Hawks in Iran seek to overawe reformers

By Kesava Menon

MANAMA (BAHRAIN) APRIL 30. ``Forget about the Basij (the religious vigilante groups which try to impose codes of behaviour on ordinary Iranians). Everyone is interested in making money, including the Basij,'' said the driver of one of Teheran's innumerable taxi cabs, responding to a question how activities declared ``illicit'' by the Islamic regime could be carried on so easily behind closed doors.

This comment, by a very ordinary Iranian, encapsulates some crucial elements of the circumstances that could determine the outcome of the ongoing struggle between reformers and conservatives in Iran.

The first element is the fear or intimidation factor. Having seized the initiative through a wave of arrests and threatening demonstrations and speeches, the conservatives clearly believe that their ability to intimidate their opponents and the vast majority of the public that supports them will be a key factor in the achievement of their objectives.

As they demonstrated during the students' protests last July (when the Basij joined policemen and brutally beat up the students) and as they have shown though assassination attempts, the conservatives will not hesitate to use physical violence.

The only questions are how far they can and will go and the likely public response to the threats of physical violence.

Experiences narrated by a number of other Iranians validated the taxi driver's views on the Basij's ideological integrity. These narratives were all about how members of the Basij had been ``bought off'' when they tried to confiscate illicit bottles of liquor, or tried to break up mixed-gender parties or tried to stop couples dating in the parks.

From these narratives it appeared that most Iranians, though bothered, were not intimidated by the Basij when they broke codes of imposed behaviour in their day-to-day life.

Would the situation be very different when the Basij, co- ordinated and controlled by their ideological masters, acted in concert to defend what they perceive as the interests of the Islamic regime? In several reported instances over the last few months, groups of youths have spontaneously come together to fight off Basij members who have tried to impose dress and behaviour codes.

Pro-reform students and youths have formed at least informal nation-wide networks during the last three years and it is not inconceivable that they could act in concert to counter the threat from the Basij.

However, the Basij only forms the frontline among the forces which the conservatives could marshal. Their real strength lies in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) directly controlled by the Supreme Religious Leader, Ayatollah Syed Ali Khamenei, who has openly declared support for the conservatives. IRGC officers were among the first to speak out against the reformers and in the strongest terms threatening that the ``hammer of revolution'' might soon come down on the heads of reformers.

Just before they too were suspended, the last two liberal newspapers had reported that IRGC officers and senior officials of the Information Bureau, also controlled by Mr. Khamenei, had formed a ``crisis committee''. There was a prompt denial of the newspapers' further claim that the committee was planning a coup. But it was left ambiguous whether the such a committee existed at least informally.

While the IRGC officials are the direct beneficiaries of conservative control on key political and economic institutions, and are probably more ideologically indoctrinated, the commitment of the rank and file is a more open question.

Before the crackdown, pro-reform activists were of the opinion that the rank and file were no different from ordinary Iranians. In support of their assessment, they pointed out that vote results from booths located in IRGC barracks in the last three elections were little different from the nation-wide trend which showed that over 70 per cent of the public supported the reforms. The conservatives have shown a remarkable propensity for self- delusion and it is possible that they have overlooked this factor.

Surprisingly, the regular Iranian army which is also ultimately answerable to the Supreme Leader rather than the President, has declared that it would be neutral in the struggle between the conservatives and the reformers. In the last days of the Shah's regime, the army had adopted a similar posture though the interests of its officers was tied in with the continuity of the regime and though some of them had urged the Shah to order a crackdown.

Reports from that period speak of how one army unit after another was paralysed into inactivity by the demonstrators slogan, ``Fellow Iranians, do not shed the blood of Iranians''. That 1979 slogan was echoed by the student demonstrators last year.

One distinctly noticeable feature of the last three years has been that ordinary Iranians had shrugged off fear to a great degree. The old habit of looking over their shoulders while criticising the regime was completely absent by February this year. It is highly probable that ordinary Iranians will resist any effort to reimpose the atmosphere of fear and misery.

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Section  : International
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