of the Congress(I) too leaves a
lot to be desired. The way she has being going about it has not
allowed a fair hearing for the best ideas; and, in addition, it
has made the atmosphere in the party somewhat suffocating for her
best people.
Slippages in such matters are costly not only for the Congress(I)
but for Mrs. Sonia Gandhi as well. There is only so much that can
be done on the basis of personal charisma. Without attending to
strategic and organisational issues, there is a limit to what can
be achieved. This came out all too clearly in the results of the
1999 Lok Sabha polls in Andhra Pradesh. Votes polled by the
Congress shot up from 12.2 million in 1998 to an impressive 14.3
million. The party got 43 per cent of the votes polled; the
second largest party, the TDP, could not even cross 40 per cent.
But, forced by its fear of the Congress(I) at the State level
into an `alliance' with the BJP at the national level, the TDP
walked off with 29 of the 42 Lok Sabha seats. The Congress(I) got
just 5. It does not make sense to team up with parties anyway on
their way down; or with those who have no momentum except what
they derive from you. But these are the only people that Mrs.
Sonia Gandhi feels really comfortable with. Others she sees as a
threat.
A change of advisors will not help; for best results, Mrs. Sonia
Gandhi needs to relinquish control. She ought not to trust her
instincts in `policy' matters. Direct appeals to the people are
what she is good at. This is what she should stick to; leaving
strategic and organisational matters to be handled by others who
are better fitted to do so. They need her as badly as she needs
them, and she can therefore safely leave them to get on with
their jobs, without her insisting that all decisions be hers.
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail
|
|
Section : Opinion Previous : Consensus that never was Next : Realignment | |
|
Front Page |
National |
International |
Regional |
Opinion |
Business |
Sport |
Entertainment |
Miscellaneous |
Features |
Classifieds |
Employment |
Index |
Home | |
|
Copyright © 2000 The Hindu Republication or redissemination of the contents of this screen are expressly prohibited without the written consent of The Hindu |
|