One year after Kargil

By K. K. Katyal

THE DAMAGE done to Indo-Pakistan relations by Islamabad's misadventure in Kargil remains acute despite the passage of one year. New Delhi continues to feel a deep sense of betrayal and is not in a mood to resume the dialogue in the absence of tangible steps by Pakistan to stop sponsoring terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir. It is a moot point whether the first anniversary of the Kargil conflict would have seen a thaw in tension, had the democratic Government not been dismissed in Pakistan; but the army rule, it is clear, is regarded unpropitious. The prospects of an early end to the current stalemate are, thus, dim. The scope for creative diplomacy is virtually non-existent, but whether track-II interaction has a role is to be seen.

By sheer coincidence, a comprehensive situation report has emerged from the recent discussions of a senior U.S. functionary, Mr. Thomas Pickering, in New Delhi and Islamabad. His visit had not been planned to coincide with the Kargil anniversary - the New Delhi part of it was among the series of contacts, envisaged in the vision statement signed during the visit of the U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton - but it became an occasion for an assessment of India-Pakistan relations. In New Delhi, Mr. Pickering's talks were held in a positive spirit, with the Indian side happy at the sympathy shown for its concerns and its cynicism about the Pakistani mood. In Islamabad, it was in the nature of a follow-up to the tough message conveyed by Mr. Clinton to the Pakistani military ruler.

The New Delhi discussions covered, as was intended, a vast area - bilateral relations, regional developments, Asian security, China, Sri Lanka, a brief reference to nuclear issues, but India- Pakistan stalemate was taken up at length. In Pakistan, that was the only other issue, apart from the domestic situation and non- proliferation matters. The talks in New Delhi were significant on two counts - one, because of the detailed enunciation of India's stand and, two, the U.S. response to it. The Indian side, it appears, elaborated the known rationale of its decision not to restart the dialogue unless a ``proper climate'' was created - in other words, the ground situation in Jammu and Kashmir confirmed the end of trans-border terrorism. As of now, it was pointed out, terrorist activities and the infiltration of armed bands from Pakistan continued unabated, there being no evidence of any official pressure against the jehadi outfits in Pakistan, contrary to that Government's claims. Also conveyed was the trepidation of the Indian side in dealing with the military dictatorship in Pakistan which, it was pointed out on the strength of experience, had been responsible for starting armed conflicts. New Delhi wondered who wielded the real power in Islamabad - the Chief Executive, General Pervez Musharraf, or the corps commanders or General Aziz, a key architect of the coup, who was later moved to a relatively low-visibility position.

The U.S. side was stated to have shown full understanding of India's hesitations. It found no evidence of the first tangible move by Pakistan which, as was made known by Mr. Clinton during his talks here, was necessary for a positive Indian response and for giving a push to the dialogue process. On the other hand, the first step, it was noted, had been taken by India - in ordering the release of the Hurriyat leaders in Jammu and Kashmir, with the intention of engaging them in talks (as part of the political process to resolve the Kashmir imbroglio). The Americans were believed to have concurred with the Indian view that some of the signals from Pakistan - such as Gen. Musharraf's concession to Islamic fundamentalists in restoring the rigidities of the anti- blasphemy law - were disturbing. On Afghanistan-related matters, too, the U.S. seemed to accept the Indian assessment as against that of Pakistan, obviously because there had been no concrete indication of Islamabad's pressure on the regime in Kabul nor any headway in the efforts to bring to book Osama bin Laden.

These issues, as borne out by reports from Islamabad, were taken up by Mr. Pickering with Pakistani interlocutors. On terrorism, they did considerable explaining - and this, naturally, became a core issue as the discussion turned to India-Pakistan problems and to the dialogue issue. The official account glossed over this matter - ``The Chief Executive emphasised the centrality of the Kashmir issue to peace and security in South Asia. The U.S. should prevail upon India to agree to Pakistan's sincere offer of a dialogue to resolve all outstanding problems, particularly the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan was similarly committed to restoration of durable peace in Afghanistan through reconciliation among Afghan parties.'' Not unexpectedly, it did not tell the full story.

New Delhi feels vindicated because of Washington's understanding of India's position. With the U.S. pressing Pakistan to take the ``first tangible step,'' the Indian side may be spared immediate pressure (from the U.S. or the rest of the world community) on the dialogue issue. New Delhi would do well to make use of this respite to address the domestic side of the Kashmir problem. The release of the Hurriyat men is, no doubt, the right step but it does not mean much in the absence of related moves. The situation is highly complicated, what with the Hurriyat men speaking in different voices (their single label covers a conglomeration of hardliners and not-so-hardliners). The BJP may have put on the hold its demand for the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution in order to accommodate its partners in the National Democratic Alliance, but will it be inclined to take an initiative to put together an autonomy package for Jammu and Kashmir, so very essential for the resolution of the problem in the internal context? Also, there could be no guarantee that the Chief Minister, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, would not act as a spoiler.

The prospects for resumption of the dialogue with Pakistan remain dim, but there can be no escape from it in the ultimate analysis. At some stage, the two neighbours will have to talk - to engage each other. How long it will take is hard to say. However, it would be a mistake to believe that the two countries are heading towards confrontation, the description of the region as ``the most dangerous place in the world'' notwithstanding. It is a suspended no-dialogue situation (neither engagement nor confrontation). Is India working for the isolation of Pakistan's military regime? That is the belief of some in the ruling establishment in Islamabad - they draw this conclusion from India's moves at the Commonwealth summit, at the NAM Ministerial conference and its role in getting the SAARC summit postponed. But Islamabad, they maintain, has foiled these attempts.

That is not the non-official view in Pakistan. Now that the military regime's honeymoon with the people is over, senior leaders representing the political spectrum blame the Government for the country's isolation and for the failure to resolve the pressing economic problem. The daily Dawn quotes a veteran politician, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, who last week presided over an all-party conference (on the current situation), as having disputed Gen. Musharraf's claim that Pakistan did not face isolation - ``countries like the U.S., France, Germany and the U.K. were supportive of India wanting to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. The Turkish Prime Minister said, during his recent visit to New Delhi, that Turkey and India faced similar problems of terrorism. What does it mean? Nothing except that Pakistan stood isolated in the comity of nations.''

The mounting difficulties, signs of unrest and open articulation of criticism is certain to have a bearing on Pakistan's approach to India. The military regime may stop taking even the cosmetic steps for the sake of improving the prospects for contacts or making a show of fulfilling conditions, considered essential by the world community for the resumption of the dialogue. Some such trend is already discernible in the General's latest statements. It only means that the stage for a serious, substantive bid for reconciliation is getting pushed farther and farther away.

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