The French connection

By K. K. Katyal

A SENIOR Foreign Ministry official from France, who arrived in New Delhi for routine consultations on May 10, 1998, received the stunning news that India had exploded nuclear devices earlier that day. By the time he attended a dinner at the French Ambassador's residence he had contacted Paris for a fresh brief on the changed situation, and told the Indian guests unhesitatingly that ``France will have no difficulty in coming to terms with a nuclear India''. The understanding shown by France contrasted sharply with the tough stand taken by other industrialised countries, their decision to impose sanctions and their call for de-weaponisation.

Another episode. Earlier in January 1998, when the French President, Mr. Jacques Chirac, was in India as the chief guest at the Republic Day parade, his discussions with the Prime Minister of the day, Mr. I. K. Gujral, touched on the then unexercised nuclear option by India. Speaking hypothetically, Mr. Gujral enquired: ``What would France do if India chooses to exercise the option and explodes a nuclear device?'' The visiting President counter-queried: ``What did India do when we conducted the last nuclear test?'' ``We,'' Mr. Gujral replied, ``issued a statement.'' Mr. Chirac shot back: ``We will do the same.''

What does this anecdotal account show? That France did not take a grave view of the Indian tests, that it was prepared to continue its normal dealings with India and that it did not intend following the sanctions route. At a time when other major countries suspended official contacts and recalled their envoys for a short while, France stepped up its interaction. The current visit of the President, Mr. K. R. Narayanan, to France comes in the wake of several positive developments in the bilateral field. It is not merely the symbolism of the first ever-visit by an Indian head of state to France (as against four Presidential trips from the other side) that is significant but the substantive content of the bilateral relationship is what matters. Through conscious, carefully-considered positive moves by France and an equally positive Indian response, the two sides have created a vast space for cooperation. But it is not an unlimited space, there being rigid parameters in sensitive matters. Both the vastness of the scope and restrictive factors in one or two areas need to be kept in mind. Cooperative endeavours will not be limited and will cover several fields, political, diplomatic, economic, social and cultural, apart from defence-related subjects.

This is no mean achievement for, not long ago, the bilateral ties were strained and the contacts minimal, so much so that a meeting of the joint commission, main vehicle for bilateral dealings, had to be cancelled. The Indo-French relationship, for some strange reason, came to rest on a single issue - the supply of Mirage aircraft and other military equipment by France to Pakistan. France may now be sensitive to India's problem with its neighbours, while New Delhi has shed the earlier Pakistan- centricity. Even during the cold war, France - as also India - kept elbow-room to serve national interests, steering clear of the bloc rigidities. The uninterrupted normality in Indo-French dealings after Pokhran-II was no freak development.

In the current context, the two countries have significant common approaches. On multipolarity, both would like a change in the global unipolar pattern, marked by the supremacy of one power, U.S. Both favour a more equitable international system, in line with the new demographic, economic and geo-political realities. France would like Europe to be one of the poles in the new order and India another. As the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hubert Vedrine, told a recent seminar in New Delhi, ``if a multipolar system is built, I am convinced that India will be and must be one of its poles. This continent-country, this country-civilisation, as old as history, has many advantages, one of the main being the strength of its democratic system''.

France is the second major power - after Russia - to have publicly backed India's claim to permanent membership in an expanded U.N. Security Council. Initially France, while inclined to back India, was less than forthright in public comments. As Mr. Chirac told me in an interview in Paris in 1998, on the eve of his journey to India, ``I regard India's candidacy as normal and I feel that, within the framework of the global overall negotiations if the Security Council is opened up, then, of course, India would quite naturally have a vocation for membership.'' Later, at a press conference in New Delhi, he again did not go beyond saying India had the ``aptitude'' for becoming a permanent member. But now France is categorical that, to quote Mr. Vedrine, ``India has the right to be in the Council'', which according to him, needs to be reformed.

France did not shy away from demonstrative defence-related contacts with India, after the nuclear tests. If the Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes, was in Paris for talks with his counterpart last year, a French naval carrier was in Mumbai recently and was engaged in exercises with the Indian side. Later this month, the Chief of the Combined Staff from France will be in New Delhi to carry forward the defence interaction. The French side is keen on not letting the momentum, generated in the last two years, slow down and as a French commentator noted: ``Two years ago, the other major powers were on the sanctions line. Now they have veered round to our viewpoint - they are exploring ways to lift the sanctions.''

In the business field, however, the performance is far short of the potential, be it in trade or investment. An earlier plan for inclusion of a business group in the President's delegation was given up but the Commerce Minister, Mr. Murasoli Maran, due to visit France in May for the Economic Commission meeting, may take a representative group from trade and industry. For unexplained reasons, the French business community had been hesitant in responding to the liberalisation process in India. The earlier reservations about the durability of reforms ought to be dispelled by now. The French, like others, took a dim view of the Indian bureaucracy and its official procedures - finding their doubts strengthened by commercial disputes in the past. But others had not been deterred by such hurdles. On its part, the Indian business community finds its counterpart a tough nut to crack. Obviously, the Indian side would like the French terms to be competitive, their negotiations more flexible. Of late, however, there has been a promise of increase in the French business presence.

Reflective of the increased mutual interest is the progress of the strategic dialogue, the very sweep of it - covering, on one side, strategic balance in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, India's relations with China and Pakistan, India's nuclear doctrine and, on the other, the progress in unification of the European Union, in particular the moves for common foreign and security policies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and its doctrine. While showing an understanding of the security threat perceptions that led to the conduct of the nuclear tests, France would like India to be more transparent - in particular, wanting it to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, accept the norms for ending the production of fissile material and control the export of sensitive items.

Only when these steps are taken, says France, will it be in a position to help New Delhi in the establishment of nuclear power plants. The cooperation makes tremendous sense - India's energy requirements are vast while France has perfected nuclear power production methods. But as part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, France pleads inability to offer nuclear technology even for civilian uses to a country which does not accept international safeguards for all its nuclear facilities. Isn't there a strong case for the two sides overcoming this hurdle?

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