Time for a ceasefire

EVEN IF THE fall of Jaffna may not be imminent, it is time for the Sri Lankan Government to come to terms with ground realities. Because of the numbers and the recently-enhanced air power, the Government troops have put up a stiff resistance to a determined Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the past fortnight. If the LTTE decides to damage the runway at the Palali air base and the port at Kankesanthurai, the soldiers could be trapped. It seems unlikely that the Tamil Tigers will give up till they wrest Jaffna from the Sri Lankan Government's control. But the fall of Jaffna will do no good to Colombo, New Delhi or even the Sri Lankan Tamils in the peninsula. The fast-paced developments this week and the frequent meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Security in New Delhi tell their own tale on what lies ahead in Sri Lanka. The disappointment and frustration of the island's President, Ms. Chandrika Kumaratunga, in her interview to this newspaper is understandable. She must realise that without a professional armed force, a thinking leadership and motivated soldiers, it is difficult to prosecute a war for two decades on the run. The continuing desertions in the ranks and frequent changes at the top confirm this malaise.

The best way out of the present imbroglio is to work for a ceasefire. Apparently, the Norwegian initiative to facilitate a return to the peace process has not made much of a headway. Colombo is now thinking of a multilateral diplomatic effort, including India, to restart negotiations between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE. For that to happen, a cessation of hostilities is a pre-condition. The question remains, will the LTTE return to the negotiating table without taking control of Jaffna? And if it does, as the President argues, it will establish de facto, if not de jure, a separate state''. What will they talk about after that? Given its track record, can the LTTE be relied upon to take such negotiations seriously and work for a political solution to the ethnic issue within the constitutional framework and the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka? That is something that the multilateral facilitation group must ponder over. From the LTTE's viewpoint, unilateral declaration of independence will be meaningless as the international community has set its face against the demand for Eelam. The Tamil community has to set its sights on a federal union, guaranteeing the rights of the minorities.

It now appears inevitable for India to get involved once more in Sri Lanka's ethnic tangle. But the Centre is right in ruling out any military intervention, though Ms. Kumaratunga is obviously disappointed at this stance. Her hope that India has the influence with the LTTE to bring it to the negotiating table may be misplaced. But if the U.N., the U.S. and the European Union throw their weight behind this multilateral initiative and exert pressure on the LTTE, which functions out of many European cities and Canada among others, it may at least begin talks about talks. The starting point right now will be a ceasefire. Obviously, Colombo will find it more acceptable if it takes effect before the fall of Jaffna. One formula could be to freeze the present military positions for a cessation of hostilities and begin talks so that an interim package can be evolved to pull out the troops and put in place a civil administration for the north. If the LTTE insists on taking Jaffna first, it may be a loss of face for Colombo. This insistence on speaking from a position of strength can only hamper negotiations, if and when they take place. At least to end the suffering of the Sri Lankan Tamils, the proposed multilateral diplomatic initiative must succeed.

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