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The Expenditure Reforms Commission
By S. Ambirajan
JUST WHEN we were reconciled to thinking that the public
expenditure commission promised in their budgets by Mr. P.
Chidambaram and Mr. Yashwant Sinha was a kind of mot pour rire to
keep the audience amused, Mr. Sinha sprang a surprise. He kept
the promise to constitute the Commission, made in the 1999-2000
Budget, just 48 hours before he was to present the 2000-2001
Budget.
As it is, one cannot fault the composition. It has a former civil
servant with considerable experience in the Finance Ministry
heading it, and other seasoned bureaucrats to help him. One would
not have thought of Dr. Kirit Parekh as the obvious choice for
economist member as his specialisation is more in energy
economics than in public expenditure analysis. Some may find the
Commission a mere technical/advisory body rather an executing
authority with the requisite teeth in the absence of any
political heavyweight.
It would appear that the brief of the Commission is to examine
only the problems of the burgeoning expenditure of the Centre.
Obviously the contribution of the State Governments to fiscal
profligacy has not been given thought to while forming this
Commission. Even so, the tasks assigned to this body are truly
mind-boggling. It has to: (1) ``Suggest a road map for reducing
the functions, activities and administrative structure of the
Centre'', (2) ``Review the framework of all subsides, both
explicit and implicit'', (3) ``Review the framework for
determination of user-charges of departmental and commercial
entities and suggest an effective strategy for cost recovery'',
(4) ``Review the adequacy of staffing under Central Ministries...
and the existing arrangements for redeployment'', (5) ``Review
the procedure for the setting up of government-funded autonomous
institutions...'' and (6) ``Consider any other relevant issue
concerning expenditure management''. All these, the Commission,
with only two full-time members and no secretariat as yet, has to
accomplish within ``a period of one year''.
What can the Commission do? The answer has to be seen in what it
should not do. First, it should not be mesmerised by notions of
inevitability of high public expenditure; second, it should not
attempt things which it cannot do. Economists have propounded
seductive theories like what the 19th century German savant,
Adolph Wagner, claimed as an inexorable ``law'' of ever-
increasing state activity and expenditures that applies to
``progressive'' nations. He argued that all varieties of public
expenditures tended to rise more proportionately than national
and/or per capita incomes as time passed. Dividing public
expenditures into two categories i.e. ``internal & external
security'' and ``culture & welfare'', Wagner postulated that the
former increased fast because of the increasing use of modern
technology, capital intensive warfare and the need for heightened
police protection due to increasing ``friction'' in society as a
result of urbanisation and industrialisation. Expenditure on
``culture & welfare'' would increase because many of these items
such as education, health, transportation, communication, banking
and insurance were highly income elastic (demand that rises
faster than income), and could be produced more efficiently by
the public sector.
Wagner did not substantiate his theory either analytically or
empirically, but there is a plausible air about it. Does it mean
it should be taken as a ``law'' that cannot be defied? Given the
way Wagner has stated it, it is not a ``law'' that could be used
to predict the course of public expenditure in particular
countries. Numerous studies have been made to test this ``law''
both with time-series data of single countries and cross-section
data that examines a group of countries at different income
levels to see the connection between levels of public expenditure
and income. The one uniform conclusion is that at the gross
level, the ``law'' holds but once we go into detail, it falls
flat because it is in the detail that the devil resides. The
economic factors suggested by Wagner as causing the escalation
began to be contested even during his lifetime. Critics such as
Karl Deutsch have argued that political pressures caused by
economic development and democracy result in increased government
spending. S. P. Gupta added to this, drawing our attention to the
voters' desire for increased government spending financed solely
by richer minorities. Of course, beyond a point, financing has to
be done by taxing the poorer majorities. This leads to the
eventual decline (or at least of the rate of growth) of
government expenditures.
In a landmark study, Peacock and Wiseman have shown that public
expenditure continues to rise primarily because of the
Government's desire to control the economy as well as the
increase of tax tolerance among the population. Their data from
Britain has demonstrated that tax rates do not decline to their
previous low levels once they are increased temporarily to face
certain serious social upheavals such as a war. Demand for public
services may grow sky high, but where public expenditure to
provide these has grown substantially, it has always been with
people's willingness to pay for it. Satisfying the demand for the
public provision of goods and services cannot be independent of
resources available to do so.
It should be clear that the long-term growth pattern of
government spending does not give any licence to this Commission
to approve high public expenditures on the basis of any kind of
``law''. But how should public expenditure be kept in check in
the absence of the necessary financial wherewithal? This is where
the Commission must exercise another kind of self-restraint. The
Commissioners will know all too clearly how public expenditure
keeps creeping up every year. Once a spending agency is created
with broad objectives and a bureaucratic set-up, it continues for
ever with its allocation increasing every year. Nothing seems to
stop these juggernauts because every such agency will have to
yield to the powerful vested interests that would fight tooth and
nail all attempts at reducing expenditure.
Given this reality, cutting down public expenditure is something
that should be done at the lowest level, asking queries about the
relevance and utility of individual expenditure heads. In the
British parliamentary system, which we are supposed to follow,
this exercise is routinely done by the Finance Ministry. This
department with a large staff has, as a former Treasury
Secretary, Sir Herbert Brittain, said ``a traditional expertise
in criticism and cross-examination, born of long experience but
continuously brought up to date''. These officers vet every item
informally on the basis of the merits of the case, whether it
accords with government policies elsewhere, and above all to
ascertain the priority to justify the expenditure. The task of
spending properly and prudently the assigned sums is left to the
departments concerned. The final say is with the full Cabinet.
Invariably as the pursemaster of the nation the Finance
Minister's views are taken seriously even by the Prime Minister.
All these mean that keeping actual expenditure under manageable
proportions has both a political and administrative angle.
This Commission has neither the time nor the necessary
political/administrative strength to undertake such a task, and
in any case the exercise should be a continuing one. Hence it
should not attempt to do the impossible by going into the
minutiae. But that does not mean ``bowling a loose ball'' as Mr.
Geethakrishnan, chairman of the Expenditure Reforms Commission,
said at a meeting organised by the public expenditure round
table, meaning he would not like to give any advice that will not
be carried out by the political establishment.
On the contrary, the Commission should give a tight and concise
report setting out (a) a clearly-defined direction that Indian
finance should take, (b) enunciating the principles that should
guide the public expenditure reforms and (c) indicating the
processes and procedures that should be adopted. If what they say
is found politically difficult to carry out or unacceptable for
electoral reasons, it should not be the concern of the
Commissioners.
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