A shift in Pak. approach

By Amit Baruah

ISLAMABAD, APRIL 16. An unacknowledged paradigm shift appears to have taken place in Pakistan's approach towards a dialogue with India. From the rigid insistence on third-party mediation, Islamabad now is ready to hold bilateral dialogue at ``any time, anywhere, and any level''.

In a sense, Kargil lies at the root of this shift. Till the Kargil misadventure, Islamabad was under no great pressure to get off its high horse - demanding third party involvement. Today, it finds there are few takers for its view of things in Kashmir - and the issue being discussed in world capitals is Pakistan- sponsored terrorism and not the UN resolutions on Kashmir.

The October 12, 1999, coup in the country, too, impinged directly on this position. The Lahore process was pooh-poohed as a ``phalana and dhimkana'' process and senior functionaries of the Musharraf regime said they would have to ``scour'' the Lahore agreements for positive elements.

In a bid to appear ``tough'' on India as distinct from the ``soft'' policy of the Sharif Government, the military regime began issuing statements on India without realising that the dice was loaded against it.

It took some time for the import of the diplomatic setback in Kargil to sink in among the foreign policy managers working for Gen. Musharraf. Once the realisation dawned on it, Pakistan sent various messages seeking resumption of the dialogue process.

As India sticks to its rigid no-dialogue stance, one can only wonder whether New Delhi has thought through this approach. At every stage, it is being claimed that India would not let Pakistan ``off the hook'' by holding any dialogue.

The comic images of ``non-contact'' between the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Sattar, and his Indian counterpart, Mr. Jaswant Singh, and between the Human Resource Development Minister, Dr. Murli Manohar Joshi, and Gen. Musharraf, even when they were aboard the same flights, reveal the ridiculous extent to which New Delhi is prepared to go.

It would be in the interests of the people of both countries for New Delhi to spell out its long-term policy goal of isolating Islamabad. Today, the international environment favours India (the recent excesses in Anantnag have not created much of a ripple). But that could change and so could Pakistan's approach to dialogue.

Yes, India will be in a position to evaluate what is happening on the ground when the snow melts. But why should Pakistan use its influence on the ``jehadi groups'' when India is out to attack the ``military regime'' on every available fora.

If Pakistan feels no benefit would accrue to it, there will be little chance of the Musharraf Government preventing the ``jehadi elements'' crossing the Line of Control.

Ironically, it would appear that India's policy, too, is Kargil- driven. It is now clear that when Mr. A. B. Vajpayee alighted from the DTC bus at Wagah on February 20 last year, Pakistani soldiers (using the mujahideen pseudonym) were already occupying the heights of Kargil.

So, rather than holding the then Prime Minister responsible for what happened, India focussed on Gen. Musharraf as the ``villain''. By raising the ante on the military nature of his regime, India is now aware that justifying yet another process of engagement will not be easy.

Pakistan's paradigm shift in the dialogue (when the Foreign Secretaries met in October 1998 to discuss peace and security and Kashmir, Islamabad stalled over giving firm dates for the remaining six issues under the agreed ``two plus six'' framework) needs to be used by India, not rejected or gloated over.

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