Call Musharraf's bluff

By K. K. Katyal

TO RESUME or not to resume dialogue with Pakistan - that is the question. The issue has been debated intensely since it first arose in October last in the wake of the military coup in Islamabad. The fact that it has persisted that long shows that the arguments in support of engaging the neighbour are not devoid of force. Had that not been the case, the debate would have died down, with the firm rejection of the idea by the Government. It would be unrealistic on the part of New Delhi to take for granted the continued understanding of its position by the world community. The fatigue factor may come into play soon, leading to an adverse reaction to India's ``no'' to talks. Before that happens, let Indian diplomacy play a creative role. Apart from a formal structured dialogue, there are some possibilities: (1) talks to prepare for talks (2) back-channel efforts and (3) track-II diplomacy. Any one of the routes - even all - could be explored.

New Delhi's initial caution was, no doubt, justified. It was rudely shaken by the blatant betrayal of the trust reposed in Pakistan through the bus diplomacy. The realisation that preparations for the Kargil misadventure were on even as the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and his then Pakistani counterpart, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, affixed their signatures to the Lahore Declaration and the two sides committed themselves to a new set of confidence-building measures was strong enough reason to banish the thought of a fresh initiative. The wariness increased when the architect of the Kargil operation, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, took over as the military ruler. But will India's interests be promoted if the Government sticks to the present line and chooses not to explore ways of restarting bilateral contacts? No.

This is so even though the most powerful nation, U.S., has ended its tilt towards Pakistan and appreciates India's stand on issues such as terrorism. The U.S. has modified its earlier stand, calling upon India to resume talks with Pakistan, and now wants Islamabad to take the first tangible step with a view to facilitating the process. That, however, is not to be regarded as conferring on India a right to take the negative line for all time to come. There is the risk of New Delhi losing the understanding and appreciation of others in the world, if it is seen as not doing its bit to set in motion the dialogue process. Last week-end's comment by the U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. Thomas Pickering, confirms this fear. Reiterating the U.S. view that Pakistan needed to create ``peaceful conditions'', he said: ``Kargil cannot be forgotten but it can and should be transcended. We are asking New Delhi to consider very seriously the possibilities for resuming the dialogue''.

The conduct of the other side needs to be taken into account by New Delhi. While putting on a brave face in the wake of the rebuff received from the U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton, Gen. Musharraf has sought to ``correct'' some of the policy stances considered objectionable by the U.S. He has made a show of containing the militant outfits - announcing steps to disarm the jehadi groups, even though vast sections of Pakistanis themselves are sceptical of the success of the move. Four major sectarian groups have been outlawed, the misuse of the anti-blasphemy law is to be prohibited and the flow of arms and movement of militants from Afghanistan to Pakistan is to be controlled. That, in any case, is what is stated publicly. The activities of Masood Azhar, one of the militants whose release was secured by the hijackers of the Indian Airlines plane, have been restricted.

These steps may be cosmetic, intended for the consumption of the U.S. and other major countries. But can one be sure that the world community will not be taken in, and that Gen. Musharraf will not succeed in his carefully-planned bid to project an image of moderation? Pakistani representatives cite the statement by our Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes, that the exchange of firing along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir has subsided to make out a case of improvement. In the midst of propaganda blasts from Islamabad, the reality - continued infiltration of armed bands - may go unnoticed.

New Delhi is well within its rights in saying that a perceptible reduction in terrorist violence is the real test of Islamabad's intentions but to insist on an end to the virulent anti-India propaganda - or similar conditions - for creating the right climate for talks may not be realistic. Pakistan says it will scale down its ``moral, political and diplomatic'' support to ``Kashmir freedom-fighters'' if there is reciprocity by the Indian side, and by this it means curtailment of ``repression'' by the security forces. This is a deliberate bid to create confusion - by ignoring the central point that the operations by paramilitary forces are essentially a response to organised trans-border terrorism. Pakistan's argument is untenable for another reason too - it seeks to link bilateral dealings with changes in decisions on matters of India's domestic concern (of curbing terrorist violence).

A way will have to be found to reconcile India's indifference to the present regime in Pakistan and the need for a working relationship with it. New Delhi's reluctance to be a party to an arrangement that may give legitimacy to the military takeover and the dismissal of the democratic Government was evident on various occasions - (1) the move, at India's instance, to postpone the SAARC summit (because Gen. Musharraf's presence there would have given respectability to him in the region), (2) its support, along with several African states, to the proposal for suspension of Pakistan from the Commonwealth and (3) its role at the recent ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned in the exclusion of military-ruled Pakistan from the grouping - a move that is certain to be pursued at the NAM summit.

But it should not be difficult to evolve a compartmentalised approach, enabling New Delhi, on the one hand, to stick to its concern over military dictatorship (assuming that it is called for) and, on the other, not to block bilateral contacts. However, Pakistan may not be inclined to talk under the shadow of non- recognition by New Delhi. As a matter of fact, Gen. Musharraf is keen on the resumption of the dialogue, not because he expects a forward movement on Kashmir but because this course may help neutralise New Delhi's antipathy to the military regime.

The options other than a structured dialogue were tried in the past - and gave rise to hopes, faint though, for breaking the deadlock. The back-channel contacts, involving Mr. R. K. Mishra, a New Delhi-based journalist, and Mr. Niaz Naik, former Pakistan Foreign Secretary, which had begun before the Lahore bus journey continued even after the two sides were locked in a bitter armed conflict in Kargil. The new regime in Pakistan is not averse to the revival of this process. This much is evident from Mr. Niaz Naik being allowed to maintain contacts with the Indian side - in New Delhi and, on the occasion of seminars, in Kathmandu and Colombo - and his statement that he had kept Gen. Musharraf posted with his efforts even before the dismissal of the Sharif Government. However, Mr. Niaz Naik's recent visit to New Delhi produced heat and dust rather than substantive contacts. However, the track-II exercises have of late picked up, thanks to the exchange of visits by women's delegations, poets and persons connected with friendship organisations.

At the political level, there has been no interaction while official contacts are mostly confined to the summoning of the High Commissioners by the host Governments for tough messages. For more than six months after the coup, India's High Commissioner in Pakistan, Mr. G. Parthasarthy, did not get an opportunity to see anyone of consequence in the Government. Recently he was called for talks with the Foreign Secretary to be conveyed the Pakistani stand on the dialogue, with a one-sided account of the meeting finding its way into the local press. Gen. Musharraf later repeated the ``offer of talks at any place, any time, at any level''. This, according to New Delhi, was a propaganda ploy, in the absence of evidence of deeds matching his words. Let New Delhi call his bluff - with a specific suggestion for talks, in the first instance, to ensure the sanctity of the LoC.

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Section  : Opinion
Previous : The Expenditure Reforms Commission
Next     : Probity in public life